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JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff/Appellant Lynn B. Astill originally filed 
this appeal with the Supreme Court of Utah according to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2 (1996). This matter was assigned to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
excluding Astill's expert witnesses from testifying about Clark's 
speed for the first time in rebuttal when Astill withheld their 
testimony until after the defense had rested even though the 
speed of Clark's vehicle was an issue since the very beginning of 
this litigation. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion at 
trial by enforcing its pre-trial exclusion order barring all 
witnesses from the courtroom during the testimony of other 
witnesses. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
ruling that Astill could not have her employer/chiropractor 
present at the independent medical examination conducted by a 
neurologist or that Astill could not videotape the examination. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
Astill is appealing a jury verdict awarding Plaintiff 
no damages after Clark's vehicle impacted Astill's vehicle when 
Clark's foot slipped off her brake pedal as she was adjusting her 
child's seatbelt while stopped at an intersection. (R. at 636-
1 
41.) Astill complains of the trial court's ruling that she 
should have presented her evidence in chief before rebuttal, the 
trial court's enforcement of its pre-trial exclusion order, and 
the trial court's refusal to allow her employer/chiropractor to 
observe an independent medical examination conducted by a 
neurologist. 
B. Course Of The Proceedings. 
Trial in this matter was held in the Third District 
Court on February 6, 1996 through February 8, 1996. (R. at 143-
46.) The jury returned a special verdict finding Clark 
negligent, but not a proximate cause of the injuries alleged by 
Astill. (Id.) Judgment was entered on March 5, 1996. (Id. ) 
On March 15, 1996, Astill moved for a new trial. (R. 
at 149-50.) The trial court heard oral arguments on Plaintiff's 
Motion for a New Trial on May 31, 1996 and took the matter under 
advisement. (R. at 278.) On July 26, 1996, Judge Brian filed a 
detailed written Court Ruling denying Astill's motion for a new 
trial. (R. at 279-84.) Astill filed a Notice of Appeal in this 
matter on September 23, 1996. (R. at 288-89.) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Astill's claim stems from a rear-end automobile 
collision between the parties on or about June 6, 1994. (R. at 
1-4, 9-11, 242, 279, 636-41.) Neither Clark nor her three-year-
old son were injured in the collision. (R. at 637.) No accident 
report was filed because the damage was reported to be under 
2 
$400.00. (R. at 638-40, 684. ) x Clark's rented Taurus sustained 
a small dent in the front license plate, possibly from hitting 
the ball on the Explorer's trailer hitch. (R. at 638-39, 699-
03.) 
2. On May 24, 1995, approximately nine months before 
trial, Clark testified during her deposition that she was 
travelling at a low speed when she collided with Astill. (R. at 
242, 647.) Clark testified that as she reached to adjust her 
three-year-old's seatbelt while stopped, her foot slipped of the 
brake and her Ford Taurus bumped into the rear of Astill's Ford 
Explorer. (R. at 636, 685, 694.) 
3. The Taurus was not available for inspection during 
discovery because the rental vehicle was no longer in Clark's 
possession. The Explorer was available for inspection, but it 
had been involved in another accident with speeds between 3 5 and 
40 miles an hour. (R. at 684, 702.) 
4. The Court held a Scheduling Conference on 
September 14, 1995 at which time the Court ordered Astill to 
identify her witnesses by November 15, 1996. A Court Order was 
entered thereafter which so stated. (R. at 242.) 
5. On October 16, 1995, Clark moved under Rule 3 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to compel an independent 
medical examination by a neurologist, Dr. Nord, without the 
1
 To avoid confusion, please note that the court reporter 
inserted 75 pages of a "partial transcript" into the middle of the 
Jury Trial Volume III. Thus, when you reach the bottom of record 
page 650, you should then refer to record pages 674 to 751 before 
continuing to record page 651. 
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presence of Astill's chiropractor and employer, Dr. Wright. (R. 
at 3 0-41.) Astill objected to the motion to compel and moved to 
have Dr. Wright attend the examination, or in the alternative, to 
have the examination videotaped. (R. at 44-48.) The trial court 
granted Clark's motion to compel an examination without the 
presence of Astill's chiropractor/employer, but allowed Astill to 
be accompanied at the examination by a neurologist of her 
choosing. (R. at 50-51.) 
6. On November 15, 1996, Astill identified her 
witnesses, including: 
West Valley Auto Body 
a. Plaintiff's husband took her vehicle to this 
shop for a damage estimate. 
b. Plaintiff's counsel will provide the name of 
this mechanic as soon as possible. 
(R. at 242.) 
7. On January 2, 1996, over a month before trial, 
Clark formally identified Newell Knight as an expert witness in 
Defendant's Designation of Expert Witnesses. (R. at 242, 279, 
732.) 
8. Sometime thereafter, Astill submitted a letter to 
Clark's counsel wherein she supplemented her witness list to 
include David Lord. (R. at 57-59, 279.) 
9. Astill failed to take Knight's deposition or to 
seek any other discovery regarding Knight's testimony. (R. at 
279, 732.) 
10. At the pre-trial conference, the trial court 
entered an exclusion order barring all witnesses from the 
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courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses. (R. at 280.) 
At no time prior to trial did either party request their experts 
be present in the courtroom during the direct-examination of the 
opposing expert. (R. at 280.) 
11. On February 6, 1996, during opening statements at 
trial, Astill's counsel represented to the jury the accident 
involved a substantial impact estimated at 10 to 25 miles per 
hour. (R. at 281, 733.) Astill's counsel also made an issue of 
speed during his direct-examination of Astill. (R. at 281.) 
12. During Clark's opening statement, her counsel told 
the jury a very low-speed impact occurred after Clark's foot 
slipped off the brake while she was stopped behind Astill at a 
red light. (R. at 243, 281, 733, 741.) 
13. Astill testified at trial that Clark was 
travelling 10 to 15 miles per hour at the time of collision. (R. 
at 279.) Astill rested her case without having called any 
accident reconstructionist or other expert witness. (R. at 633.) 
14. Although they were available to testify, Astill's 
counsel decided to not call any expert witnesses to establish the 
speed of the collision during Astill's case in chief, and instead 
chose to reserve all expert testimony for rebuttal. (R. at 279.) 
15. When the defense called Knight to testify, 
Astill's counsel requested that Lord be allowed in the courtroom 
to analyze Knight's testimony and advise counsel on how to 
conduct cross-examination. (R. at 280, 675.) The trial court 
held Astill's request was in violation of its pre-trial exclusion 
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order, but allowed a recess between direct-examination and cross-
examination in which time Astill consulted with Lord on how to 
conduct cross-examination. (R. at 280-81, 675, 709.) 
16. Knight testified at trial that Clark's speed at 
the time of collision was three to four miles per hour. (R. at 
243, 694, 703, 710.) Knight based his conclusions on the 
photographs of the vehicle's bumpers, the lack of movement of 
Astill's vehicle, the absence of any skid marks and the absence 
of any injury to Clark resulting from the collision. (R. at 
243 . ) 
17. After his consultation with Lord, Astill's counsel 
conducted a "lengthy and well-directed" cross-examination of 
Knight. (R. at 281, 710-30.) He questioned Knight with respect 
to the deformation of the bumper brackets and the "return-to-its-
shape" propensity of a Taurus bumper. (R. at 722-23, 725-27.) 
He also tried to impeach Knight's testimony by handing Knight an 
impact-absorbing Taurus brace, which he later introduced into 
evidence. (R. at 718-19.) 
18. Sometime before the defense rested its case, one 
of Clark's counsel, John E. Hansen, moved for the Court to 
exclude Astill from calling her expert witnesses for the first 
time in rebuttal. (R. at 731.) 
19. Before granting Hansen's motion in limine, the 
trial court asked Astill's counsel to explain why Astill's expert 
witnesses were not called in her case in chief. (R. at 731-32.) 
Astill's counsel explained that he was waiting to call his 
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experts until Clark had "carried [her] burden of proof by showing 
[she has] a serious challenge to [Astill's] version of the 
facts." (R. at 732.) 
20. The trial court stated that the accident's impact, 
speed and resulting injury were elements of Astill's case in 
chief. (R. at 736-38.) The trial court informed Astill's 
counsel of the following: 
[Y]ou have the burden of proof, and in your 
case in chief you are well advised to prove 
what you intend to prove. In this particular 
case, the Court understood that you were 
going to prove that this accident was caused 
by a 10- to a 15-mile-an-hour impact or 15-
to 25-mile-an-hour impact, and, because of 
that, the plaintiff sustained injury. You 
need to prove that. 
(R. at 740-41.) 
21. Astill's counsel readily admitted he knew before 
trial that Clark was going to challenge Astill's account of the 
speed of the accident, and assumed that Knight, "was going to put 
in [sic] the speed around three to four miles an hour." (R. at 
243, 279-81, 733, 740-42.) He stated his assumption was 
confirmed when he heard Clark's opening statement. (R. at 243, 
281, 733, 741.) 
22. The trial court granted Clark's motion in limine 
because Astill "knew or reasonably should have known and 
anticipated that the defense was going to challenge the testimony 
of the plaintiff" based on the following: (i) photographs of both 
vehicles; (ii) the back bumper of Astill's vehicle; (iii) the 
absence of skid marks; (iv) the absence of any significant 
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movement of Astill's vehicle after being struck by Clark; and (v) 
the lack of any injury to Clark. (R. at 748-49.) 
23. With respect to the motion in limine, the trial 
court made the following findings: 
1. The speed of Defendant's vehicle has been 
an issue since the beginning of this 
litigation and Plaintiff could have and 
should have reasonably anticipated 
Defendant's evidence before trial and could 
have and should have called her expert 
witness in her case in chief to meet 
Plaintiff's prima facia burden. 
2. Plaintiff's expert witnesses should be 
and are excluded from testifying in rebuttal 
because Plaintiff improperly withheld them 
until after the defense rested. 
(R. at 244, 748.) 
24. After taking exception to the trial court's 
ruling, Astill's counsel stated, "we have no rebuttal." (R. at 
750.) 
25. The jury returned a special verdict finding Clark 
negligent, but not a proximate cause of Clark's damages. (R. at 
103-04.) Judgment was entered on March 5, 1996. (R. at 143-46.) 
26. Astill moved for a new trial based on the trial 
court's exclusion of his expert witness from the courtroom during 
Knight's testimony, the exclusion of his expert witnesses' 
testimony in rebuttal, defects in voir dire, and the trial 
court's failure to provide the jury with a present value table. 
(R. at 149-74.) 
27. After both parties fully briefed the issues, the 
trial court took the matter under advisement. (R. at 151-239, 
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260-78.) On July 26, 1996, the trial court entered a six-page 
court ruling denying Astill's motion for a new trial. (R. at 
279-84.) 
28. The trial court found that "speed was an issue 
from the outset" and that Clark was unfairly prejudiced by Astill 
"saving such testimony as the last word and not giving the 
Defense an opportunity to address it in their case in chief." 
(R. at 282.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Having stopped at an intersection, Clark reached to 
adjust her son's seatbelt and accidently bumped the rear of the 
car in front of her. A small dent in the license plate of 
Clark's rented Taurus was the only noticeable damage. During the 
ensuing litigation, Astill and her counsel made a series of 
tactical decisions which yielded certain consequences at trial. 
Astill's strategic decisions included the following: 
(i) the decision to not depose Clark's accident reconstructionist 
before trial; (ii) the decision to not retain a neurologist of 
Astill's choosing to attend her independent medical examination; 
(iii) the decision to not request permission at the pre-trial 
conference for her expert witness to be in the courtroom during 
Knight's testimony; (iv) the choice to not prepare in advance for 
the cross-examination of Knight; and, most importantly, (v) the 
decision to attempt to present key expert testimony for the first 
time during rebuttal. 
The trial court exercised appropriate discretion in 
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not allowing Astill to present her case in chief in rebuttal. 
Astill's counsel readily admitted that he was aware Clark would 
present evidence that her low-speed collision could not have 
possibly caused the damages claimed by Astill. Clark had said so 
in her deposition, and her counsel openly stated her position 
during his opening statement. (R. at 733.) Astill's counsel even 
alleged that he anticipated the exact content of Knight's 
testimony. (R. at 243, 279-81, 733, 740-42.) 
Having chosen to wait until after the defense rested to 
present both of her expert witnesses, Astill ran the risk the 
evidence would be excluded altogether. Had the trial court 
allowed Astill to present her evidence in such an unusual order, 
Clark would have been deprived the opportunity to address 
Astill's key evidence during her case in chief. Such "trial by 
ambush" should not be permitted. 
While Astill claims on appeal she was harmed by the 
court's exclusion of Lord during Knight's testimony, she is 
actually only stating the consequence of the decisions to not 
depose Knight, to not prepare for cross-examination before trial, 
and to not request advance permission for Lord's attendance in 
light of the trial court's exclusion order. 
Having chosen not to retain her own neurologist to 
attend the IME, Astill alleges on appeal that she was harmed by 
the "adequacy of the examination." She argues the "direct 
confrontation of the credibility" between Dr. Nord, a 
neurologist, and Dr. Wright, a chiropractor, could have been 
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avoided if the examination had been monitored. Astill now 
proposes the "unobtrusive" approach of videotaping a party's 
medical examination. Clark respectfully submits that Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 35 provides adequate guidance on this issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE IN CHIEF WHICH ASTILL IMPROPERLY SAVED FOR 
REBUTTAL« 
The trial court exercised its sound discretion in 
excluding Astill's rebuttal witnesses after concluding that the 
evidence should have been offered during Astill's case in chief. 
See Duncan v. Western Refrigeration Co., 354 P.2d 572, 573 (Utah 
1960) ("[T]he trial court has considerable latitude in admitting or 
excluding such [rebuttal] evidence, which properly should have been 
introduced in the case in chief.") . The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by excluding counsel from calling case-in-chief 
expert witnesses for the first time in rebuttal. 
A. Astill Should Have Presented Her Expert Witnesses 
During Her Case In Chief. 
As the party with the burden of proof, Astill was bound 
to present all of her evidence during her "case in chief, before 
the close of the proof, and may not add to it by the device of 
rebuttal." 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 373 at 572 (1991) . See Soliz v. 
Ammerman, 395 P. 2d 25, 26 (Utah 1964) (" [U] sually the party who has 
the affirmative burden of proof is required to produce the first 
evidence on an issue, and at that time should produce all his 
evidence in chief.") . Rebuttal is not intended to give a party an 
opportunity to present evidence that was proper for the case in 
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chief. 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 374 at 573 (1991) . By withholding 
key evidence from their case in chief, a plaintiff can deprive the 
defense the opportunity to address the evidence during its case. 
Id. at 573. (R. at 282.) 
The trial court has discretion to exclude even "relevant 
rebuttal evidence, which might properly have been introduced in the 
case in chief." 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 373 at 573. (R. at 282.) 
The trial court appropriately excluded Astill from putting on her 
prima facia case in rebuttal. See Sirotiak v. H.C. Price Co., 758 
P.2d 1271, 1277-78 (Alaska 1988) (" [T]he plaintiff may not ignore 
known defense theories or close his or her eyes to evidence that 
directly counters plaintiff's prima facia case."). 
After Clark rested her case, the trial court asked 
Astill's counsel to explain the reasons why Astill had not called 
her expert witnesses during her case in chief. (R. at 731-32.) 
Astill's counsel responded that "[i]t is a matter of the shift of 
the burden of proof," and spoke of Clark's responsibility of 
carrying its "burden of proof." (R. at 731-32.) Astill's 
assertion, however, is a false statement under Utah law. See Ames 
v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993) (noting that the 
Supreme Court of Utah recognizes a plaintiff's burden of proof with 
respect to negligence and proximate cause). Astill bore the 
ultimate burden of production and persuasion and is required to 
establish prima facia elements, including causation, during her 
case in chief. See Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 462 
(Utah App. 1991). 
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Astill's counsel readily admitted that although he failed 
to depose Knight, he had nonetheless anticipated the exact content 
of his testimony. (R. at 733.) The trial court stated the 
following with respect to Astill's trial tactics: 
If you knew that [speed] was going to be an 
issue in this case, then it is your 
responsibility to present that in your case in 
chief, not present half your case at the 
beginning, and the other half at the 
conclusion of the defense case. 
(R. at 735.) The trial court further noted that Astill failed to 
comply with the time-honored principle of the orderly presentation 
of the evidence: 
[T]he Court is of the opinion that you simply 
cannot sandwich the defense with testimony 
that you have known and anticipated right from 
the beginning, and hope to maybe get the last 
word in. 
(R. at 282, 741.) See 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 356 at 560 (1991) 
("[A]dherence to the appropriate trial procedure and order of 
presenting evidence cannot be perceived as error."). 
B. Evidence Of Causation Should Be Presented In 
Plaintiff's Case In Chief To Establish A Prima 
Facia Case of Negligence. 
Astill's counsel has argued on appeal that the "exact 
impact speed was not a necessary factor of her case in chief." 
(Brief of Appellant at 19.) However, the record reveals that 
Clark's negligence was never an issue in this case (R. at 652) ; she 
admitted in her deposition that her foot slipped off the brake and 
she drifted into Astill's vehicle. (R. at 647, 685, 694.) The 
real issue at trial was whether Clark's bumping fenders with Astill 
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created forces sufficient to cause Astill's alleged injuries; 
proximate cause was the controlling issue. (R. at 279.) 
Astill's counsel chose not to depose Clark's expert 
witness, Knight, because he knew "he was going to put in [sic] the 
speed around three to four miles an hour." (R. at 733.) Astill's 
counsel also stated at trial that his assumption "was confirmed 
when [he] heard the opening statement." (R. at 733.) Fully 
realizing that Clark would challenge the issue of causation, Astill 
had an affirmative duty to present her entire case, including her 
evidence on causation, in her case in chief. Sirotiak, 758 P. 2d at 
1277-78. See Brief of Appellant at 15, 19 (stating the general 
rule that a plaintiff should introduce all of her vital evidence in 
chief) . 
C. The Trial Court's Exclusion Of Astill's Rebuttal 
Witnesses Was A Case Management Decision Within The 
Trial Court's Discretion. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the cases 
assigned to their courts. Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. 
Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992). See Duncan, 354 P.2d at 
573. In this case, the trial court's exclusion of Astill's 
rebuttal witnesses was not an evidentiary decision governed by the 
traditional rules of evidence, but rather was a case management 
decision under the rules of civil procedure. Berrett, 354 P.2d at 
295-96. The trial court stated: 
It defies reason that any of [Knight's] 
testimony would come as a surprise to the 
Plaintiff. It was known or reasonably could 
have been known. It was anticipated. It was 
not a surprise. And it is a requirement that 
the burden of proof be met showing that the 
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accident, as it was alleged by the Plaintiff, 
occurred from a high-speed collision, that is 
10 or 15 or 20 miles an hour, that substantial 
damage would have been caused, and that 
resulting injury could have occurred. 
And the trial court finds that it is not 
appropriate, when those matters are part of 
the Plaintiff's case in chief, and do not come 
as a surprise in any way to the Plaintiff, 
that it is inappropriate to sandwich the 
Defendant's case with the Plaintiff's case on 
matters that could and should have been 
presented in the case in chief. 
(R. at 748-49.) The trial court acted within its sound discretion 
in determining that Astill's rebuttal witnesses should be excluded 
because Astill "knew or should have reasonably anticipated" Clark 
claimed her vehicle was travelling only four miles an hour. See 
Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994). See Wells v. C M . 
Mavs Lumber Co., Inc., 754 P.2d 888, 889 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987). 
Thus, the trial court did not bar Astill's rebuttal 
evidence based on its content; rather, it exercised its discretion 
in preventing Astill from strategically withholding key evidence in 
a failed attempt to have the "last word," after Clark's expert had 
already testified. (R. at 282.) The paramount issue on appeal is 
whether the trial court erred in excluding Astill's experts from 
testifying for the first time in rebuttal after having concluded 
that Astill should have called them in her case in chief. 
D. Astill Has Not Shown Any Prejudicial Harm Or That A 
Different Verdict Would Have Resulted. 
Astill has failed to establish the trial court's rulings 
constituted either an abuse of discretion preventing a fair trial, 
or an error in law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a). The trial court 
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acted within its sound discretion and determined that Astill's 
evidence was not appropriate for rebuttal. (R. at 281-82.) The 
trial court found that Astill unfairly prejudiced Clark by saving 
her key evidence for rebuttal. (R. at 282.) It is an elementary 
notion that a plaintiff must sustain her burden of proof for 
negligence and proximate cause during her case in chief. 
Even if this Court were to determine the trial court 
erred, Astill has failed to show that any error was "substantial 
and prejudicial." See Utah R. Civ. P. 61; Ashton v. Ashton, 733 
P. 2d 147 (Utah 1987) . A new trial is appropriate only where there 
is "substantial doubt" that the issues were fairly tried. Page v. 
Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391 P.2d 290 (Utah 1964). 
Astill had a full opportunity to meet her prima facia 
burdens in her case in chief, and has failed to show that a 
different verdict would have resulted absent the decision to 
withhold evidence on causation. Hall v. Blackman, 417 P. 2d 664 
(Utah 1966). (See R. at 281.) 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that every 
reasonable presumption in favor of the validity of a verdict must 
be taken as true on appeal. Leigh Furn. & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 
P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). See Sirotiak, 758 P.2d at 1279 
("Nevertheless, we may affirm a judgment on any ground supported by 
the record even if it was not relied on by the trial court."). 
Astill called no rebuttal witnesses. After the defense 
rested, the jury was dismissed and the parties debated defense 
counsel's motion in limine regarding the expert witnesses. After 
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the trial court directed defense counsel to prepare "very specific 
findings" on the motion in limine to clarify the record, Astill's 
counsel stated the following: 
If the record may show my exception to the 
ruling of the Court, with the -- we have no 
rebuttal. 
(R. at 749.) Astill's counsel's decision to rest at this stage of 
the trial is significant for two reasons: he could have recalled 
Plaintiff to testify as to speed; or he could have petitioned for 
an extraordinary writ. Instead, Astill took her chances with the 
jury. See Berrett, 830 P.2d at 299 ("Plaintiffs did not petition 
for any extraordinary writ and chose instead to take their chances 
and proceed to trial."). 
E. Astill Has Failed To Marshall The Evidence. 
Astill has failed to marshall the evidence in his Brief 
in support of the verdict as is required by appellate courts in 
Utah. By failing to marshall the evidence, Astill has made it very 
difficult for the Court to determine whether a different result 
would have occurred had the rebuttal experts been permitted to 
testify. See Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & 
Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 1994) ("We have shown 
no reluctance to affirm when the appellant fails adequately to 
marshall the evidence."). 
"In order to properly discharge the duty of marshalling 
the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." 
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West Vallev City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App. 1991) (emphasis in original). Additionally, Astill's Brief is 
fraught with factual statements not supported with citations to the 
record. See Steel v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 
960, 962 (Utah App. 1993). 
POINT II; THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT WITNESSES 
DURING OTHER WITNESSES' TESTIMONY IS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION. 
Despite Astill's claims of error, the trial court was 
fully within its discretion in excluding all witnesses from the 
courtroom. See Duncan, 354 P.2d at 573; Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-4 
(1996); Utah R. Evid. 615. Having permitted a lengthy recess to 
allow Astill's counsel to prepare for cross-examination with Lord, 
the trial court found the "outcome of the trial would not have been 
altered by Mr. Lord's admission into the courtroom during Mr. 
Knight's testimony." (R. at 281. See. R. at 280, 675, 709.) 
Astill cites State v. Stevens, 797 P,2d 1133 (Utah App. 1990),2 to 
support her contention that the trial court erred by not allowing 
Lord to assist counsel with cross-examination. Stevens does not 
support Astill's contention that experts are allowed in the 
courtroom to "evaluate and modify the testimony of an opposing 
expert," (Brief of Appellant at 22.) 
2
 To avoid confusion, please note that State v. Jones, 
cited by Appellant on page 22 of her Brief, is actually entitled 
State v. Stevens, 797 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1990). 
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A. Astill's Cited Authority Does Not Support Her 
Position The Trial Court Erred in Excluding Expert 
Witness From The Courtroom. 
In Stevens, the Court of Appeals of Utah found the trial 
court "did not abuse its discretion" in failing to exclude all 
witnesses from the courtroom. Stevens, 797 P. 2d at 1139. Stevens 
involved a neglect petition filed by the state seeking to terminate 
a father's parental rights. During the trial, the court allowed 
state Social Services personnel and three expert witnesses to 
remain in the courtroom during the other witnesses' testimony. 
The court stated that "even if error occurred under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 315 in allowing these witnesses to remain in the 
courtroom, [the father]'s claim of unfair prejudice is wholly 
speculative in this case. Therefore, any error occurring in this 
respect was harmless." Id. at 1139. Astill attempts to use 
Stevens in reverse to support her contention that the trial court 
"committed error in not allowing Plaintiff's designated expert to 
sit beside, and assist, Plaintiff's counsel during testimony of 
Defendant's key accident reconstruction expert." (Brief of 
Appellant at 21-22.) 
In addition to not supporting Astill's position, Stevens 
specifically leaves open the possibility that the juvenile court 
erred in allowing expert witnesses to remain in the courtroom to 
hear the others' testimony. Stevens, 797 P.2d at 1138-39. 
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Astill concedes in her Brief3 that the exclusion of 
experts during the testimony of other witnesses "does not 
necessarily constitute error." (Brief of Appellant at 22.) See 75 
Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 244 at 466 (1991). Although an expert's 
opinions may be based on evidence presented at trial under certain 
circumstances, Astill cites no authority for the proposition that 
a court errs as a matter of law by excluding an expert from the 
courtroom. The rules of evidence cited by Astill show that the 
exclusion of witnesses is within a trial court's discretion. See 
Utah R. Evid. 615 Sc 703. 
Each authority cited by Astill actually supports Clark's 
position that the trial court merely exercised its discretion in 
excluding all witnesses from the courtroom. Moreover, Astill fails 
to cite any reference to the record where counsel argued at trial 
that rebuttal witness Long's presence "was essential to the 
presentation of its cause" under Rule of Evidence 615(1)(c). See 
Stevens, 797 P. 2d at 1139. Without such support in the record, 
Astill has no basis to appeal the trial court's exclusion of her 
witnesses. 
B. Any Harm To Astill From The Exclusion Could Have 
Been Avoided If Astill's Counsel Had Taken Knight's 
Deposition Before Trial. 
By his own admission, Astill's counsel strategically 
chose to not depose or otherwise obtain any discovery from Clark's 
expert witness, Knight. (R. at 733.) On appeal, Astill argues 
3
 To avoid confusion, please note that although Astill 
cites American Jurisprudence 2d, Volume 75, Trial, Section 62 on 
page 22 of her Brief, she was actually quoting Section 244. 
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that she was harmed by the exclusion of her expert during Knight's 
cross-examination because her counsel: (i) did not know there was 
only one bumper-support system in a Taurus; and (ii) did not know 
to ask Knight whether he had personally inspected the bumpers and 
the underside of damaged Taurus vehicles. (Brief of Appellant at 
23-24.) However, before Astill's counsel cross-examined Knight, he 
was allowed a recess to consult with Long about Knight's testimony 
on direct examination. (R. at 280, 709.) 
Any harm not cured by the court's recess could have been 
prevented if Astill's counsel had chosen to deposed Knight before 
trial. Rather than preparing in advance for Knight's testimony, 
Astill's counsel chose instead the strategy of a "spur-of-the-
moment" cross-examination, apparently hoping to be assisted by a 
witness he knew had been excluded from the courtroom in a pre-trial 
ruling. 
As was the case with his choice to withhold key evidence 
for rebuttal, Astill's counsel's strategic decision to not depose 
Knight "backfired" at trial. Having lost at trial, Astill now 
claims the trial court abused its discretion or erred by 
frustrating his trial strategy. 
C. Astill's Contention The Trial Court Barred An 
Effective Cross-Examination Is Not Supported By 
Utah Case Law. 
Astill cites Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 
801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990), to support her claim that by excluding 
Lord from the courtroom, the trial court barred her from conducting 
an effective cross-examination of Knight. (Brief of Appellant at 
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22-23.) However, Whitehead has no relevance to the issues in this 
case and does not even involve counsel attempting to have an expert 
assist in cross-examination. Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 924-925. 
In Whitehead, the "defendants were repeatedly cut off 
during attempts to cross-examine plaintiffs' experts. The numerous 
objections of plaintiffs' counsel, many of which were improperly 
sustained, prevented defendants from probing the basis of opinions 
given by plaintiffs' experts on comparisons they had made in their 
direct examination." The Supreme Court of Utah held that "the 
trial court erred in limiting defendants' cross-examination of 
plaintiffs' expert witnesses." Id. at 925. 
Whitehead is easily distinguished from the case at hand 
where Plaintiff did not even call expert witnesses in her case in 
chief. Astill does not claim that she was limited in cross-
examination because the trial court sustained too many objections, 
or would not allow her to explore the basis of the experts opinions 
or to probe comparisons made on direct. Rather, Astill claims she 
was limited in cross-examination because having not deposed Knight, 
her counsel was not prepared and she was denied the opportunity of 
having her expert assist him with cross-examination. 
Astill also cites Whitehead for the proposition that the 
cumulative effect of several errors may undermine a jury verdict. 
(Brief of Appellant at 34-35.) A careful reading of Whitehead 
reveals that the court's primary concern was whether defendants 
were able to "present to the jury their theory of the case." 
Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 928. Astill does not dispute that she had 
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every opportunity to present her theory of the case in her case in 
chief, her dispute is that the trial court prevented her from 
presenting her theory of the case in rebuttal. 
Although Whitehead may not support Astill's positions, it 
supports Clark's position that "the proper scope of cross-
examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court and 
should not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse." Id. at 923-24. 
POINT III; ASTILL HAS NOT PRESENTED ANY RECORD WITH WHICH THE 
COURT MAY REVIEW THE TRIAL COURTS EMPANELING OF THE JURY, 
Since Astill has admittedly failed to provide the Court 
with any record on the empaneling of the jury, Astill has no issue 
to appeal. In this instance, Astill claims "no record was made of 
the questions and responses so that Plaintiff was denied a record 
as to whether any of those jurors should have been excused for 
cause." (Brief of Appellant at 25.) 
The appellate rules provide "if no report of the evidence 
or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made . . . the appellant 
may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the 
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall 
be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose 
amendments within 10 days after service." Utah R. App. P. 11(g). 
The appellate rules further provide the statement be provided to 
the trial court to be included in the record on appeal. 
Under Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Astill has the responsibility to include in the record a transcript 
of all evidence relevant to the appeal. See Jesche v. Willis, 793 
P. 2d 428, 428 (Utah App. 1990) . Moreover, Astill cannot raise 
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issues regarding voir dire for the first time on appeal. Broberg 
v. Hess. 782 P.2d 198, 198 (Utah App. 1989). 
Since Astill has failed to follow the appellate procedure 
outlined in Rule 11, this Court should presume the trial court 
acted properly. See Interiors Contracting, 881 P.2d at 933; Lake 
Philgas Serv. v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 959 (Utah 
App. 1993) . 
POINT IV: ASTILL HAS NO ISSUE TO APPEAL WITH RESPECT TO A PRESENT 
VALUE DETERMINATION, 
Astill has provided no issue for the Court with respect 
to a determination of the present value damages for lost wages and 
future medical expense. The record indicates that the jury awarded 
Astill no damages for lost wages and future medical expenses. (R. 
at 144.) Even if the jury had awarded Astill future special 
damages, and failed to reduce those damages to their present value, 
Astill would have benefitted therefrom. 
If a party is concerned about "jury guesswork" with 
respect to the present value of future damages, the party can 
simply call a witness at trial to explain to the jury the process 
by which one dollar would be reduced to its present cash value. 22 
Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 974 at 1012 (1988) . See 22 Am. Jur. 2d 
Damages § 907 at 930 (1988) . Such a practice has been followed in 
Utah for many years. Jurisdictions are split whether the trial 
court is required to give specific instructions of formulas to the 
jury for reducing future earnings to their present worth. 22 Am. 
Jur. 2d Damages § 998 at 1042 (1988). 
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Astill was not harmed by failing to provide a witness to 
instruct the jury on the present value process. 
POINT V: ASTILL'S REQUEST FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS IS WITHOUT ANY 
BASIS. 
One of Clark's counsel, John Hansen, moved for Astill's 
rebuttal witnesses to be excluded because Clark's evidence could 
have been "reasonably anticipated" before trial, and therefore 
should have been presented in Astill's case in chief. Attorney 
Hansen presented a good faith argument to the trial court that 
Astill's rebuttal witnesses should be excluded under the authority 
of Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994). 
Hansen drew the trial court's attention to the striking 
similarities in Turner because the plaintiff failed to depose the 
defendant's expert witness before trial, and later attempted to 
call rebuttal witnesses concerning issues that should have been 
presented in the case in chief. Such analogy is applicable to the 
argument that Astill's rebuttal evidence should be excluded for 
failure to anticipate Clark's evidence. Had Astill's counsel 
deposed Knight, he could have prepared for his case in chief and 
prepared for cross-examination with his experts before trial. 
Astill argued at trial that Turner was inapplicable 
because Astill's witnesses were not "surprise" witnesses. (See R. 
at 734-37.) The trial court determined that it would not allow 
Astill to "lay back in the bushes" in an attempt to have the "last 
word." (See R. at 739, 742.) 
Astill has further charged Hansen is guilty of misconduct 
for making a "deliberate misstatement of law" and is therefore 
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subject to Rule 11 sanctions. Hansen made a good faith argument 
that the 1994 Turner decision created a new standard for rebuttal 
witnesses in Utah. 
The comments to Rule 3.3, Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, explain the relevant standard for ethical conduct: 
[A] n assertion supporting to be on the 
lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by 
the lawyer or in a statement in open court, 
may properly be made only when the lawyer 
knows the assertion is true or believes it to 
be true on the basis of reasonably diligent 
inquiry. 
(Emphasis added.) Sanctions are not appropriate because Hansen 
believed his statement to be true. 
Furthermore, Rule 11 sanctions are only appropriate 
for signed documents submitted to the trial court in violation of 
the rule. Jesche v. Willis, 811 P. 2d 202 (Utah App. 1991) . As was 
the case when Astill's counsel's made his request for sanctions 
against Hansen to the trial court and to the Supreme Court of Utah, 
Astill's counsel's current request is frivolous and does not merit 
further response. (R. at 165-72.) 
POINT VI; THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN REQUIRING ASTILL TO 
SUBMIT TO AN INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATION BY A NEUROLOGIST 
WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF ASTILL#S CHIROPRACTOR/EMPLOYER OR A VIDEO 
RECORDING DEVICE. 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling Was Not an Abuse of 
Discretion. 
In appeals addressing medical examinations the Utah 
courts have adhered to an "abuse of discretion" standard of review. 
See, e.g. , Stone v. Stone, 431 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1967); State v. 
Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Utah App. 1990). As described in 
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detail below, the weight of legal and policy considerations in this 
case validate the trial judge's order. Dr. Wright is not qualified 
to evaluate Dr. Nord's examination because he represents a 
different medical specialty than Dr. Nord. Videotaping of 
examinations is not affirmatively authorized by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and poses a substantial threat to examinees' 
privacy. Taken together, these arguments demonstrate that the 
trial judge's order was well within his sound discretion. 
B. Astill's Chiropractor Represents a Different Area 
of Medical Expertise and Is Not an Impartial 
Observer. 
The trial court was correct in not allowing Dr. Wright to 
attend Dr. Nord's examination of appellant. Because Dr. Wright's 
chiropractic training differs substantially from Dr. Nord's 
education as a neurologist, Dr. Wright is not qualified to evaluate 
Dr. Nord's examination techniques. In medical malpractice cases, 
the Utah courts have expressed strong opposition to such testimony 
by physicians from different areas of expertise; the same principle 
should apply to medical examinations in personal injury cases, as 
well. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 822 (Utah App. 
1988) (" [W]e think it is sound policy to limit expert testimony in 
medical malpractice cases to that which is in the doctor's specific 
field of practice"). 
Equally important, the trial court's order did not 
prevent Astill from challenging Dr. Nord's medical conclusions. 
Astill's counsel received Dr. Nord's detailed written report, and 
cross-examined Dr. Nord before the jury regarding his 
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qualifications, medical conclusions, and previous activities and 
compensation as a defense witness. In addition, the trial court 
permitted Astill to have a neurologist of her choosing attend the 
examination as a monitor, although she failed to exercise this 
option.4 
Finally, Dr. Wright is Astill's employer, and has treated 
her in the past; he may have an interest in criticizing or 
otherwise affecting Dr. Nord's evaluation. In any event, Dr. 
Wright's presence would place Dr. Nord in the uncomfortable 
position of examining Astill while being watched by someone who has 
already reached a diagnosis. The trial judge's order helped to 
prevent Astill from thrusting "the adversary process itself into 
the physician's examining room." Wood v. Chicago, M. , S.P. & P.R. 
Co., 353 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
C. Videotaping of Physical Examinations Should Not Be 
Allowed Because Utah Rules Expressly Provide for 
Written Reporting of Physical Examinations and 
Because of Substantial Privacy Concerns. 
Utah courts have not addressed the issue of a plaintiff's 
right to videotape independent medical examinations. But Rule 35 
provides for a written report of such examinations: "If requested 
. . ., the party causing the examination to be made shall deliver 
to the person examined . . . a detailed written report of the 
4
 For these reasons, Astill's reliance on Justice Ellett's 
dissent in Stone v. Stone, 431 P.2d 802 (Utah 1967), is misplaced. 
In that case, Justice Ellett claimed the majority's holding 
(denying a mental evaluation) prevented the court from hearing "all 
of the evidence which a judge would require to make a proper 
decision." Id. at 808. Because Astill could cross-examine Dr. 
Nord and choose a neurologist to attend the examination, the trial 
court's order did not deprive the court of any relevant evidence. 
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examiner." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35(b) (1) . Although Rule 
35(a) does allow the court to "specify the time, place, manner, 
conditions, and scope of the examination," the California courts 
interpreted a nearly identical statute to bar videotaping in 
examinations. 
In Edmiston v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1978) , 
the court considered the California statute on medical 
examinations, which included "time, place, and manner" language 
identical to Rule 35(a) of Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
court found that this provision "deals with conducting a medical 
examination -- not the reporting thereof." Id. at 592. The court 
then declined to allow videotaping of medical examinations, stating 
that "Videotaping is not affirmatively authorized in this case and, 
. . whether it should be 'is a matter for the Legislature to 
determine.'"5 Id. at 593 (quoting Bailey v. Superior Court, 568 
P.2d 394, 399 (Cal. 1977)). Although the California legislature 
revised the statute in the 1980's, the California courts have 
remained resolute in their opposition to videotaping medical 
5
 It is incorrect to assert that Edmiston allows videotaping 
"if the subject shows that the video taping is necessary to protect 
the subject an [sic] to assure the integrity of the physician's 
report." (Brief of Appellant at 32) . As described above, Edmiston 
flatly bars videotaping of independent medical examinations in the 
absence of legislative authorization. Moreover, analogizing the 
present case to State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336 (Utah App. 1990), is 
inappropriate. In Braun, the court denied an examination of a 
young sex abuse victim, instead allowing the defendant to critique 
a videotape of the exam. But an important difference distinguishes 
Braun from the present case: the Braun court had not allowed the 
defendant to have a monitor at the examination, while here the 
trial court permitted Astill to be accompanied by a neurologist. 
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examinations. See Ramirez v. MacAdam, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911, 912 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
Substantial policy considerations weigh in favor of the 
California approach. Medical examinations often involve intensely 
personal and private procedures. Videotaping would require 
strangers to be present in the examination room and to watch these 
procedures during filming. Examinees then face a second, more 
public, humiliation if these recordings are shown in the courtroom. 
Taking these factors into account, permitting videotaping of 
medical examinations poses a substantial threat to examinees' 
privacy and would have a "chilling effect" on both the plaintiff 
and the examining physician. 
CONCLUSION 
Having chosen an unsuccessful trial strategy in this 
matter, Clark now petitions this Court for a reversal of the jury's 
verdict. The trial court ruled within its sound discretion in each 
of the issues raised in this appeal. For the foregoing reasons, 
this Court should sustain the jury's verdict. 
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Judge: r J U D G E pAT BRIAN 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF and alleges as follows: 
1. At approximately 7:30 A.M., June 6, 1994, Plaintiff was 
the driver of a Ford Explorer being driven East on 4100 South, West 
Valley City, Utah. Plaintiff was stopped at a red light when she 
was rear ended by Defendant, who was driving a Ford Taurus. 
2. Prior to being rear ended, Plaintiff glanced in her rear 
view mirror and saw Defendant. Plaintiff thought Defendant would 
stop. 
3. Immediately after impact, Plaintiff felt pain in her 
lower back, due to the strong impact. Plaintiff also hit her head 
o ft o ft o 1 
on the head rest behind her. 
4. Defendant was driving a rental car. She did not have 
Rental Car Insurance. 
5. Defendant's insurance is Atlanta Casualty Companies, P.O. 
Box 105435, Atlanta, Georgia, 30348-5435. 
6. The sole proximate cause of the collision was the 
Defendant's failure to maintain control of her vehicle, to keep 
proper lookout, and driving into Plaintiff's vehicle stopped at a 
red light. 
7. As a direct proximate result of the collision, Plaintiff 
has suffered injuries, including injury to her head and lower back, 
causing her past and future pain, suffering, partial disability, 
medical expense, impairment of wage and earning capacity, and other 
expenses incident to her injuries, all of which will continue in 
the future and may be permanent. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as follows: 
1. Finding Defendant, Leesha Clark, liable to Plaintiff. 
2. Awarding Plaintiff judgment against Defendant Leesha 
Clark, for such general and special damages as are justified by the 
evidence, her costs, interest on special damages from date of 
accident, and such other relief as the Court deems proper• 
DATED THIS J^fgr day of AJlAfftf 1995. 
A WW 
David J. Frfiel 
Attorney f6r Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM "B 
JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4590 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN B. ASTILL, : ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 950902307PI 
LEESHA CLARK, : Judge Pat Brian 
Defendant. : 
Defendant, by and through her above-named counsel, hereby 
answers the Complaint of Plaintiff as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant admits, denies and alleges with respect to each 
of the numbered paragraphs of Plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
1. Defendant admits the allegations contained in 
paragraph number 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
C:\JEH\CLIENTS\CURK.ANS 
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2. Defendant is without sufficient information to admit 
or deny the allegations contained in paragraph number 2 and for 
this reason denies the same. 
3. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraph number 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
4. Defendant admits the allegations contained in 
paragraphs numbers 4 and 5 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
5. Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraphs numbers 6 and 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
As a further and separate and affirmative defense, 
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has failed to reasonably mitigate 
her damages, if any. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiff's 
Complaint not heretofore admitted or denied. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiff takes nothing 
by way of her Complaint. 
C:\JEH\CLIEMTS\CLARK.ANS 2 
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JURY DEMAND 
Defendant hereby demands a jury trial and submits to the 
Court the statutory jury fee. 
DATED this >> ^  day of April, 1995. 
St READING 
EdwardiHansen 
orney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the J^ day of April, 1995, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND JURY 
DEMAND to the following: 
Samuel King, Esq. 
David J. Friel, Esq. 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
C:\JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK.ANS 3 
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ADDENDUM "C 
c.-OCT !••> ' 
PAULS. FELT (A1055) +v-^ .rjC .'V.-'A^ V^ VV 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER*'' $ All V&Tj '" " *'' 
Attorneys for Defendantw ,^)^\Ju>^! 
79 South Main Street ° TilVuT^  c-: 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO 
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL 
EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN 
CHIROPRACTOR PRESENT 
Civil No. 9509023DPI 
25t>1 
Judge Pat Brian 
ooOoo 
Defendant Leesha Clark, by and through counsel, moves 
the Court pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 35(a) and 
7(b) for an Order compelling plaintiff Lynn Astill to submit to a 
physical examination conducted by Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord, M.D., at 
the agreed date, time, and location of October 31, 1995, at 2:30 
p.m., at Dr. Nord's office at 370 East South Temple in Salt Lake 
City. Defendants move that the examination be conducted without 
the presence of plaintiff's chiropractor and employer, Dr. G. 
Richard Wright, D.C. This motion is made on the basis that the 
physical condition of the plaintiff is in controversy, and the 
plaintiff insists on having Dr. Wright attend her physical 
o cor-o 
examination by Dr. Nord# which is not agreeable to the defendant. 
Attached hereto and incorporated herein is a memorandum of points 
and authorities in support of this motion. 
DATED this 7 
_J2_ 
day of October, 1995. 
RAY, Q#INNEtf $ NEBEKER 
147073/edb 
2-
0 C C C 3 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL 
EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN CHIROPRACTOR PRESENT was hand 
delivered on this day of October, 1995 to the following: 
Samuel King 
David J. Friel 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
260 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM "D 
PAUL S. FELT (A1055) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 





MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE 
MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO 
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL 
EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN 
CHIROPRACTOR PRESENT 
Civil No. 9509023TTPI 
Judge Pat Brian 
ooOoo 
Defendant Leesha Clark, by and through counsel, submits 
this memorandum of points and authorities in support of her 
motion pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 35(a) and 7(b) 
to compel the plaintiff to submit to an independent physical 
examination by Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord, M.D., without her own 
chiropractor and employer, Dr. G. Richard Wright, D.C., present. 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff, Lynn Astill, complains of injuries she 
allegedly suffered as a result of an automobile accident with the 
defendant. Compl. \\ 6-7. Her physical condition is in 
controversy. Counsel for the defendant scheduled an independent 
o h \j M «> * 
medical,examination of the plaintiff by Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord, 
M.D., on October 31, 1995 at 2:30 p.m. and notified plaintiff's 
counsel of the same. The plaintiffs have not objected to the 
time, place, or defendant's choice of physician to conduct the 
examination. 
However, in a letter dated September 21, 1995, 
plaintiff's counsel said they intend to have plaintiff's 
chiropractor (and employer), Dr. G. Richard Wright, attend Dr. 
Nord's examination of the plaintiff.1 Defendant's counsel 
responded by letter dated October 3, 1995, that this was 
unacceptable. Nevertheless, plaintiff's counsel continues to 
insist that Dr. Wright attend the independent medical exam of the 
plaintiff by Dr. Nord. The defendant brings this motion seeking 
to compel the plaintiff to submit to the physical examination 
without her own medical representative and possible witness at 
trial, Dr. Wright, present. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 35(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that a court may order a party to submit to a physical 
*Dr. Wright's practice is located at the Midvalley Clinic in 
Salt Lake City, 4758 South 1950 West, where the plaintiff is 
employed as a receptionist/assistant. Pi's. Ans. to Def's. First 
Set of Interrog. 11 1, 6. Medical records provided by the 
plaintiff show that she has received numerous chiropractic 
treatments at the Midvalley Clinic from Dr. Wright and also from 
Dr. Keith S. Hansen. She claims $4,450 in past medical expenses 
incurred to the Midvalley Clinic. Pi's. Ans. to Def's. First Set 
of Interrog. 1 2. 
-2-
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examination when the physical condition of the party is in 
controversy and good cause is shown. Good cause is presumed in 
personal injury actions, see Schlagenhauf v. Holder. 379 U.S. 
104, 119 (1964) (applying the corresponding federal rule), and 
plaintiff has not objected to the need for an independent 
examination in this case. To defendant's knowledge, the only 
dispute is whether the plaintiff may have her chiropractor and 
employer, Dr. Wright, present during Dr. Nord's examination. 
Rule 35 is silent on the issue, essentially leaving to 
the trial court's discretion the details of the medical 
examination. See State ex rel. Hess v. Henry. 393 S.E.2d 666, 
669, (W. Va. 1990) (applying comparable state rule); 8A C. 
Wright, A. Miller & R. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 
2234, at 476 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing comparable federal rule). 
While Utah courts have not addressed the issue directly, others 
persuasively reason that a party subject to a Rule 35 medical 
examination must show good cause or exceptional circumstances 
before a medical representative or attorney of that party will be 
permitted in the examination room. See, e.g.. State ex rel. 
Hess. 393 S.E.2d at 669; Wood v. Chicago. M.. S.P. & P.R. Co.. 
353 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Mertz v. Bradford. 543 
N.Y.S.2d 786 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).2 
2Some other courts, admittedly, have suggested that a party 
subject to a Rule 35 medical exam may ordinarily have his or her 
own physician present during the examination. See, e.g.. Warrick 
-3-
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The plaintiff cannot establish good cause for having 
her chiropractor attend Dr. Nord's examination. See State ex 
rel. Hess. 393 S.E.2d at 669 (good cause exists only if "the 
truth-finding function of the examination may be threatened 
absent the requested presence"). Under the circumstances in the 
present case, the truth-finding function of Dr. Nord's 
independent medical examination would be threatened far more by 
the presence of Dr. Wright than by his absence. It is commonly 
understood that the presence of a medical representative of the 
examined party can potentially disrupt a Rule 35 medical 
examination, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra. § 2236, at 
497, by "shift[ing] the forum of controversy from the courtroom 
to the physician's examination room." Wood. 353 N.W.2d at 197. 
That concern is particularly acute here. 
Dr. Wright would not be an independent observer. As 
the plaintiff's employer and someone who has provided numerous 
treatments to the plaintiff in past months for conditions that 
allegedly persist, Dr. Wright may have both personal and 
professional interests in criticizing, directing, or otherwise 
affecting Dr, Nord's evaluation. Even if Dr. Wright were to 
remain completely silent, his mere presence in the examination 
v. Brode. 46 F.R.D. 427 (D. Del. 1969). See generally Annot., 
Right of Party to Have Attorney or Physician Present During 
Physical or Mental Examination at Instance of Opposing Party. 84 
A.L.R.4th 558 (1991 & Supp.). 
-4-
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room would place Dr. Nord in the awkward situation of seeking to 
determine the plaintiff's physical condition in the presence of 
someone who has already formed an opinion of her physical 
condition. Such awkwardness could inhibit either Dr. Nord or the 
plaintiff and prevent Dr. Nord from accomplishing a complete, 
objective evaluation of the plaintiff's physical condition. That 
would defeat the truth-finding purpose of an independent medical 
evaluation as contemplated by Rule 35. 
Furthermore, Dr. Wright is a chiropractor, not a 
medical doctor. Dr. Wright's training and expertise differ 
substantially from Dr. Nord's. Consequently, any advice or 
assistance that Dr. Wright might provide may be unhelpful or 
unfamiliar to Dr. Nord, and thus heighten the disruption of the 
examination. Even if Dr. Wright simply observed without 
interrupting, he may be asked at trial to critique Dr. Nord's 
examination if it yields conclusions contrary to his, and Dr. 
Wright is not qualified to critique Dr. Nord's examination in 
light of the differences in their respective training and 
practice areas. 
It has been observed that n[t]he most competent and 
honorable physicians in the community would predictably be the 
most sensitive to such intrusions." Wood. 353 N.W.2d at 197. 
Dr. Nord is a competent and honorable physician. He has examined 
the plaintiff on a previous occasion in relation to a previous 
-5-
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automobile accident, and he prepared an extensive, objective, 
written report of his findings and conclusions from that previous 
examination. While Dr. Nord's reaction to the prospect of Dr. 
Wright observing his examination could not be obtained as of the 
filing of this motion, in the event counsel for the defendant 
learns that Dr. Nord has objections to or concerns about such 
circumstances, counsel will take his testimony by affidavit and 
submit it to the Court to supplement this memorandum, and a copy 
will be served on plaintiff's counsel. Defendant's counsel is 
proceeding in this expedited fashion in light of the approaching 
date of Dr. Nord's scheduled examination of the plaintiff. 
Finally, the plaintiff's interest in fairly litigating 
the issue of her physical condition is adequately protected 
without Dr. Wright attending the examination. The plaintiff may 
obtain a copy of Dr. Nord's detailed written report, Utah R. Civ. 
P. 35(b), take Dr. Nord's deposition, cross-examine Dr. Nord at 
trial if he testifies, and object to any inadmissible evidence at 
trial; she may also have Dr. Wright or any other medical 
representative of her choosing testify at trial to relate his or 
her own observations of the plaintiff's physical condition. See 
State ex rel. Hess, 393 S.E.2d at 669; Wood. 353 N.W.2d at 197. 
This is an adversary proceeding. The defendant, as 
well as the plaintiff, has a right to fairly investigate and 
litigate the plaintiff's physical condition, which is in 
-6-
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controversy. The defendant's investigation could be disrupted by 
the presence of the plaintiff's chiropractor and employer, Dr. 
Wright, in Dr. Nord's examination room. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed herein, the defendant 
respectfully requests that this Court grant her motion to compel 
a physical examination of the plaintiff without the plaintiff's 
chiropractor being present. 
DATED this / > day of October, 1995. 
RAY, QUJNNEY & NEBEKER 
-7-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO 
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN CHIROPRACTOR 
PRESENT was mailed, postage prepaid, on this day of 
October, 1995 to the following: 
Samuel King 
David J. Friel 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84106 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
260 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
147073/edb 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO 
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN CHIROPRACTOR 
PRESENT was hand delivered on this of October, 1995 to 
the following: 
Samuel King 
David J, Friel 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
260 East 300 South, Suite 200 





SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
DAVID J FRIEL, No. 6225 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-3751 
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN B. ASTILL, 
Plaintiff, 
) REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 




Case No. 950902307 PI 
Judge: Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiff, Lynn B. Astill, by and through counsel, submits 
this Rely in response to Defendant's Motion to Compel and 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of the Motion to compel Plaintiff 
to submit to a Physical Examination Without Her Own Chiropractor 
Present. 
ISSUE 
IN A PERSONAL INJURY CASE, DOES THE INJURED PERSON HAVE THE 
RIGHT TO A THIRD PERSON MONITORING THE INDEPENDENT MEDICAL 
EVALUATION PERFORMED BY A DOCTOR RETAINED BY THE DEFENDANT'S 
INSURED? 
Plaintiff states that the answer is Yes! 
000044 
Plaintiff's basis is that each party has rights. These rights 
are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they can be exercised 
in harmony. 
The right of the Defendant is to have an independent physician 
assess the Plaintiff's injury. 
The claimant's right is to have the examination monitored. 
As the I ME doctor does not enter into a doctor/patient 
relationship, he does not have a basis to claim confidentiality. 
Claimant's need is to be sure that the IME is genuinely 
objective, and not slanted against the claimant. Such "slanting" 
occurs frequently in IME's. 
That is a fact of life. 
Performing numerous IME's can yield substantial income for 
the doctor who gets large numbers of referrals to perform. His 
economic interest is served by conservative reports. If he saves 
the insurer money, he gets more referrals. If he doesn't save the 
insurer money, he doesn't get referrals. 
Too frequently, as the Court knows, there are trials within 
trials dealing with the objectivity, impartiality, and accuracy of 
the IME doctor's report. 
The presence of a monitor for the claimant should reduce the 
frequency of these trial within trials. This serves justice and 
makes the trial quicker, more focused, and less expensive, all to 
the benefit of the proper function of the judicial system. 
2 
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FACTS 
Plaintiff accepts Defendant's introduction as so stated. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff agrees that Rule 35(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure control the issue at hand. Plaintiff does not dispute 
the fact that the Defendant is entitled to an independent medical 
examination of the Plaintiff by a physician of Defendant's choice. 
Defendant correctly asserts that Rule 35 and the Utah courts 
have remained silent on these issues, essentially leaving the 
determination to the trial court's discretion. 
Defendant also admits in her memorandum that, "some other 
courts, admittedly, have suggested that a party subject to a Rule 
35 medical exam may ordinarily have his or her own physician 
present during the examination. (Defendant's Memorandum at page 3, 
note 2.) 
The latest case dealing directly on point with this issue 
states that, "Plaintiff, at her expense, may have her personal 
physician in attendance during the physical examination . . . w 
Bennett v. White Laboratories, Inc., 841 F.Supp. 1155 (M.D.Fla. 
1993) . 
The Eighth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals has also adopted 
this rationale by stating that, "the manner and conditions of a 
court ordered medical examination, as well as the designation of 
the person or persons to conduct such an examination are vested in 
the sound discretion of the trial court. Although the examined 
party will usually be permitted to have his or her own physician 
3 
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present." Sanden v. Mavo Clinic, 495 F.2d 221 (1974), This is 
further enumerated in Moore's Federal Practice at: 4A J. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice, Section 35.04, at 35-24, 35-25 n.ll, and 
at Section 35-29 n.12, it states that, "the cases suggest that 
usually the court will permit the examined party to have his 
personal physician present." See Sanden v. Mavo Clinic, 495 F.2d 
221 (8th Cir. 1974); Dziwanoski v. Ocean Carriers Corp., 26 F.R.D. 
595 (D.Md. 1960); Klein v. Yellow Cab Co.. 7 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 
1945) . 
These cases do not mention the "good cause" or "exceptional 
circumstance" exceptions pointed out by the Defendant. Defendant 
has cited no cases wherein the courts have absolutely stated that 
a person does not have a right to have their attending physician or 
a third party present during the IME. 
Plaintiff represents to the Court that her attending physician 
could remain silent, thereby not causing an disruption of 
Defendant's doctor. Further, Plaintiff represents that both Dr. 
Wright and Dr. Nord are experienced professionals. It is highly 
unlikely that this would be an awkward situation for either 
doctors. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed in her burden to prove that a patient's 
attending physician cannot attend the IME. Clearly, Plaintiff has 
shown that it is imperative that a patient has the right and 
ability to demand that their physician attend their examination. 
4 
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DATED O c t o b e r rf , 1995 iz_. 
lAMtt. -
DavidJ Fri/eT 
Attorney for Plaint iff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was faxed on this the Q.H day of October, 1995, to the 
following parties: 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
Fax No. 531-7968 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Fax No. 532-7543 
Dl:Astill.rep 
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ADDENDUM "F 
PAUL S. FELT (A1055) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
John Edward Hansen (A4590) 
SCALLEY & READING 
260 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-7870 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 3 1995 
~" Deputy Oer* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO 
SUBMIT TO A PHYSICAL 
EXAMINATION WITHOUT HER OWN 
CHIROPRACTOR PRESENT 
Civil NO. 950902307PI 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
ooOoo 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Submit to a 
Physical Examination Without Her Own Chiropractor Present was 
heard on Monday, October 30, 1995 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. before 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian with Samuel King and David Friel 
appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, Paul S. Felt of Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker and Wesley D. Hutchins of Scalley & Reading 
appearing on behalf of defendant. The court having reviewed the 
memoranda of counsel and good cause here appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Submit to 
a Physical Examination Without Her Own Chiropractor Present is 
granted and plaintiff is compelled to submit to a physical 
examination by Dr. Nathaniel Nord without having any chiropractor 
or family member present. No video taping of the procedure will 
be allowed. 
2. Plaintiff may have a neurologist of her choosing 
present at her independent medical examination. If plaintiff 
chooses to do so, she must notify defendant's counsel no later 
them 10:00 o'clock a.m. on October 31, 1995. 
_^ __ 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
J O'CLOCK a.m. on occooer 31, l s s a . 
DATED t h i s
 7/jL day of A/<Wy^dsA^ 
a^l / Patf B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
f. 
-<£ Samuel King 
David Friel 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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PAUL S. FELT (A1055)yh -„-
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKERA . " 
79 South Main Streefey ~A ( 
P.O. Box 45385 ~^T~H 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
John Edward Hansen (A4590) 
SCALLEY & READING 
260 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-7870 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DEFENDANT'S WITNESS LIST 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LYNN B. ASTILL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LEESHA CLARK, : Civil No. 950902307PI 
Defendant. : Judge Pat B. Brian 
ooOoo 
Defendant Leesha Clark, by and through her attorneys, 
hereby designates the following witnesses she may call at the 
trial. 
1. Leesha Clark. Ms. Clark will testify about facts of 
the accident and other matters discussed in her deposition. 
2. Dr. Nathaniel Nord. Dr. Nord will testify about 
plaintiff's injuries and medical condition as reflected in his two 
independent medical examination reports. 
c ••» \j ' 
3. Newell Knight. Mr. Knight is an accident 
reconstruction expert. He will testify about the two motor vehicle 
accidents in which plaintiff was involved and will contrast and 
compare them, the resulting forces and injuries. 
4. All plaintiff's medical care providers not called by 
plaintiff. 
DATED this /<~- day of January, 1996. 
RAY, QULtfNEY y& NEBEKER 
F^HrsTF^t 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Defendant's Witness List was mailed, postage prepaid, on 
this^^y^f day of January, 1996 to the following: 
Samuel King 
David J. Friel 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
260 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
157391 01/psf 
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rnird Judicial District 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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Civil No. 950902307PI 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
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MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a 
preponderance of the evidence* If you find the evidence 
preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer " Y e s . " If 
you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot 
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that 
the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer 
" N o . " Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence*. 
1. Was the defendant, Leesha Clark, negligent as 
alleged by plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
2. Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of 
the injuries or aggravation of prior injuries or conditions 
sustained by the plaintiff? 
01. G 1 0 3 
ANSWER: Yes No 
3. If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 *AYes,'' 
state the amount of special and general damages, if any, 
sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries 
complained of. If such questions were not answered ^Yes,'' do 
not answer this question. 
Special Damages: 
A. Past Special Damages 
B. Future special Damages 
General Damages: 
TOTAL 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 







CASE NUMBER 950902307 PI 
DATE 02/08/96 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG 
COURT CLERK BHA 
TYPE OF HEARING: JURY TRIAL 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. KING, SAMUEL 
D. ATTY. HANSEN, JOHN E 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT FOR THE THIRD DAY OF JURY 
TRIAL. THE PLAINTIFF IS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL, SAMUEL KING AND 
DAVID FRIEL. THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL, PAUL FELT 
AND JOHN HANSEN. THE JURY IS PRESENT IN THE JURY BOX. LYNN 
ASTILL IS RECALLED AND TESTIFIES. THE PLAINTIFF RESTS (11:35 AM) 
TESTIFYING FOR DEFENDANT ARE LEESHA CLARK AND NEWELL 
KNIGHT. IKE DEFENSE RESTS (3:45 PM) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DENY 
REBUTTAL WITNESSES IS GRANTED. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT IS DENIED. 
THE COURT GIVES JURY INSTRUCTIONS. BOTH COUNSEL PRESENT 
THEIR CLOSING ARGUMENTS. THE JURY RETIRES FOR DELIBERATION AT 
6:00 PM. BOTH COUNSEL STATE EXCEPTIONS TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON 
THE RECORD. THE JURY RETURNS WITH A VERDICT AT 7:25 AM. THE 
JURY FINDS DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT, BUT DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE 
WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES OR 
CONDITION. NO DAMAGES AWARDED. 
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ADDENDUM "J 
PAUL S. FELT (A1055) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LYNN B. ASTILL, : 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
v. 
LEESHA CLARK, : Civil No. 950902307PI 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant. : 
ooOoo 
This action came on regularly for trial on Tuesday, 
February 6, 1996, in Salt Lake City, Utah, before the Honorable Pat 
B. Brian, Third District Judge, sitting with a jury. Plaintiff 
Lynn B. Astill, appeared by her attorneys, Samuel King and David 
Friel of King, Friel & Colton; and Defendant Leesha Clark, appeared 
by her attorneys, Paul S. Felt of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and John 
E. Hansen of Scalley & Reading. 
After hearing the evidence, the instructions of the 
Court, and listening to the arguments of counsel, the jury retired 
to consider a Special Verdict and subsequently returned the Special 
Verdict as follows: 
FILED DISTRSCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR ^ 5 1996 
B y -
deputy Cterk 
1. Was the defendant, Leesha Clark, negligent as 
alleged by plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
2. Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of 
the injuries or aggravation of prior injuries or conditions 
sustained by the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
3. If you have answered Questions 1 and 2 "Yes11, 
state the amount of special and general damages, if any, sustained 
by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained 
of. If such questions were not answered "Yes", do not answer this 
question. 
Special Damages: 
A. Past Special Damages $ 
B. Future Special Damages $ 
General Damages: $ 
TOTAL $ 
DATED this 8th day of February, 1996. 
Richard Roethel 
Foreperson 
The Court having reviewed the Special Verdict and having 
found it to be in the proper form, pursuant to the instructions 
given to the jury by the Court, it is hereby: 
2 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Complaint against 
Defendant Leesha Clark is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon 
the merits, no cause of action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendant is awarded her costs in this matter. 
DATED this p day of Yw4&ry, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Pat B. 
District Court Judge l 
3 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Samuel King 
David J. Friel 
KING, FRIEL & COLTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ADDENDUM "K 
\l~~) 
SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
DAVID J. FRIEL, No. 6225 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-3751 
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil NO. 950902307PI 
Judge: Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiff moves for new trial and other relief, pursuant to 
the reasons stated in her supporting Memorandum. 
DATED THIS J& day of March, 1996. 
Samuel King 
QC»U» 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document on. March 2l__, 1996, to: 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
260 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
S14:AstiU.not 
•zr 
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ADDENDUM "L 
SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
DAVID J. FRIEL, No. 6225 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-3751 
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL AND OTHER RELIEF 
Civil No. 950902307PI 
Judge: Pat B. Brian 
AUTHORITY 
This motion is made pursuant to Rule 59(a) (1), (3), (4), (6) 
and (7) and Rule 60(b) (1), (2), (3), and (7) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
BASIS OF MOTION 
The essence of this motion is a fair trial, nothing more, but 
certainly nothing less. 
The court is concerned with fair play, and if convinced that 
Defendant used vital testimony and tactics that were so wrong and 
clearly prejudicial as to deny Plaintiff an even playing field on 
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the determinative issue of fact, Plaintiff believes the court will 
see to it that Plaintiff receives a fair retrial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant rear-ended Plaintiff. 
2. Accordingly, the negligence issue between them was 
trivial. Plaintiff was not negligent and Defendant was. The jury 
so found. 
3. THE KEY FACTUAL ISSUE WAS WHETHER DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE 
WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
4. The issue of proximate cause boiled down to whether 
Defendant's vehicle struck Plaintiff's at sufficient speed to cause 
injury. 
5. PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE: Plaintiff testified that it was a 
hard impact, Defendant traveling at least 15 miles per hour when 
she struck Plaintiff. Plaintiff's evidence was that over $400.00 
damage was done to her rear bumper, primarily that the heavy metal 
bumper support brackets were both bent at least an inch and had to 
be replaced. Plaintiff drove a Ford Explorer. 
6. Plaintiff had substantial medical testimony supporting 
her claim of injury, from Plaintiff herself, her husband, a former 
co-worker and her employer, Dr. Richard Wright, who had treated her 
for an injury two years prior. Dr. Wright had noted her 
2 
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substantial convalescence and then her sharply worsened condition 
immediately following the subject accident. 
Thus Plaintiff carried her burden of proof in her case in 
chief - Defendant's negligence, proximately causing damage to her 
vehicle and injury to herself. 
7. Defendant's Evidence: Defendant's testimony was in sharp 
conflict. She said she had come to a full stop and rolled forward. 
While she was distracted and caring for her child she struck 
Plaintiff so lightly that it was in her words, "just a bump," and 
"just a noise." Her front bumper showed no visible damage. She 
drove a Ford Taurus. 
8. On this conflict of evidence, Plaintiff had the edge as 
both her car was damaged and her injury was verified by several 
people. Something caused this harm and Defendant was the only 
known source. 
9. Expert Testimony: The only "expert" testimony was from 
Defendant. Newell Knight, Defendant's expert, testified that he 
was an expert in automobile collision reconstruction. His 
testimony was on two points - (1) speed and (2) injury. As to 
speed, he swore Defendant's vehicle, i.e. a Ford Taurus, would have 
shown damage, permanent deformation, to the front bumper if the 
impact speed had been over 2 or 3 miles per hour, at most five 
3 
0 C G 1 o 3 
miles per hour. As there was no such damage, Mr. Knight concluded 
that the impact speed was less than that. 
10. As to injury, Mr. Knight testified that at a 2 - 3 mile 
per hour impact speed, Plaintiff would have suffered no force on 
her body stronger than sitting down hard in an upholstered chair, 
and would not be injured. 
11. The effect of his testimony was that Plaintiff was less 
than candid in her claims of speed, damage, and injuries. He 
effectively destroyed her credibility. If his testimony were 
accepted, Plaintiff had to be lying as the impact speed was too low 
to cause the results she claimed. 
12. The jury also could reasonably believe that Plaintiff had 
been fairly caught in such exaggerations because she called no 
expert to rebut him. 
13. The jury clearly accepted Mr. Knight's testimony, as it 
found that Defendant was negligent, but that her negligence was not 
the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. 
14. The Court was misled by Defense counsel (Argument, Point 
2) into refusing to allow Plaintiff to call her two rebuttal 
witnesses. These witnesses were David Lord (affidavit Ex. 2), an 
automobile collision reconstruction expert, and Leonard Hartle, a 
mechanic who specializes in Ford Taurus automobiles, doing 
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mechanical work, but primarily repairing them after collision 
(affidavit Ex. 1). These affidavits are incorporated herein. 
15. AT THE TIME THE COURT REFUSED TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S 
REBUTTAL EXPERTS TO TESTIFY, MR. HARTLE WAS SITTING IN THE HALLWAY 
OUTSIDE THE COURT ROOM, HOLDING THE RIGHT HALF OF A FRONT BUMPER OF 
A FORD TAURUS ON HIS LAP. (Ex. 1, Exhibit A) 
16. Mr. Hartle was prepared to testify that Mr. Knight's 
testimony was totally false. He was prepared to testify that the 
bumper he had with him, was one he had taken from a Ford Taurus, 
where the vehicle was substantially damaged by a front end 
collision at over 20 miles per hour, yet the bumper showed no 
damage. 
17. The following content is in Mr. Hartle's affidavit. It 
should be in the Court transcript and would have been but for the 
error in refusing to allow Mr. Hartle to testify. 
Q. Mr. Hartle what is that? 
A. Half a Ford Taurus bumper. 
Q. Are they all the same? 
A. Yes. The Taurus is a new Ford vehicle and each model has 
the same bumper design. 
Q. Is there any deformation? 
A. No. 
Q. Where did you get i t ? 
5 
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A, From a Ford Taurus that was totalled in a front end 
collision. 
Q. Do you know the impact speed of that vehicle? 
A. Over 20 miles per hour. 
Q. Do you have a photograph of the Taurus from which you 
removed the bumper? 
A. Yes, here it is. 
Then the bumper and photograph are entered as Exhibits and the 
jury examines them. 
18. Mr. Hartle was prepared to testify that the front bumper 
on Defendant's Taurus was resigned to collapse on impact, that 
additional impact force would go into the shock absorbers, then 
into the frame. The bumper would then return to its original 
configuration. At impacts at major speeds, the bumper would be 
destroyed, but at mid ranges of 15 - 25 miles per hour, it would 
show no visible damage. 
19. It is difficult to image a more dramatic contradiction of 
testimony than that which Mr. Hartle would have produced, directly 
contradicting Defendant's testimony. 
20. An actual bumper is worth more than a whole lot of words 
about a bumper. Annexed to Mr. Hartle's affidavit (Ex. 1) are 
photographs of a Taurus bumper and of the wrecked Taurus from which 
he removed it. The Taurus is a new Ford vehicle. Its front bumper 
6 
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is the same in each model year. Exhibit 1. A. shows Mr. Hartle 
holding a half bumper. This bumper shows no damage. Mr. Hartle 
cut the bumper in half so that he would be able to carry it into 
the courtroom. Exhibit 1. B. shows the Taurus from which Mr. 
Hartle removed the half bumper. This photograph shows major damage 
to the vehicle, and the remaining one-half of its bumper which is 
not damaged. Exhibit 1. C. is a closer view of the remaining 
bumper half. Even at close range it shows no deformation. As per 
his affidavit (Ex. 1), Mr. Hartle's testimony would be that the 
front Taurus bumper shows no deformation, yet the vehicle was 
totalled by the speed of the impact, a speed in excess of 20 miles 
per hour. These prove incontrovertibly that Mr. Knight's testimony 
that a Taurus bumper would be deformed at an impact speed over 3 
miles per hour is absolute rubbish. 
21. Mr. Lord's testimony would have parallelled Mr. Hartle's 
in regard to the resilience of the Taurus front bumper, and that no 
damage would occur to the Forerunner at up to 5 miles an hour as 
the Taurus bumper "like a pillow" would absorb it, so the damage to 
Plaintiff's- heavy bumper braces was caused by am impact speed well 
over 5 miles per hour. As per his affidavit (Ex. 2), Mr. Lord 
would also have testified that at 8 - 9 miles per hour impact 
normal males can receive real injury from rear-end collisions even 
with headrest and seat belts, with less speed required for women or 
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those with prior injuries. While Mr. Knight testified that he 
personally investigated only 250 accidents, Mr. Lord would have 
testified that he had personally investigated thousands, and that 
in those he has often seen injuries comparable to Plaintiff's from 
speeds comparable to that involved in the subject accident. (Ex. 
2) 
22. Mr. Knight is retained by Defense in automobile 
accidents. He is a "damage-control specialist". In this case, 
Defendant's negligence was irrefutable. He was retained for the 
sole purpose of giving testimony attacking the element of proximate 
cause. He earned his pay. He testified falsely as to an absurdly 
low impact speed. He knew, or should have known, as he claims to 
be an expert, how wrong his testimony was. 
23. The question is how to make his testimony stand up? How 
Defense dealt with this is covered in Argument Point 2. 
24. That Mr. Knight was wrong is proved by Mr. Hartle's 
bumper. Mr. Knight upgraded the weight of his own testimony saying 
he "knew" so as to get his testimony in when if he had fully 
honored his oath to tell the whole truth, he would have testified 
he "assumed without specific data or personal knowledge." That 
though would not lead to his being retained by defense 250 times a 
year at $300 to $3,000 each as he admitted in cross. 
8 
00015* 
25. This time Mr. Knight has been caught flat out. It is too 
late to repair the damage done Plaintiff in the first trial. It is 
not too late to rectify that in the only way possible - giving her 
a retrial in which Mr. Knight's testimony will receive only the 
minute weight it deserves. 
26. The probability that the jury verdict would be for 
Plaintiff on the issue of causation rather than for Defendant, had 
rebuttal testimony been allowed by the Court, or, at the least 
Plaintiff's expert been allowed to attend Mr. Knight's testimony to 
advise on attacking the foundations of his conclusions, and on 




PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED DURING TRIAL OF THIS CASE, SUCH 
BEING RECENTLY DEFINED AS " ...FOR AN ERROR TO REQUIRE REVERSAL, THE 
LIKELIHOOD OF A DIFFERENT OUTCOME MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY HIGH TO 
UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE VERDICT." Harline v. Barker, 284 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10 (2-14-96). 
The court erred in ruling that Plaintiff could not call 
rebuttal witnesses. This was due to Defendant's timing tactics. 
9 
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First though, let's examine the Court's refusal to allow 
Plaintiff's expert in Court while Mr. Knight testified. 
If Plaintiff had been allowed to have Mr. Lord or Mr. Hartle 
sit in court while Mr. Knight testified, Plaintiff's counsel could 
have effectively cross-examined Mr. Knight. This is why an expert 
is allowed in the court to listen to the testimony of another 
expert particularly when the presence of one expert is needed to 
evaluate and modify the testimony of an opposing expert. State v. 
Stevens, 797 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Mr. Lord stated in his affidavit that he has never before been 
excluded from listening to an opposing expert. His court 
experience is extensive, including having been qualified in 29 
states to testify as shown by his curriculum vitae. 
Applied, the Court departed from accepted procedure in 
excluding Mr. Lord. 
American Jurisprudence 2d, Volume 75, Trial, Section 62, 
Witnesses Within Exclusionary Rule states that "the general rule is 
that experts may be allowed to attend the testimony of other 
witnesses.1* 
Am. Jur. also states that excluding such a witness, "...does 
not necessarily constitute error," but justification for the 
exclusion must be present to avoid error. No justification has 
been submitted in this case. 
10 
C f, 0 J 6 0 
Turning now to the Court's ruling excluding Mr. Lord and Mr. 
Knight from giving rebuttal testimony, two points should be made at 
the start. 
First, Defense acknowledged that in the exchange of names of 
witnesses, as soon as defense stated it would call Mr. Knight, 
Plaintiff promptly gave notice that it would call Mr. Lord and Mr. 
Hartle as "rebuttal" witnesses. 
Plaintiff's experts were not "surprise" witnesses. 
Calling a rebuttal witness is customary. 
The general Rule is stated in 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial, Section 145, 
Order of Proof: 
"While the trial court is invested with wide discretion 
in permitting departures from the usual order of proof 
when circumstances of the case require, the general rule 
is that the party who has the burden of proof is entitled 
to open the evidence; he should then introduce all his 
evidence in chief, and after his adversary has introduced 
all his evidence in chief, the former should be confined 
to rebuttal evidence. Generally speaking, on rebuttal, 
he can only give such evidence in reply as tends to 
answer new matter introduced by his adversary." 
Astill v. Clark fits precisely within the general rule as 
s t a t e d in Am.Jur. 
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Plaintiff introduced evidence that she was rear-ended by 
Defendant, that while she didn't at first know of damage to her 
vehicle nor injury to herself, she learned on the same day that her 
Ford Explorer bumper was damaged and that she was in severe pain. 
This carried Plaintiff's prima facie burden of proof. 
Defendant then put on its case, relying essentially on the 
testimony of Mr. Knight that the impact was at such a low speed 
that it could not produce injury. Mr. Knight's scientific analysis 
of the Ford Taurus bumper was critical to his testimony. He 
testified that it would remain deformed after an impact at a speed 
over 2 - 3 miles per hour. 
Plaintiff's rebuttal complies precisely with the Am.Jur. quote 
of the general rule. As Mr. Lord states in his affidavit (Ex. 2) 
low speed impacts, at speeds over 8 - 9 miles per hour frequently 
cause real injuries, and that the Taurus bumper would not 
permanently deform, but to the contrary, would absorb an impact up 
to five miles an hour without structural damage to either vehicle's 
bumper system, so that the damage to the Ford Explorer's bumper 
indicated at speed well in excess of the five mile an hour no damage 
speed. 
Mr. Hartle's testimony would have been even more dramatic by 
showing the undamaged bumper he had with him and photographs of the 
totalled Taurus from which he took it. 
12 
0 0 0 ! 6 ? 
This is precisely rebuttal by definition. 
Had this testimony been given, the jury would have understood 
that Mr. Knight was just plain wrong. More than that, they would 
have understood that the actual impact speed would have been in the 
mid-range testified to by Plaintiff. 
With Mr. Knight rebutted, the combination of the evidence as 
to Plaintiff's genuine injury occurring on the day of the accident 
as presented in her case in chief, the substantial speed with which 
she felt Defendant strike her, and the demolishing on rebuttal of 
Mr. Knight's testimony, the jury verdict would have probably found 
proximate cause on Defendant's part. 
That is, there can be no confidence that the jury verdict 
would be the same had Plaintiff been allowed either to have her 
expert assist in cross-examination of Mr. Knight, or her experts 
allowed to rebut him. This is prejudicial error. Harline, supra. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR, CUMULATIVE IN EFFECT, OCCURRED AS FOLLOWS: 
1) THE EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT DURING TESTIMONY OF 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT. THIS PREVENTED PLAINTIFF FROM MAKING AN 
EFFECTIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERT (NEWELL KNIGHT) 
GROSS FACTUAL ERRORS IN HIS TESTIMONY. (POINT I, SUPRA) 
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2) REFUSING TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO CALL REBUTTAL WITNESSES 
WHO WOULD HAVE EFFECTIVELY DEMOLISHED MR. KNIGHT'S TESTIMONY, 
3) THE COURT WAS LED INTO ERROR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
REBUTTAL BY INTENTIONALLY FALSE STATEMENTS OF LAW MADE BY DEFENSE 
COUNSEL JAMES E. HANSEN. SUCH MISCONDUCT JUSTIFIES SETTING ASIDE 
THE JURY VERDICT, GRANTING A NEW TRIAL, AND AN AWARD OF FEES, 
COSTS, AND SUCH OTHER SANCTIONS THAT THE COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE. 
Defense counsel intentionally misled the Court! 
At the conclusion of Defendant's evidence, Plaintiff called 
her rebuttal witnesses, Mr. Lord and Mr. Hartle. 
Defendant then objected and handed to the Court a copy of the 
case Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021(Utah 1994). (Ex. 3) 
Defense counsel argued that a rebuttal witness could not be 
called and that Turner so held. Defense argued Mr. Lord and Mr. 
Hartle should have testified in Plaintiff's case in chief (this is 
bad law as per Point I). 
Under the pressure of the moment, defense counsel having made 
the tactical decision not to make the argument until the moment 
when Plaintiff commenced her rebuttal case, the Court misread the 
decision and agreed with defense counsel's interpretation of it. 
In so ruling, the Court was undoubtedly influenced by the fact 
that co-defense counsel, James E. Hansen, told the Court that he 
had been counsel for the losing party, Turner, in the Turner case. 
14 
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Actually, on reading the opinion, it is clear that it 
specifically allows the calling of a rebuttal witness. At notes 3 
and 4, and in footnotes 2 and 3, the Utah Supreme Court 
specifically cited Utah cases allowing rebuttal witnesses. 
Similarly, at the front of the case, the CASE NOTES state: 
"2. Pre-trial Procedure, key 40. It is within trial 
court's authority to order parties to disclose all 
potential witnesses in advance of trial. 
3. Pre-trial Procedure key, 45. Trial court does not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a party to call 
surprise witnesses, absent 'good cause' for failure to 
disclose witnesses required by court order or rule." 
4. Pre-trial Procedure key, 45. Whether party will be 
allowed to call surprise witness when a party contends 
that undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut adverse 
party's evidence is determined by whether evidence sought 
to be rebutted could reasonably be anticipated before 
trial." 
Thus, it is clear that Turner holds exactly the opposite of 
that which defense counsel argued to the Court. Mr. Hansen was not 
an outsider to Turner, giving it a hurried misreading as the Court 
did. 
15 
o o o i o ~ 
Mr. Hansen was counsel in that case. Exhibit 4 is copies from 
the "Brief in Chief" in Turner filed by Mr. Hansen, in the Utah 
Supreme Court. In it he states: 
"II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL 
TESTIMONY WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR." 
Mr. Hansen then cites cases from Utah and other jurisdictions 
that rebuttal witnesses are proper. 
Exhibit 5 is a copy of Mr. Hansen's "Reply Brief." In it he 
argues that the trial Court's refusal to permit rebuttal testimony 
was prejudicial error. This time, responding to Defendant's brief, 
he addresses his argument to the right to call a surprise rebuttal 
witness. 
Mr. Hansen knew, having lost the case, that the Utah Supreme 
Court found no fault in calling a rebuttal witness. The error he 
had committed while representing Turner was that he called his 
rebuttal witness as a surprise witness with no advance notice to 
the opposing side. For this he had no excuse acceptable to the 
trial or appellate court. 
Turney involved Defendant running a stop sign and hitting 
Plaintiff. Defendant claimed early on that she couldn't see the 
sign because it was badly placed, obscured by shrubbery, and was 
bent so that it did not face approaching traffic. The Court had 
required all witnesses be submitted to opposing counsel. Mr. 
16 
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Hansen did not list his rebuttal witness. Mr. Hansen's rebuttal 
witness was a gentleman who lived in the neighborhood where the 
accident occurred who was prepared to testify that the sign was 
visible. Because Mr. Hansen had known since the time of the filing 
of Defendant's answer of the defense position, his error was in not 
listing his rebuttal witness on a timely basis. 
The Utah Supreme Court found absolutely nothing wrong with his 
sequence of evidence. 
Mr. Hansen produced evidence that his client was struck by a 
vehicle that ran a stop sign. The Defendant then put on evidence 
that they didn't see the stop sign due to its position, obscuring 
vegetation and the sign being bent. Mr. Hansen then wanted to 
rebut by a neighbor who said that at the time the accident 
occurred, the sign was perfectly visible. 
It was Mr. Hansen's not releasing the name of his rebuttal 
witness to the other side in time for them to prepare in whatever 
means they saw fit, whether by deposition or other means that was 
the sole rqftson the witness was excluded. In sum, Mr. Hansen lost 
Turner notvJaacause he had a rebuttal witness, but because he used 
him as a surprise witness so he wouldn't have been allowed to call 
him in his case in chief either. 
This makes Mr. Hansen an expert on the Turner holding. 
17 
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At trial of Astill v. Clark, Mr. Hansen told the Court in 
person, during that argument, that Turner held exactly the opposite 
of what it actually held. He told the Court Turner didn't allow 
rebuttal witnesses. 
An attorney is an officer of the Court. He may not 
intentionally misquote law to the Court, particularly in a hurried 
context where the Court lacks time to research or deliberate and so 
tends to rely on counsel's candor. This, though, was the context 
in which he presented his Motion. 
This was misconduct on the part of Mr. Hansen. 
Mr. Hansen's argument to the Court was never reduced to 
writing. It was though a formal motion, a motion to exclude 
rebuttal witnesses. 
As such, it comes within the meaning of Rule 11, URCP which 
requires that no attorney make a Motion to the Court unless, "...to 
the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well-founded in fact and is warranted bv 
existing lyf«. .and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, sgpsb as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation." 
The purpose of Mr. Hansen's deliberate misstatement of the law 
was to deny Plaintiff a fair trial by excluding from the jury 
evidence that would have destroyed the effectiveness of the 
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testimony of his expert Mr. Knight. This is an "improper purpose11 
if there ever was one. 
Rule 11 then goes on to sanctions: 
"If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, 
or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 
Rule 11 specifically refers to a "signed" Motion. Mr. Hansen 
chose to make his Motion verbally. He had the Turner case with 
him. He could have submitted a written Motion. As a matter of 
tactics, he chose to give a verbal Motion. Technically this might 
evade the reach of Rule 11. Plaintiff submits that the key word is 
"Motion" not quotes "signed" or Rule 11 is vitiated. In support, 
of the Rules, focus on character of the misrepresentation, not the 
form. 
The same rule is restated in the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal: 
"a. A lawyer should not knowingly: 
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1) make a false statement of material fact or 
law to a tribunal." 
The Rule is also covered by statute. 
"78-51-26 UCA. Duties of Attorneys and Counselors. 
It is the duty of an attorney and counselor: 
3) to counsel or maintain no other action, 
proceeding or defense than that which appears 
to him legal and just, excepting the defense 
of a person charged with a public offense; 
4) to employ for the purposes of maintaining 
the causes confided to him such means only as 
are consistent with truth, and never to seek 
to mislead the judges by any artifice or false 
statement of fact or law.,f 
"78-51-31 UCA. Deceit and Collusion. 
An attorney and counselor who is guilty of 
deceit or collusion, or who consents thereto, 
with intent to deceive a court or judge or a 
party to an action or proceeding is liable to 
be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured 
party treble damages to be recovered in a 
similar action." 
20 
In this case, there is no doubt that: 
1. When Mr. Hansen made the argument to Judge Brian 
that Turner precluded the use of a rebuttal witness, he 
knew that the holding in Turner was exactly to the 
contrary. 
2. Mr. Hansen made the argument for the purpose of 
denying Plaintiff a fair trial, specifically from 
allowing her to rebut false testimony given by his 
expert. 
3. Mr. Hansen knew that such false argument might well 




THE COURT ALSO ERRED IN INADEQUATE EXAMINATION OF THE JURY, IN 
NOT SUBMITTING A PRESENT VALUE TABLE TO THE JURY, AND IN OTHER WAYS 
AS SHOWN IN THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT. THESE ERRORS ARE PRESERVED, BUT 
NOT ARGUED HERE, AS POINT II IS DETERMINATIVE. THEY ARE PRESERVED 
IN THE EVENT OF AN APPEAL. 
It is up to the trial court to grant or not grant Plaintiff a 
new trial. 
21 
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If the court declines to do so, in addition to the merits of 
this case, there are two very important separate issues of law that 
will probably be addressed by the appellate court. These are: 
1) The scope of appropriate examination of jurors. 
Plaintiff claims that the Court improperly restricted the 
scope of examination of jurors as per the written 
questions Plaintiff had submitted to be asked of the 
jurors. 
2) The Utah Jury Instruction book (MUJI) provides that 
verdicts shall be reduced to present value. The book 
though gives no elucidation of how this should be done. 
Plaintiff proposed that the Court follow the statistical 
present value table used by the California courts to 
supplement the present value instruction. Without that 
table, the jury has no means of determining how to arrive 
at present value. Plaintiff believes that for guidance 
of the trial court, on reversal, that the Utah Appellate 
Court »ay well approve submission of a present value 
table 0long with the present value instruction. 
AFFIDAVITS & TRANSCRIPT 
A transcript of the testimony of Newell Knight is necessary. 
The court reporter, Brad Young, has advised, due to his press of 
22 
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other business, it will take him some time to submit that 
transcript. 
Modified affidavits will be submitted if needed, within ten 
days of the time that the Knight testimony transcript is delivered 
to Plaintiff. Unless Defendant denies Mr. Knight testified that 
the Taurus bumper would be deformed at an impact speed over three 
miles per hour, this matter can move forward to oral argument, by 
which time Mr. Young should have the transcript ready for 
distribution to counsel and the court. 
Plaintiff has also ordered from Mr. Young a transcript of the 
in-court argument concerning Plaintiff's right to call rebuttal 
witnesses, and of the argument and order excluding Plaintiff's 
expert from being in court while Defendant's expert testified. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff returns to her first point. She is entitled to a 
fair trial. Error of the Court, largely caused by intentional 
misconduct of defense counsel, barred her that at trial. 
Fair play is the essence of conservatism. Conservatism rests 
on values and, in court, no value is more important than fair play. 
Plaintiff having been denied fair play, she prays the Court 
enter its order setting aside the jury verdict and directing a new 
trial; that Plaintiff recover her court costs and attorney fees 
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both for the trial and for this motion; that Defendant's costs bill 
be vacated, and that the Court enter such other sanctions as it 
deems appropriate. 
DATED THIS 15 day of March, 1996. 
"Samuel King ^~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document postage prepaid on March 
/5 , 1996, to: 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. BOX 45385 
Salt Lake city, UT 84145-0385 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
260 East 300 South, Suite 200 
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SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
DAVID J FRIEL, No. 6225 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-3751 
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
LYNN B. ASTILL 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





AFFIDAVIT OF LEONARD HARDLE 
Case No. 950902307 PI 
Judge: Pat B. Brian 
) 
)ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Leonard Hardle, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am an automobile collision repairman and have been for 
16 years. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, and am the owner of 
an automobile repair shop whose address is 4195 South 500 West, 
Murray, Utah. 
2. For several years I have specialized in the repair of 
Ford Taurus automobiles. 
1 
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3. I have read Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial. So far as 
it states facts relative to a Ford Taurus, and to the testimony 
that I was prepared to give at the trial, the motion is accurate, 
4. Annexed to this affidavit are photographs taken at my 
business by David J Friel on March 13, 1996. These photographs 
accurately depict the bumper and Taurus automobile I was prepared 
to testify about during trial to illustrate my testimony in this 
case. Actually, I brought part of this same bumper to court with 
me on February 8, 1996 and I was waiting out in the hall of the 
Third District Court ready to be called upon. 
Judge Brian refused to allow me to rebut Defendant's 
expert, Newel Knight, concerning his erroneous testimony of Ford 
Taurus bumpers. 
5. Exhibit A is a photograph of me and half of the bumper 
from the vehicle I was prepared to testify concerning. Exhibit B 
is a photograph showing major damage to the vehicle. This vehicle 
was totalled. I have already completed some major repair work to 
this pictured vehicle's front end. The front frame of this car was 
damaged significantly more than the picture depicts. Upon close 
examination it can be seen that the bumper received only a few 
scrapes. 
Exhibit C is a close-up photograph of half of the bumper 
on the vehicle. I sawed off the other half of the bumper and took 
2 
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it to Court with me on February 8th. After the trial was completed 
and the Plaintiff lost, I threw the other half of the bumper away. 
The section thrown away was in similar condition as the other half. 
6. A comparison of these photographs reveals that the bumper 
shows no apparent damage, while the vehicle shows very substantial 
damage caused by a front-end collision. 
7. This bumper is essentially identical to the bumper on the 
Ford Taurus Defendant was driving, with the support structures in 
both vehicles being the same. 
8. Based on my experience, the vehicle and its bumper 
identified in these photographs were involved in an impact of at 
least 15 miles an hour. My knowledge is based on inspection of 
over 50 damaged Ford Taurus automobiles. I understand the 
mechanical function and structure of the bumper and its supporting 
units and its ability to withstand impact, and the damages which 
different components of the system will show. 
9. In part, the technical statements concerning the Ford 
Taurus and its bumper, stated in Plaintiff's Motion, was based on 
advice I have given Plaintiff's counsel. For that reason I am 
incorporating the statements of that Motion in this Affidavit. 
10. If Defendant's expert, Mr. Knight, had in fact testified 
that a Ford Taurus bumper would remain deformed after a front-end 
impact of two or three miles an hour, or even twice that speed, his 
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testimony was absolutely wrong. The heavy front portion of the 
bumper is designed to "take a heavy hit" before the energy is 
transferred to the energy absorbing shocks in the bumper mounts. 
However, it is also designed to return to form after impact. Yet, 
to determine the damage to Defendant's Taurus in the subject 
accident, a person would have to get underneath the vehicle and 
examine the bumper structure, and its energy absorbing shocks and 
inner frame structure. The way to tell if the bumper has been 
fully compressed is to look at the energy absorbers. It will chip 
a bit when the bumper has been fully compressed. This is not 
noticeable, appearing only as a thin line, when one knows what to 
look for. It is my understanding that absolutely no inspection was 
made of the Defendant's vehicle from underneath the car and that 
only a visual inspection took place standing in front of the car. 
11. Having examined damage to Plaintiff's Explorer before it 
was repaired, and having observed the damage to its support 
brackets that connect the bumper to the frame, I can state with 
confidence^that Defendant's vehicle must have been traveling at 
approximately ten miles per hour, not the two or three miles per 
hour as Defendant's expert testified to. 
12. I have read the Affidavit of David Lord, and agree with 
that affidavit and the statements made in relation to Ford Taurus 
bumpers and statements made by Defendant's expert witness. 
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DATED THIS /J) day of •TT'sfy?V£ 1996. 
Leonard Hardle 
Affiant 
SWORN TO and testified to before me this /3 day 
M/jjCCH- 1996 by Leonard Hardle. 
l$&Sfei umoxnia I 
. Vy&SPM S*l*»»C«*U*i 84106 • 
, 2^H>^ STATEOFUTAH • 
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SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
DAVID J FRIEL, No. 6225 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-3751 
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN B. ASTILL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
LEESHA CLARK, | 
Defendant. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID LORD 
1 Case No. 950902307 PI 
Judge: Pat B. Brian 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
David Lord, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am a former police officer for Salt Lake City assigned 
for seven years as a traffic investigator and reconstructionist. 
Currently, I now own two businesses in Accident Reconstruction and 
Cause Analysis. My curriculum vitae is attached. 
2. I have read Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial. So far as 
it states facts relative to a Ford Taurus, and to the testimony 
that I was prepared to give, the Motion is factually accurate. 
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3. As the most frequent city driving collision is a "rear-
ender", I investigated 7,000 accidents during my work for Salt Lake 
City. I have investigated several thousands of these types of 
rear-end collisions. This has continued on a frequent basis since 
I have been self-employed and investigating and reconstructing 
about 3,000 more accidents. 
4. It is not uncommon for people to sustain real neck and/or 
back injuries in low speed rear end collisions. I am not a medical 
doctor. My observation is based on my dealing with, and personal 
knowledge of, people involved in such collisions, and my reading of 
material in this field relating statistics on low speed accidents 
to injuries caused by them, verifying the many times victims have 
told me of their injuries and subsequent medical confirmation of 
these injuries. 
5. Reputable studies have shown real injuries occurring to 
occupants of the front car in rear end collisions at speeds as low 
as eight to nine miles per hour, even though the injured occupant 
wore a seat belt and had a head rest. These studies are consistent 
with my own observations and experience. 
6. As I understand it, Newell Knight testified that this 
subject accident occurred at a speed well under eight to nine miles 
per hour, basing this opinion on lack of visible damage to the 
Taurus front bumper. He erred in that testimony. 
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7. The Taurus is a recent car model. All of them have front 
bumpers designed to absorb energy (they are called "energy 
absorbing" bumpers), and to absorb up to a five mile per hour 
impact without sustaining or imparting any structural damage. It 
is designed to be soft - like hitting a pillow or being hit by a 
pillow. 
8. For the impact to deform and displace both of the 
Explorer's heavy steel rear bumper supports by at least an inch, 
indicates the Taurus struck the Explorer at a speed well in excess 
of five miles per hour, as the first five miles per hour would have 
produced no structural damage to either vehicle. Without an 
examination of the Taurus' strong structural bumper parts, a 
determination of the actual impact speed of the Taurus cannot be 
made. However, in view of the known damage to the Explorer bumper 
supports, it is obvious that the actual impact speed was well over 
five miles per hour. 
9. The above is testimony I was prepared to give at trial of 
this case. I was there, waiting outside the Courtroom. I have 
testified in court as an expert witness many times. This case is 
the first time that the court has refused to allow me to attend the 
testimony of the opposition expert reconstructionist, and the first 
time when notice that I would testify was timely given, that I have 
not been allowed to testify as a rebuttal witness. 
SKrLord.aff 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
David Lord being first duly sworn on his oath, swears he is 
the Affiant in the above-entitled action, that he has reviewed the 
foregoing document and that he executes the same voluntarily, and 
that the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief. 
1996. 
David Lo£d 
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David G. Lord 1996 
RESUME 
1967-Present Director and Owner of Accident 
Reconstruction & Cause Analysis, a 
consulting company that operates in 
thirteen (13) states, 
1985-Present Director and programmer for 
Computerized Accident Reconstruction, a 
company that operates in twenty seven 
(27) states and Queensland, Australia. 
1966-1972 Salt Lake City Police Department, 
Accident Investigation Squad. 
Averaging 1000 investigations 
annually. 
SCHOOLS and STUDY 
1961-1964 Utah Tech, Drafting and Pattern design. 
1966 Salt Lake City Police Academy. 
1968 Northwestern University's Accident Investigation. 
1968-Present Accident Reconstruction. 
Auto Accident Site Diagraming (in house). 
Accident Site Investigation (in house & outside 
instructors). 
Accident & Forensic Photography (in house & outside 
instructors). 
Anatomical Interaction During Collision (autopsies). 
Vehicular Dynamics. 
Vehicular Structure, Design and Collision Analysis. 




Psychology of the Highway User (outside instructors). 
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Tire Design and Construction (Goodyear Tire Company). 
Road Design and Construction (as it pertains to auto 
accidents) Gibbons and Reed Construction and 
others. 
Forensic Evidence Evaluation. 
Surprise Intrusion Response. 
Legal Issues of The 1990, admissibility of 
accident reconstruction evidence. 
The investigation of child restraint and 
seatbelt injuries 
TEACHING 
1967 Guest Instructor Weber College, Accident Investigation. 
1967-1972 Basic, Intermediate and Advanced for SLCPD and other 
agencies. 
1968-Present Peace Officers Standards and Training, all levels of 
Accident Investigation and Reconstruction, including thirty 
(30) controlled crash tests. 
1983-1984 Salt Lake Community College, Advanced Accident 
Reconstruction. 6 Credit hours. 
1985-Present Computerized Accident Reconstruction, Computerized 
Accident Investigations. 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
Personally investigated 7000 auto accidents and consulted on an 
additional 3000 cases. 
I was the first person certified to teach any subject at P.O.S.T., 
the State Police Academy. 
I have participated in litigation and given expert testimony in 
thirteen states over the past 29 years. 
I have produced twelve (12) computer graphic accident reenactment. 
In 1985 I applied for and was given a copyright on a computer 
program that I conceived and designed. My concept is presently 
being used by Police Departments, Insurance Companies, Bureau of 
Land Management investigators, Attorneys, Civilian Consultants and 
Safety Supervisors in 27 states and Queensland, Australia. 
-2-
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In April 1990 the United States Department of the Interior gave an 
account to representatives of the government of Queensland, 
Australia. In it they report, "their civi1ian investigators using 
my computer system and safety program over the last four years have 
saved the U.S. taxpayers $12,000,000.00" in just the Utah 
jurisdiction. 
In February 1993 the management team for BLM approved adoption of 
my computer system and safety program for all of their 180 offices 
in thirteen jurisdictions. 
An Accident Reconstructionist that critiques Traffic products for 
Law & Order Magazine made the following comments about my computer 
system in their April 1990 issue. It is "user friendly, 
aesthetically pleasant, easy to understand, never leaving the user 
in the dark and the greatest thing since sliced bread." 
I have written two books in conjunction with the computer program, 
CHECKLIST / USER MANUAL and the C.A.R. TECHNICAL MANUAL. 
I have authored an article for the Australian Police Journal 
quarterly magazine titled, COMPUTERIZED ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION. 
This paper was printed in December 1991. 
I collaborated with Joseph E. Badger, a nationally recognized 
accident reconstructionist, on a Law and Order Magazine article 
titled, HOW CRITICAL IS CRITICAL SPEED. This paper was published 
in the October-November issues of 1991. 
I have written opinions that were used in criminal traffic trials 
in The Queens Court, Queensland, Australia. 
This year, 1995, I was awarded a five year contract by the 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management for my safety 
program, it will be used in twelve (12) jurisdictions and 180 
offices. I will be providing computer software, pre-programmed 
hardware, training in accident investigation, expert witnesses and 
case management for the U.S. Attorneys Office. 
-3-
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Julie Anderson Turner, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
Amy Nelson, Defendant and Appellee 
No. 920195 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
872 P.2d 1021, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 
March 30, 1994, Filed 
Third District, Salt Lake County. The Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick 
COUNSEL 
John E. Hansen, Salt Lake City, and John W. Anderson, Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, for Turner. 
Robert L. Stevens, Salt Lake City, for Nelson. 
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ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice : 
Plaintiff Julie Anderson Turner appeals from a jury verdict 
for defendant Amy Nelson on Turner's negligence claim. Turner 
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing 
her to call a "rebuttal" witness whom she had not listed on her 
pretrial designation of witnesses. She further asserts that the 
trial court erroneously allowed Nelson to add a nonparty, Salt Lake 
City, to the verdict form in order to have the jury apportion its 
fault. We affirm the trial court. 
Thisr action arises from an automobile accident. On July 6, 
1989, Turner was traveling west on Third Avenue near the Canyon 
Road intersection in Salt Lake City. At about the same time, Nelson 
was driving north on Canyon Road. Turner contends that Nelson 
failed to heed the "Stop Ahead" warning sign and then ran the stop 
sign at the intersection of Canyon Road and Third Avenue. Nelson's 
vehicle hit Turner's vehicle on the front left quarter-panel. 
Turner suffered physical injuries as a result. 
Turner served Nelson with a complaint alleging negligence on 
March 27, 1991. Nelson answered the complaint and denied any 
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negligence. Her answer claimed, among other things, that Turner was 
contributorily negligent and that Turner's injuries were caused by 
the negligence of unnamed third parties. Soon thereafter, discovery 
commenced. 
The trial court issued a scheduling order setting February 
20, 1992, as the discovery cutoff date. The order required both 
parties, by February 14th, to exchange designations of the 
witnesses they planned to call at trial. Although Nelson complied 
with that order, Turner filed her designation on February 19th, 
five days late. On February 26th, Nelson filed a "Motion for 
Apportionment of Fault of Salt Lake City" and an accompanying 
memorandum. She sought to include Salt Lake City on the verdict 
form for apportionment purposes, even though it was not a 
defendant. Over Turner's objection, the trial court granted the 
motion. 
At trial, Turner presented evidence tending to show that 
Nelson had been negligent in failing to heed the stop sign. 
Conversely, Nelson contended in opening arguments and throughout 
trial that Salt Lake City was at fault because it "had negligently 
designed" the intersection and because it allegedly had allowed the 
stop sign to become obstructed and perhaps bent, making the sign 
difficult to see. The jury returned a verdict of no negligence on 
the part of Nelson, from which Turner appeals. AX1 
Turner's first contention on appeal is that the trial court 
abused its discretion by refusing to allow the testimony of her 
"rebuttal" witness, Jim Nakling. Turner acknowledges that Nakling 
was not listed on her pretrial designation of witnesses. She 
asserts, however, that the need for Nakling's rebuttal testimony 
became apparent only after trial began, a fact that justified the 
admission of his testimony. 
Specifically, Turner contends that she was surprised by 
defense counsel's statements during his opening remarks that the 
sign had been partially obstructed and that Salt Lake City, not 
Nelson, was really at fault. On the evening of the first day of 
trial, Turner's counsel made an effort to find a witness to testify 
that the sign had not been obstructed. That same evening, counsel 
found Nakling walking near the accident site. Nakling had lived 
near the relevant intersection for the past ten years. He 
purportedly!was prepared to testify that he had walked his dog by 
the intersection twice a day and the stop sign was not obstructed 
at the time of the accident. 
On the morning of the second day of trial, Turner moved the 
court to allow Nakling's testimony, and Nelson opposed that motion. 
The court did not rule on the motion at that time. On the third day 
of trial, Turner attempted to call Nakling as a rebuttal witness, 
effectively renewing the motion. Turner argued that the testimony 
was properly admissible to rebut Nelson's "new" contentions that 
the sign was obstructed and perhaps had been replaced with a larger 
sign since the accident and that Salt Lake City was actually at 
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fault. The court refused to allow the testimony, stating: 
I am persuaded that the motion to call the new witness 
should be and is denied, and my reasoning is as has been stated by 
[Nelson's counsel], but moreover, it has been the essential defense 
here that-the sign was obstructed, thereby limiting the Defendant's 
opportunity to timely observe it and take appropriate action. That 
aspect of Guertz's testimony is not new, and my decision to allow 
Salt Lake City on the verdict form for purposes of apportionment of 
the responsibility here does not change the essential defense that 
the sign was obstructed. . . . It seems to me that allowing the 
testimony in at this point in the trial puts Nelson at an unfair 
disadvantage, not knowing who this individual is and not having had 
the opportunity to cross-examine or at least depose this witness, 
while as Mr. Guertz [Nelson's expert] was available and notified in 
a timely fashion as far as the opposition was concerned, that he 
would be testifying. I am therefore persuaded that it would place 
Nelson in an unfair posture to grant this motion and it's denied. 
Turner then proffered what Nakling would testify to and sought 
a continuance to allow Nelson an opportunity to depose Nakling. The 
court denied the request and again refused to allow the testimony. 
The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow Nakling's testimony. We will not 
reverse the trial court unless the appellant demonstrates that the 
trial court has clearly abused its discretion and thereby affected 
the appellant's substantial rights. See Utah R. Evid. 103; State v. 
Albretsen, 7\j P.2d 515, 518-1* (Utah 1989); Haroy v. Hardy, 776 
P.2d 917, 92* (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord In re Estate of Gardner, 
31 Colo. App. 361, 505 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); King Pest 
Control v. Binger, 379 So. 2d 660, 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
As a threshold matter, it is well within a trial court's 
authority to order the parties to disclose all potential witnesses 
in advance of trial. See Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P. 2d 1307, 1310 
(Utah 1993); Hardy, 776 P.2d at 924-25. Such disclosure serves a 
number of significant purposes. See, e.g., Kott v. City of Phoenix, 
158 Ariz. 415, 763 P.2d 235, 238 (Ariz. 1988). It gives both 
parties the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial, including, 
among other things, deposing witnesses, investigating witnesses' 
testimony, and preparing an effective cross-examination. See, e.g., 
Gardner, 505 P.2d at 52. It also encourages the parties to make a 
serious effort to investigate the facts and discover all relevant 
witnesses in a timely manner. Finally, it furthers the orderly and 
efficient administration of justice by avoiding trial delays which 
might otherwise be necessary to accommodate the need to prepare for 
a surprise witness. 
Given these significant policies, a trial court does not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a party to call a 
surprise witness absent "good cause" for the failure to disclose 
the witness as required by a court order or rule. AX2 See Arnold, 
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846 P.2d at 1310; Hardy, 776 P.2d at 925. When the offering party 
contends that the undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut the 
adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on whether the evidence 
"sought to be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior 
to trial." 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial AU 371, at 570 (1991) (emphasis 
added); see, e.g., Albretsen, 782 P. 2d at 518; AX3 King Pest 
Control, 379 So. 2d at 663. 
Turner offered Nakling's testimony for the express purpose 
of contradicting Nelson's evidence that the sign was obstructed and 
perhaps bent. Turner contends that because Nakling's testimony was 
intended to rebut this "new, unforeseen" argument, the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to allow the testimony. Turner's 
claim hangs on whether she "could reasonably have anticipated" the 
testimony of Nelson and Nelson's witnesses that the sign was 
obstructed. 
In deciding this issue, the trial court had all of the 
evidence before it and was in the best position to determine 
whether Turner could reasonably have anticipated the 
obstructed-sign testimony. As noted earlier, the trial court 
indicated that the testimony regarding the obstructed stop sign was 
"not new" and Nelson's "essential defense" had always been that the 
sign was obstructed. Although the trial court did not specifically 
say that Turner "could reasonably have anticipated" the testimony, 
the thrust of the court's ruling is clear — Nelson's evidence was 
foreseeable. 
As appellant, Turner has the burden of showing that the 
trial court erred in determining that the "new testimony" could 
have been anticipated. To meet this burden, she must provide this 
court with a complete record of all evidence relevant to the 
alleged error. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). AX4 In the absence of a 
complete record "we assume that the proceedings at trial were 
regular and proper." Bevan v. J.H. Constr. Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443 
(Utah 1983); see Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1985); 
Stephens v. Schwendiman, 688 P.2d 466, 467 (Utah 1984); Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In the present case, Turner has failed to provide this court 
with the necessary evidence. She has not included in the record or 
with her briefs copies of depositions, Nelson's answers to 
interrogatories, or other evidence that could support Turner's 
claim that Nelson's evidence was new. This court must therefore 
assume that the trial court was correct in its statement that 
Nelson had asserted all along that the stop sign was obstructed and 
the intersection poorly designed and, by implication, that Salt 
Lake City was negligent. 
Moreover, the record seems to support Nelson's assertion 
that Turner knew or should have reasonably anticipated that Nelson 
would claim the sign was obstructed. AX5 In fact, the record 
suggests that if Turner failed to appreciate the extent of Nelson's 
reliance on this defense, it was probably because of Turner's 
earlier failure to depose adequately several adverse witnesses. 
Nelson presented the evidence of at least three witnesses, 
including herself, that the sign was obstructed and the 
intersection poorly designed. Nelson testified at trial that she 
was unable to see the stop sign until just prior to entering the 
intersection because the sign was partially obstructed by foliage. 
Nelson also presented the testimony of Mr. Rusk, a witness to the 
accident. Rusk testified that at the time of the accident, the stop 
sign was bent and partially obscured by the limbs of a nearby tree. 
Nelson further introduced the expert testimony of Mr. 
Guertz, who before his retirement was a "traffic design expert" 
with the Utah Department of Transportation. Guertz testified that 
the intersection was designed poorly for a variety of reasons and 
that the stop sign might have been replaced or moved since the 
accident. 
Nelson's counsel had listed Guertz, Rusk, and Nelson on 
their designation of witnesses and had made them available for 
deposition. Turner made no attempt to depose Guertz or, as far as 
we can tell from the record before us, determine through written 
interrogatories the content of his testimony. Rusk apparently was 
deposed by Nelson, and Turner was properly notified of that 
deposition. It is unclear, however, whether Turner's counsel chose 
to attend the deposition or examine Rusk. Finally, Nelson was 
deposed by Turner and during that deposition reportedly indicated 
that the stop sign had been partially obstructed. Once again, 
because Turner has not provided as with a complete record, we have 
no way of verifying this statement. AX6 
Similarly, Turner s argument on appeal that Salt Lake City's 
inclusion on the special verdict form created the necessity for 
Nakling's rebuttal testimony is unpersuasive. According to Turner, 
Nakling would have testified only that the sign was not obstructed, 
bent, or replaced since the accident. The trial court indicated 
that these were not new issues. In other words, regardless of Salt 
Lake City's presence on the special verdict form, the trial court 
concluded that it was foreseeable that Nelson would assert the 
obstructed-sign defense and, thus, rebuttal evidence would be 
necessary.* AX7 
Finally, given the ease with which Turner's counsel located 
Nakling, there is no merit to the argument that he was unavailable 
or undiscoverable, as Turner seems to imply. By Turner's own 
admission, Nakling had lived in the area for ten years and walked 
by the intersection twice a day. If Turner's counsel could locate 
him in one night, counsel easily could have found him in the months 
before trial. In summary, there is nothing in the record before us 
to indicate that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing 
to admit the testimony of the unlisted witness. 
We next address whether the trial court misinterpreted the 
o c c i G i 
Utah Liability Reform Act (the "Act") in granting Nelson's motion 
to add a nonparty, Salt Lake City, to the special verdict form. As 
noted earlier, several days before trial Nelson filed a "Motion for 
Apportionment of Fault" and a supporting memorandum. The court 
granted Nelson's motion, adding Salt Lake City to the special 
verdict form on the first day of trial. 
According to Turner, the statutory scheme and the plain 
language of the Act do not permit the apportionment of negligence 
to nonparties. See Utah Code Ann. AUAU 78-27-38 to -41. Therefore, 
the argument continues, the Act requires Nelson to join the City as 
a party before it may be added to the special verdict form. See id. 
This would be an issue of first impression in Utah, but we do not 
reach it. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Turner has properly 
interpreted the Act, the presence of Salt Lake City on the verdict 
form was harmless in this case. The jury determined that Nelson was 
not negligent. For that reason, the jury never reached the issue of 
whether Turner herself or Salt Lake City was negligent, and the 
jury never apportioned fault between the parties. Turner simply has 
not provided this court with a cogent theory of how Salt Lake 
City's inclusion on a portion of the special verdict form that the 
jury never reached altered the facts, the presentation of those 
facts, or the result in this case. Cf. Beitzel v. City of Coeur 
d'Alene, 827 P.2d 1160, 1164-65 (Idaho 1992). 
Turner admits that Nelson was free to argue to the jury that 
Salt Lake City was at fault, regardless of whether the City was 
included on the special verdict form. In fact, it is common trial 
practice for a defendant to allege that a third person, named or 
unnamed, party or nonparty, is the real culprit. Turner does not 
allege that the Act in any wry restricts this practice. Both 
parties presumably would have presented the same evidence and made 
the same arguments, even if Salt Lake City had not been on the 
special verdict form. 
Turner's real complaint seems to be that Nelson allegedly 
concealed, until right before trial, her obstructed-sign defense. 
Turner apparently believes that this subterfuge is highlighted by 
the late d*t« of the motion to add Salt Lake City to the special 
verdict fodp« Nevertheless, Turner has not alleged or provided 
evidence s\Jpjesting that Nelson in any way distorted her answers to 
interrogatories, failed to disclose her defense, or otherwise 
misrepresented her position prior to trial. Nelson timely listed 
all witnesses who testified, made them available for discovery, and 
as far as the record we have indicates, truthfully responded to 
written interrogatories. It is not unusual or inappropriate for a 
party to file a trial-related motion in close proximity to the 
trial. In short, if Turner believes that discovery abuses occurred, 
that is a separate issue which she should have raised at trial. 
The jury determined that Nelson was not legally negligent. 
Turner has failed to demonstrate how the City's presence on a 
U I l; i \j f> 
portion of the special verdict form that was not completed by the 
jury prejudiced her case. The error, if any, was harmless. We 
affirm the trial court. 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Leonard H. Russon, Court of Appeals Judge 
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sat prior to his appointment to this court. 
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notifying zn< -rial court: and Turner or .ar intent to aad 
the City to the special verdict form.9 
Nelson's delay, whether the result of a tactical 
decision or a lack of diligence, should not have been 
allowed to prejudice Turner and deny her any recovery for 
her injuries. The interests of justice would best have been 
served by the trial court's denial of the motion to amend ta 
add the City six days before trial. Girard v. Appleby, 560 
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). The trial court clearly abused 
its discretion. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL TESTIMONT-
The trial court compounded its error in adding the Cits 
the day of trial by subsequently prohibiting Turner from 
presenting witness Jim Nakling's ("tfakling") rebuttal 
testimony. Nakling would have directly controverted 
Nelson's testimony that the stop sign was obstructed, and 
would have nullified or minimized her assault against the 
Cf., for example, Colo. Rev. Stat. §- 13-21-111.5 (1992 d » 
Supp.), which requires that a party file notice within 
ninety (90) days of the filing g£ £&& complaint of her 
intent to have the negligence of non-parties considered. 
The party must identify the non-party's name and last-knoigj 
address, or -the best identification of such nonparty whiij| 
is possible under the circumstances, together with a brisa 
stataaacLt of the basis for believing such nonparty to be « 
faults Failure to designate the nonparty within the 
specified time precludes consideration of the nonparty* 
alleged negligence. Colorado thus expressly recognizes 
potential for abuse by a party • laying behind the log" 
discovery has concluded (or the statute of limitations 
run) and then seeking to add an "empty chair" to shift 
blame to at trial. 
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newly-added "ghost" tortfeasor, the City. Makling's 
testimony was clearly proper rebuttal testimony intended to 
neet new evidence in the case, and Nelson would have 
suffered no demonstrable prejudice from its introduction. 
Rebuttal evidence is that which tends to refute, or to 
so modify or explain as to nullify or minimize the effect 
of, the opponent's evidence. Board of Education of Soutfr 
-ganoete School District v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980). 
Rebuttal is a term of art, denoting evidence introduced by a 
plaintiff to meet new facts brought out in his opponent's 
case in chief. Morgan v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos.. 
606 P.2d 554 (5th. Cir. 1979)(emphasis original); see also 
Soliz v. Ammerman, 395 P.2d 25 (Utah 1964) (Rebuttal evidence 
should be confined to proof which answers or explains an 
adversary's evidence)^ Rebuttal evidence is designed to 
meet facts not raised prior to the defendant' s case in 
chief, not facts which could have been raised* I&. at 555* 
Tn Rodriguez v. Qlin Corp.. 780 F.2d 491 (5th. Cir. 
1986), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court • s refusal to allow rebuttal testimony in 
response to defendant's expert's testimony- In its 
decision, the court discussed the rules and considerations 
governing- the admission or denial of rebuttal testimony. 
The court held that rebuttal evidence should be allowed 
where •new- testimony is presented during defendant's case 
tn chief. The court stated than 
-24-
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Logic id fairness lead us to conclude tnat new 
evidence for purposes of rebuttal does not mean 'brand 
new." Rather, evidence is new if, under all the facta 
and circumstances, the court concludes that the 
evidence was not fairly and adequately presented to the-
trier of fact before the defendant's case in chief. 
Id* at 496. The court pointed out that a plaintiff only 
bears the burden of proving a prima facie case, and is not 
required to "prove the negative" of defendant's facts or 
theories: 
This rule proceeds from the view that a plaintiff has 
the right to adduce whatever evidence is necessary to 
establish its prima facie case and is under no 
obligation to anticipate and negate in its own case ina 
chief any facts or theories that may be raised on 
defense. 
!£.; accord, Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 
1055 (7th Cir. 1987). The court: held that the defendant1 
expert's "corrosion fatique entrapment1* testimony was -new 
that the plaintiff had no cause or duty to go forward ixt 
case in chief and negate that testimony, and that the 
district court's exclusion of the plaintiff's proffered 
rebuttal testimony was improper and prejudicial. Xi. The: 
court revere
 # and remanded the cause. 
Witness Nakling's proffered testimony was clearly 
proper rebuttal evidence that should have been admitted trfl 
the trial court- See Barton. 617 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 198(1 
It wa* offered tcr refute Nelson* s testimony that the stot* 
sign, m s obstructed, and to controvert the testimony a f 
Nelson's expert, who testified that, due to the obstructs 
Nelson could not reasonably have been aware that she neeg 
to stop. Nelson and her expert's testimony was 
-25-
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miquestionably "new" evidence which Turner was under no 
obligation to anticipate and negate in her case in chief. 
pnririauez, 780 F.2d at 496. Moreover, it is undisputed that 
the substance of Nakling's testimony had not adequately been 
presented to the jury prior to Nelson's case in chief. See 
j^.; see also Everett v. S.H. Parks S Associates, Inc., 697 
F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1983)(plaintiff•s rebuttal evidence 
-was not truly relevant until [defendant] presented its 
defense"). Turner was thus effectively prevented from 
offering any evidence that the sign was not: obstructed. The 
trial court: abused its discretion by prohibiting Nakling 
from testifying. 
Nelson's obstruction testimony was not the only "new" 
bit of evidence faced by Turner at trial. The presence of 
the City as a "ghost- tortfeasor, made known to Turner just 
minutes before opening statements, constituted "new" 
evidence of monstrous dimensions. The entire thrust of 
Nelson's case changed Irom contesting her own negligence to 
proving the alleged negligence of Salt Lake City, without 
the City present to respond to or defend those allegations. 
Turner was required to respond not just to new evidence, but 
to ney iamm* raised against a nev party. 
Moreover, the admission, of Nakling's testimony would 
have caused no demonstrable prejudice to Nelson. Turner's 
counsel offered to continue the trial or to allow Nelson to 
depose Nakling at her convenience in order to prepare cross-
examination. See State v. Albretsen. 782 P.2d 515, 519 (Utah 
-26-
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1989)(Additions to the witness list should be permitted 
where good cause is shown. "[G]ood cause must certainly be 
construed to include . . . evidentiary matters developed 
during the presentation of the case of either party, mattera 
which require clarification or rebuttal by that party"). 
Nelson further could not have been prejudiced by the 
nature of Nakling's testimony. Nelson presented two 
witnesses who testified that the sign was obstructed. 
Nakling's testimony simply controverted Nelson's witnesses, 
and clearly went to the weight, not the admissibility, of 
the evidence. The jury should have been permitted to heai 
both sides of the story* 
Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the 
court's denial of Turner's rebuttal evidence was manifestl 
unfair and patently prejudicial, and constituted a clear 
abuse of discretion. The court's ruling should be reversed 
and the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
For the foregoing* reasons, Turner respectfully request 
that the trial court's rulings be reversed, and that the 
case be remanded for a new trial consistent with. Utah. Codsi 
Ana- §> 78-27-41 and the case law cited herein • 
Respectfully submitted, 
SCALLET & READING 
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Id. 
The jury's verdict is probably the best evidence of the 
prejudice caused by the addition of the City the day of trial. 
Nelson would seemingly have the Court believe that it was the £it^/ 
not Nelson, who ran the stop sign and broadsided Turner. Had the 
court properly refused to add the City, the jury would have-
apportioned fault solely between Turner and Nelson. it is 
indisputable that, under the facts presented at trial, Nelson would, 
have borne a substantial percentage, if not the entirety, of the 
liability for Turner's damages. The prejudice to Turner is clears 
and unequivocal. 
Because the jury below was prevented from reaching the issue 
of whether Turner was in any way negligent, the Court should 
reverse the trial court and grant Turner a new trial in which the 
jury can apportion negligence between the plaintiff and the 
tortfeasor who participated in the trial, Turner and Nelson. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT REBUTTAL TESTIMONY WAS 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR _ 
Nelson's reliance upon the principle of "surprise" as a ground 
for refusing Turner's proffered rebuttal evidence is indeed curious 
and ironic. The pot has called the proverbial kettle "black." 
Contrary to Nelson's assertions, Turner was not required in 
her case in chief to prove that the stop sign was "unobstructed 
Turner was re<juired to prove that Nelson ran a stop sign, and that 
Nelson's negligence was the proximate cause of Turner's injuries 
In Rodriguez v. Qlin Corp.. 780 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1986), the FiftM 
Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that a plaintiff only bears 
-13-
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harden of proving a prima facie case, and is not required to 
te the negative" of defendant's facts or theories: 
This rule proceeds from the view that a plaintiff has the 
right to adduce whatever evidence is necessary to establish 
its prima facie case and is under no obligation to anticipate 
Eand negate in its own case in chief any facts or theories that 
jpay be raised on defense. 
Record, Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 1055 (7th 
11987); Soliz v. Ammerman. 395 P.2d 25 (Utah 1964) (Rebuttal 
Ince is designed to meet facts not raised prior to the 
idant's case in chief, not facts which could have been raised) . 
*s decision, the court discussed the rules and considerations 
rning the admission or denial of rebuttal testimony. The court 
that rebuttal evidence should be allowed where "new" testimony 
resented during defendant's case in chief. The court stated 
lLogic and fairness lead us to conclude that new evidence for 
^purposes of rebuttal does not mean "brand new." Rather, 
^evidence is new if, under all the facts and circumstances, the 
court concludes that the evidence was not fairly and 
adequately presented to the trier of fact before the 
defendant's case in chief. 
&t 496. 
Witness Nakling's proffered testimony was clearly proper 
Hfttal evidence that should have been admitted by the trial 
^ t . it was offered to refute Nelson's testimony that the stop 
P was obstructed, and to controvert the testimony of Nelson's 
E|*t, who testified that, due to the obstruction, Nelson could 
^reasonably have been aware that-she needed to stop. Nelson and 
^expert's testimony was unquestionably "newH evidence which 
gter
 w a s uncier no obligation to anticipate and negate in her case 
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in chief. Rodriguez. 780 F.2d at 496. The fact that Nakling was 
not included on pretrial Turner's witness list is irrelevant in the 
context of rebuttal. 
Moreover, it is undisputed that the substance of Nakling1s 
testimony had not adequately been presented to the jury prior to 
Nelson's case in chief. See id.; see also Everett v. S.H. Parks & 
Associates, Inc., 697 F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff • s 
rebuttal evidence "was not truly relevant until [defendant] 
presented its defense"). Turner was thus effectively prevented 
from offering any evidence that the sign was not obstructed. The 
trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Nakling from 
testifying. 
Finally, Nelson states in her Brief that 
The Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted in Utah and mosTM 
states of the United States are intended to provide each party 
with full access to the other's case to avoid surprises at 
trial. To allow one side to use a witness that was not 
revealed . . . jeopardizes the other party's trial preparation 
and should not be permitted. 
Nelson's Brief, at 24. We could not have said it better. Had both 
parties to this appeal been accorded the fairness embodied in this; 
paragraph, this case would not be before the Court. 
For th» foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth ii? 
Turner's Brief in Chief, Turner respectfully requests that th* 
Court reverse and remand this case with instructions to gran* 
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Defendant, by and through his attorney of record, 
respectively submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for New Trial and Other Relief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This claim arose over a rear-end auto collision 
between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
2» Before trial,'Defendant/formally filed a Designation 
of Expert Witnesses identifying Newell Knight on January 2, 1996. 
(See Partial Trial Transcript ("Transcript") at 60, attached hereto 
and incorporated herein as Exhibit 1). 
o o D >: ft ? 
3. Plaintiff failed to take the deposition of Mr. 
Knight, and additionally failed to obtain any answers to 
interrogatories from Mr, Knight. See Transcript at 60. 
4. Plaintiff's counsel was aware that Defendant's 
expert, Newell Knight, would testify that Defendant's vehicle was 
traveling about three to four miles per hour at impact. See 
Transcript at 60. 
5. Plaintiff failed to call any expert witnesses 
regarding the speed of the collision in her case in chief. 
6. Defendant moved to exclude Plaintiff's expert 
witnesses from rebuttal because Plaintiff could have reasonably 
anticipated Defendant's evidence before trial. 
7. The Court granted Defendant's motion to deny 
Plaintiff's rebuttal witnesses. Transcript at 76. 
8. In granting Defendant's motion, the Court ruled that 
such evidence was inappropriate for rebuttal because it could have 
/ been reasonably anticipated before trial. The Court reviewed the 
recent case of Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994), in 




POINT I; THE COURT MADE NO ERROR IN PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF'S 
RESERVE WITNESSES FROM REBUTTAL BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO 
ORDERLY PRESENT HIS EVIDENCE 
The Court appropriately excluded Plaintiff from putting 
on her prima facia case in rebuttal. After the defense rested its 
case, the Court asked Plaintiff's counsel to explain the reasons 
why it had not called its expert witnesses in its case in chief. 
Transcript at 58. Plaintiff's counsel responded that lf[i]t is a 
matter of the shift of the burden of proof," and spoke of 
Defendant's responsibility of carrying its "burden of proof." 
Transcript at 58-59. Plaintiff's assertion, however, is a false 
statement under Utah law. Plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of 
proof and must establish a prima facia case in a negligence action. 
Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 462 (Utah App. 1991). 
The burden of proof rested with Plaintiff at all times in the 
instant case. Hence, Plaintiff was unable to proffer a legitimate 
reason for not calling his expert witnesses during Plaintiff's case 
in chief. 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that Plaintiff's delay in 
withholding his expert witnessess until rebuttal was a poor trial 
maneuver. The Court stated the following: 
3 
If you knew that [low speed] was going to be 
an issue in this case, then it is your 
responsibility to present that in your case in 
chief, not present half your case at the 
beginning, and the other half at the 
conclusion of the defense case. 
Transcript at 62 (emphasis added). Plaintiff's counsel readily 
admitted that although he failed to depose Mr. Knight, he had 
nonetheless anticipated the exact content of his testimony. 
Transcript at 60. Justice requires that counsel be held liable for 
the consequences of his trial tactics. The Court further noted 
that Plaintiff failed to comply with the time-honored principle of 
the orderly presentation of the evidence: 
[T]he Court is of the opinion that you simply 
cannot sandwich the defense with testimony 
that you have known and anticipated right from 
the beginning, and hope to maybe get the last 
word in. 
Transcript at 69 (emphasis added). Hence, Plaintiff's rebuttal 
evidence was properly excluded. 
POINT II; NO GROUNDS EXIST TO WARRANT A NEW TRIAL 
Although the trial court has broad discretion to grant or 
deny a motion for a new trial, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 817 
P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court has explained on numerous 
occasions that such discretion should only be exercised with great 
forbearance. Bigler v. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co. , 669 P.2d 
434, 436 (Utah 1983) ("A jury verdict must stand unless there is no 
competent evidence to support it."); Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 
4 
6 f * fl 2 / 0 
530, 532 (Utah 1984) ("The power of a trial judge to order a new 
trial is to be used only in [] rare cases."). Thus, the Utah 
Supreme Court has clearly explained that a very high standard must 
be met before a party should be granted a motion for a new trial. 
A trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial 
absent a showing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Tanaaro v. Marrero, 373 P.2d 390 (Utah 
1962). Plaintiff's Memorandum In Support of Motion for New Trial 
or Other Relief ("Memorandum In Support") fails to establish that 
the Court's rulings constitute either an abuse of discretion 
preventing a fair trial, or an error in law. See Rule 59(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court, therefore, has no discretion 
to grant a new trial in this case because Plaintiff has failed to 
show that at least one of the circumstances in Rule 59(a) is met. 
See Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasvstems W. Contractors, Inc., 767 
P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 
(Utah App. 1989). 
In the instant case, the Court acted within its sound 
discretion and determined that Plaintiff's evidence was not 
appropriate for /rebuttal. It is an elementary notion that a 
Plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof for negligence and 
proximate cause during the case in chief. See Ames v. Ames, 846 
P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993) (noting that the Utah Supreme Court 
5 
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recognizes Plaintiff's burden of proof with regards to negligence 
and proximate cause) . The Court in the instant case was very 
specific in its reasoning for exclusion: 
It defies reason that any of [Defendant's 
expert] testimony would come as a surprise to 
the Plaintiff. It was known or reasonably 
could have been known. It was anticipated. 
It was not a surprise. And it is a 
requirement that the burden of proof be met 
showing that the accident, as it was alleged 
by the Plaintiff, occurred from a high-speed 
collision, that is 10 or 15 or 20 miles an 
hour, that substantial damage would have been 
caused, and that resulting injury could have 
occurred. 
And the Court finds that it is not 
appropriate, when those matters are part of 
the Plaintiff's case in chief, and do not come 
as a surprise in any way to the Plaintiff, 
that it is inappropriate to sandwich the 
Defendant's case with the Plaintiff's case on 
matters that could and should have been 
presented in the case in chief. 
Transcript at 75-76 (emphasis added). Hence, the Court acted 
within its sound discretion in determining that Plaintiff's 
rebuttal witnesses should be excluded because Plaintiff "knew or 
should have reasonably anticipated" that Defendant would claim that 
her vehicle was travelling only three or four miles an hour. See 
Turner v. Nelson. 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994). 
Additionally, Plaintiff has the burden of showing not 
only that an error occurred, but that such error was "substantial 
and prejudicial." Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987). 
0 ft 0 ^ I <> 
Plaintiff has failed to show first that an error even occurred, and 
second, that such an error was anything more than harmless. See 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, motions for new a 
trial should only be granted in situations where the court made an 
erroneous finding, or where there is "substantial doubt" that the 
issues were fairly tried. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391 
P.2d 290 (Utah 1964). Neither situation is applicable here. In 
the instant action, Plaintiff had a full opportunity to meet her 
prima facia burden of production in her case in chief. 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and Other Relief should 
also be denied because it fails to show that a different verdict 
would have resulted absent the Court's ruling. Hall v. Blackman, 
417 P. 2d 664 (Utah 1966). In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that every reasonable presumption in favor of the validity 
of a verdict must be taken as true on appeal. Leigh Furn. & Carpet 
Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). 
Lastly, Plaintiff failed to produce a single authority 
supporting her notions that the Court committed prejudicial error 
in excluding her expert witnesses during Plaintiff's cross-
examinatioru Despite Plaintiff's contention about his inability to 
effectively cross-examine without them, the transcript reveals that 
Plaintiff took a recess in order to consult with his "experts" in 
preparation for his cross-examination of Mr. Knight. Transcript at 
7 
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37-38. After the recess, Plaintiff's counsel proceeded to conduct 
a very extensive and pointed cross-examination of Mr. Knight, 
Plaintiff's contention of prejudicial error simply has no merit. 
POINT III: DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY DID NOT VIOLATE ANY ETHICAL 
RULES AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS IS WHOLLY 
WITHOUT MERIT 
One of Defendant's counsel, John Hansen, moved for 
Plaintiff's rebuttal witnesses to be excluded because Defendant's 
evidence could have been "reasonably anticipated" before trial, and 
therefore should have been presented in Plaintiff's case in chief. 
Attorney Hansen presented a good faith argument to the Court that 
Plaintiff's rebuttal witnesses should be excluded under the 
authority of Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994) ("[T]he 
record seems to support [Defendant's] assertion that [Plaintiff] 
knew or should have reasonably anticipated that [Defendant] would 
claim that the sign was obstructed."). Furthermore, Mr. Hansen 
drew the Court's attention to the fact that striking similarities 
existed between the two cases because both Plaintiffs failed to 
depose Defendant's expert witness and later attempted to call 
rebuttal witnesses concerning issues that should have been 
presented in their respective cases in chief. Such an analogy is 
applicable to the argument that Plaintiff's rebuttal evidence 
should be excluded for failure to anticipate Defendant's evidence. 
8 
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Defendant counter-argued at trial that Turner was 
inapplicable. Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to distinguish 
the Turner holding from the instant facts by arguing that 
Plaintiff's witnesses should not be excluded because they were not 
"surprise" witnesses. See Transcript at 62-64, 
The Court disagreed with Plaintiff's analysis and 
determined that it would not allow Plaintiff to "lay back in the 
bushes" in an attempt to have the "last word." See Transcript at 
66, 69. 
Plaintiff has further charged that Mr. Hansen is guilty 
of misconduct for making a "deliberate misstatement of law" and is 
therefore subject to Rule 11 sanctions. See Memorandum in Support 
at 18. Plaintiff further contends that "the Court misread the 
fTurner 1 decision and agreed with defense counsel's interpretation 
of it." Memorandum in Support at 14. Plaintiff is incorrect on 
both accounts. 
First, attorney Hansen made a good faith argument that 
the 1994 Turner decision created a new standard for rebuttal 
witnesses in Utah. Plaintiff contends that Mr. Hansen is an 
"expert" on Turner and should be sanctioned for his argument. See 
Memorandum in Support at 17-19. Although Mr. Hansen explained to 
the Court that he was on the losing side in Turner, this fact alone 
does not place him on a "heightened" level of professional conduct. 
9 
Plaintiff's ethical charges are extremely serious and ought not be 
made merely because one receives an unfavorable verdict at trial. 
The comments to Rule 3.3, Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, explain the relevant standard for ethical conduct: 
[A]n assertion supporting to be on the 
lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit by 
the lawyer or in a statement in open court, 
may properly be made only when the lawyer 
knows the assertion is true or believes it to 
be true on the basis of reasonably diligent 
inquiry, 
(emphasis added). Mr. Hansen not only believed his statements to 
be true when he made them, but he still believes that Turner 
supports his argument. As such, Mr. Hansen is not subject to 
discipline for violating the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Second, Rule 11 sanctions are only appropriate for signed 
documents submitted to trie Court in violation of the rule. Jesche 
v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 1991). By the Plaintiff's own 
admission, Rule 11 is inapplicable to the instant facts. See 
Memorandum in Support at 19. 
Lastly, the partial transcript only reveals that it was 
Mr. Hansen agreeing with the Court's opinion on Turner, not the 
other way around as Plaintiff has charged. Transcript at 71 ("Let 
me indicate that I think the Court's reading of Turner v. Nelson is 
exactly correct."). 
10 
V 1» V /, I C 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Defendant respectfully 
requests that the Court deny Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and 
Other Relief. 
. C?4* 
DATED t h i s / day of A p r i l , 1996 . 
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OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
confidence in your opinions with regard to the speed of those 
vehicles? 
A. I have not. 
MR. HANSEN: Nothing further. 
MR. KING: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Is there any objection to the witness 
being excused? 
MR. KING: Not at all. 
MR. HANSEN: No objection. 
THE COURT: You may be excused. Thank you. 
MR. HANSEN: The defense rests. 
THE COURT: The Court will speak with counsel for a 
moment, on the record, out of the presence of the jury. So the 
bailiff will take the jury into the jury room, and there is a 
question to be resolved out of the presence of the jury. 
(The jury left the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: The record will reflect that the Court is 
in session, out of the presence of the jury. The Court was 
notified prior to the defense resting in this case that the 
plaintiff intended to call a rebuttal witness to the accident 
reconstruction witness called by the defendant. Explain to the 
Court the reasons why the witness that you seek to call now was 
not included in your case in chief. 
MR. KING: It is a matter of the shift of tne burden 
of proof, your Honor. We had the burden of proving there was 
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1 an accident, and resulting from the accident there was an 
2 injury. The defense said they would prove that the impact was 
3 sufficiently low speed, that the injury would probably not have 
4 occurred. They may not have put on that defense depending on 
5 how our case went. Depending on how effectively they put their 
6 case on, we may or may not need the expense of a rebuttal 
7 witness. But we certainly don't need to take the time of the 
8 Court and of the jury with rebuttal witness until they have 
9 carried their burden of proof by showing they have a serious 
10 challenge to our version of the facts. At that point we called 
11 the rebuttal witness, and that was what the rebuttal witness is 
12 for, and this is the classic use of it. 
13 If I could refer to the case they gave the Court of 
14 Turner vs. Anderson. 
15 THE COURT: The Court has that case. 
16 MR. KING: In my reading of it, the witness was 
17 offered as a rebuttal witness. The problem, and the sole 
18 problem in the case was the witness1 name had not been given to 
19 the other side in time for them to depose him or find out 
20 anything about him. The fact that he was offered as a 
21 rebutting witness, the Court had no complaint with that. What 
22 they complained about is that the need to call him could have 
23 been anticipated earlier, and the other side given notice 
24 earlier. So inferentislly — or else — also, he is an 
25 improper rebuttal witness. They didn't say that. They said 
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you knew the issue. You knew the rebuttal you were going to 
put on. And you didn't give them notice that you had a witness 
to prove it. The function of the rebuttal witness, our burden, 
their burden, rebut, inferentially, it was entirely 
appropriate. So this case supports us, in view of the fact 
they stipulate, gave full and timely notice that we would call, 
possibly, Mr. Lord, a reconstruction expert, and, possibly, 
mr. Hardle, who is a Taurus mechanic and repairman. 
THE COURT: Did you depose Mr. Knight? 
MR. KING: I did not, your Honor. I have dealt with 
him in court before. 
THE COURT: Were you aware of what he was going to 
testify to? 
MR. KING: That he was going to put in the speed 
around three to four n?"**' an hour. 
THE COURT: When did you Vuow that? 
MR. KING: I assumed that he was going to do that, 
because it is what he customarily does. It was confirmed when 
I heard the opening statement. 
THE COURT: Prior to the jury being impaneled, what 
date, in relation to the 6th of February of 1996, did you know 
that Mr. Knight was going to testify for the defense, and when 
his testimony would be? 
MR. KING: It would be around the 1st of January, 
because our letter to them advised Mr. Lord would be our 
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1 rebuttal witness is dated, I think, January 6. 
2 MR. HANSEN: We formally filed on January 2 a 
3 designation of expert witnesses and identifying Newell Knight. 
4 MR. KING: That sounds right. 
5 MR. HANSEN: That was on January 2 he was formally 
6 identified. 
7 MR. KING: We, within four days, gave the response, 
8 if Newell is going to be here, we are going to call Mr. Lord. 
9 THE COURT: Is there some reason why you didn't call 
10 him? 
11 MR. KING: Mr. Lord is here. He is waiting to 
12 testify as my rebuttal witness. 
13 THE COURT: Let the Court reason outloud for a moment 
14 on the record, and then I will invite both counsel to respond. 
15 The Court has been cited by both counsel to the case of Turner 
16 vs. Nelson. It is a Supreme Court case decided March of 1994. 
17 The holding in that case regarding the calling of rebuttal 
18 witnesses centered on whether or not the evidence sought to be 
19 rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to trial. 
20 If it could, then the witness should be called in the case in 
21 chief. 
22 MR. KING: No, your Honor, it is not what the case 
23 said. 
24 THE COURT: Just a moment. Let me reason, and then 
25 you are invited to argue. If the witness -- if the testimony 
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1 that you are seeking to rebut could reasonably have been 
2 anticipated before trial, put it in, in your case. If you knew 
3 that the defense in this case was going to be that the accident 
4 was low speed, is nonimpacting, noninjury causing, it is your 
5 responsibility, knowing that, to present evidence in your case 
6 in chief to establish that it was a high accident, high impact, 
7 and injury causing. That's precisely what the sandwiching of 
8 the defendant's case involves. If you knew that that was going 
9 to be an issue in this case, then it is your responsibility to 
10 present that in your case in chief, not present half of your 
11 case at the beginning, and the other half at the conclusion of 
12 the defense case. 
13 MR. KING: The Court hasn't had a chance to study 
14 Turner vs. Nelson in detail. 
15 THE COURT: That's probably a true statement. You 
16 realize that you gave me this case while the Court was in 
17 session, and I have glanced at it as we have ruled on 
18 objections and listened to the testimony of the witness. But 
19 at least the paragraph clearly states that if you could 
20 anticipate certain witnesses to -- I mean certain evidence to 
21 be presented, then why didn't you present evidence to the 
22 contrary in your case in chief? 
23 MR. KING: What the case turns on, your Honor, is not 
24 whether he was rebuttal witness or a direct witness. What tne 
25 case turned on was that he was a surprise witness. 
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THE COURT: No. It was whether or not he was listed. 
That was one of the questions, whether or not he had been 
listed as a witness. 
4 I MR. KING: That was the sole ground for disposition. 
5 THE COURT: Not so. That clearly is not so. 
6 MR. KING: Please take a look at page 1024, 
7 paragraphs 3 and 4. "When the offering party contends that the 
8 undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut, the issue hinges on 
9 whether the evidence sought to be rebutted could have 
10 reasonably been anticipated." 
11 THE COURT: That's the Court's point. 
12 MR. KING: That doesn't put him into the case as a 
13 witness in chief. 
14 THE COURT: Read the next paragraph. The next two 
15 paragraphs^, as a matter of fact. The trial court indicated 
16 that the testimony regarding the obstructed stop sign was not 
17 new. The plaintiff had known for weeks and months that they 
18 were contending — 
19 MR. KING: Indeed — 
20 THE COURT: Just a moment. I will give you all the 
21 time to argue. You give me all the time to argue. The trial 
22 court said you have known from the get-go that there was going 
23 to be a question about whether or not this stop sign was 
24 J obstructed. Nov;, you can't, with that knowledge, wait until 
the defense has presented their case, go out the night of 
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1 trial, get a witness, and bring him in and say that the stop 
2 sign was not obstructed. You have known that was going to be 
3 an issue all along. In this case, by your own admission, you 
4 have said that you didn't even bother to depose the 
5 reconstruction witness, because you knew he was going to 
6 testify that the speed of impact was three to four miles an 
7 hour. You can't claim that that was a surprise segment of this 
8 witness' testimony. And if you have known that, then you 
9 should properly prepare in your case in chief to deal with it. 
10 MR. KING: There isn't a single reference in this 
11 opinion, Nelson vs. "Turner to — whether the surprise witness 
12 should have been in the case in chief or rebuttal. That was 
13 not the issue. The issue was that he wasn't given to the other 
14 side. 
15 Now, if I know — I am going to put on my case. 
16 Speed is not a factor. They are going to put on their case 
17 that speed is a big factor. I rebut that by showing --
18 THE COURT: Speed has been a factor from the outset 
19 in this case. 
20 MR. KING: This is rebuttal by definition, and it is 
21 the only place in the orderly sequence of the case it should be 
22 put on. I don't have to anticipate their defense until they 
23 put it on. 
24 THE COURT: But it is part of the case in chief. You 
25 are going to show high impact, high speed, and resulting 
64 
injury, you have to prove it. That's one of the elements of 
your case. 
MR. KING: I never had to prove high speed. I had to 
prove a collision and an injury. At any rate, if you will 
please read the case again, it is solely because they didn't 
give timely notice until the night of trial that they were 
going to call this witness, not that he was a rebuttal witness. 
From the defense presented, they could have ar.tirir^tcd they 
would have had to call a rebuttal witness, they did not give 
notice they were going to call the rebuttal witness until the 
start of trial. There was no objection to him being a rebuttal 
witness. The objection was no notice, as the opinion says, so 
he couldn't have been deposed or — and so forth. There is not 
a word in the opinion calling him as a rebuttal witness was 
wrong. You can anticipate a rebuttal witness is needed if the 
other side is going to put on a defense. That's what rebuttal 
is for. What we have to do, if we know we are going to put a 
rebuttal witness in, we have to give them time to prepare. 
I try a case against General Motors, and I say the 
fuel tank was defective. Then they bring in a bunch of 
witnesses that the fuel tank — 
THE COURT: Was not defective? 
MR. KING: They come up with new ideas, new 
approaches to it. Until they have done that, their battery of 
experts, I don't know exactly what to rebut. What I do know is 
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1 I have to rebut, and I give the name of the expert I am going 
2 to call to rebut. 
3 THE COURT: What you do know is it is your 
4 I responsibility to prove a defective fuel tank. You know that 
5 right from the get-go. So you have to prove it in your case in 
6 chief. You can't lay back in the bushes and wait until the 
7 defense has presented its case, and then sandwich the defense 
8 case in with what should have been presented in your case in 
9 chief. That's a time-honored principle of the orderly 
10 presentation of the evidence. 
11 MR. KING: Okay. When I tried a case of that kind, 
12 the defense General Motors put in, Ford actually, was the 
13 people would have died anyway, because the accident was severe. 
14 They didn't worry about whether the tank was adequate or not. 
15 When I realized they were coming into this new defense, because 
16 of the character of the witnesses they called, and associate 
17 counsel who had worked with Ford before said these guys will 
18 say these guys would have died anyway, then we put in our 
19 rebuttal witnesses. We didn't have to prove that in our case 
20 in chief, but we did have to prove it in our rebuttal. 
21 Rebuttal is a proper part of trial. 
22 THE COURT: It is if there is some element of 
23 surprise. 
24 MR. KING: It is not the element of surprise. 
25 THE COURT: That is what this opinion says. 
*,
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1 MR. KING: It doesn't. It says the whole problem is 
2 that she knew she needed a rebuttal witness, and so she should 
3 have told them. When she didn't tell them until the day of 
4 trial, she couldn't call the witness. 
5 THE COURT: Let's read the next paragraph. The trial 
6 court indicated that the testimony regarding the obstructed 
7 sign was not new. It wasn't a surprise. It wasn't something 
8 that had been injected into the trial during the defense of the 
9 case. Everybody knew by the pleadings and by discovery and so 
10 on that that was challenged by the defense, that the sign was 
11 obstructed. It was not a new factor. And the Court says, 
12 "Therefore, Nelson's essential defense had always been that the 
13 sign was obstructed, and although the trial court didn't 
14 specifically say that Turner could reasonably have anticipated 
15 that testimony, the thrust of the Court's ruling is clear. 
16 Nelson's evidencp /TBS foreseeable." And it is foreseeable here 
17 that they were going to challenge — 
18 MR. KING: But there is not a line in here that says 
19 Nelson wouldn't have been an appropriate rebuttal witness. The 
20 thing is they didn't give notice of him at all until the third 
21 day of trial. The proper sequence in the case is we put on 
22 ours, they put on theirs, we rebut. Just like debate. Open, 
23 respond, rebut. 
24 THE COURT: Perhaps the better analogy is you have 
25 the burden of proof, and in your case in chief you are well 
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1 advised to prove what you intend to prove. In this particular 
2 case, the Court understood that you were going to prove that 
3 this accident was caused by a 10- to a 15-mile-an-hour impact 
4 or 15- to 25-mile-an-hour impact, and, because of that, the 
5 plaintiff sustained injury. You need to prove that. 
6 MR. KING: I didn't have — I didn't care what speed 
7 was testified to. When she talked about speed and measurements 
8 and so forth, I said those are approximations. She 
9 acknowledged that. She said it was at least ten miles an hour. 
10 But ten miles was not vital to our case. 
11 THE COURT: It is three times the amount of the 
12 anticipated testimony of the defense expert. You said that you 
13 have known all along he was going to estimate this speed at 
14 three to four miles an hour, even if you went at ten miles an 
15 hour. 
16 MR. KING: Supposing they decided not to call 
17 Mr. Knight. 
18 THE COURT: It would have been a plus for you, 
19 probably. 
20 MR. KING: Possibly. But the thing is I don't have 
21 to put on testimony that speed is a factor in the injury until 
22 they put on testimony that it is not. 
23 THE COURT: I don't think -- this Court has never 
24 operated on that basis. Having tried over 200 jury trials in a 
25 criminal arena, it would be highly imprudent for a prosecutor 
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to present evidence that somebody was shot, and not put any 
evidence in until the gun — about the gun until rebuttal, 
hoping that somebody is going to challenge the shooting. 
MR. KING: I agree with that entirely. It is this is 
a totally different concept. 
THE COURT: It is, but the principle is the same. 
MR. KING: It is not, because in a criminal defense 
they don't have to put on a defense at all, and you are 
obligated to advise them of everything you have. 
THE COURT: You don't have to put anything on in a 
civil defense. They could have rested at the conclusion of 
your case, sent it to the jury, and let the jury do what they 
want to. 
MR. KING: They might have come up with 15 other 
theories. 
THE COURT: What they might have done and what they 
in fact did do are worlds apart, and the Court is of the 
opinion that you simply cannot sandwich the defense with 
testimony that you have known and anticipated right from the 
beginning, and hope to maybe get the last word in. I don't 
know what it is. 
MR. KING: I didn't know what to have Mr. Lord say 
until I heard exactly what Mr. Knight said and exactly the 
bases that he used. I couldn't use Mr. Lord in advance. 
THE COURT: Proffer what this witness is going to 
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1 testify to. 
2 MR. KING: The essential thing I am going to have 
3 Mr. Lord work on is something I couldn't anticipate Mr. Knight 
4 would say. Mr. Knight said that the body of the woman in the 
5 striking car was less exposed to harm, or more exposed to harm, 
6 than the body of the person in the struck car. 
7 THE COURT: Do you want him to testify to that? 
8 MR. KING: I didn't know he was — Mr. Lord will 
9 testify that when your head moves back a few inches, this can 
10 cause substantial damage, based on a tremendous amount of 
11 experience he has. 
12 THE COURT: If that's what you are going to call your 
13 rebuttal witness for, I will permit you. You have won trie 
14 argument. If you are going to call this witness and say that 
15 you couldn't reasonably anticipate that, because the driver of 
16 the striking car was leaning into the passenger's seat, and, 
17 therefore, was more vulnerable to injury than the driver of the 
18 car that was struck, you can call the witness and testify to 
19 that. What else? 
20 MR. KING: Just on the same line, he said the person 
21 in the car struck, eing in the seat, would not be injured. So 
22 when I cover that topic, vulnerability to injury being struck. 
23 MR. HANSEN: I think that's going to open the whole 
24 flood gates, if I may respond very briefly. 
25 THE COURT: Go ahead. You had no opportunity. Take 
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1 what time you like and respond. 
2 MR. HANSEN: Having been counsel for Plaintiff in 
3 Turner vs. Nelson --
4 THE COURT: Were you on the winning or losing side of 
5 that? 
6 MR. HANSEN: I was on the side that tried to present 
7 the new witness. I was on the losing side. We briefed this 
8 before the Supreme Court. So I well know the arguments and the 
9 positions of the parties and the underlying facts. Let me 
10 indicate that I think the Court's reading of Turner vs. Nelson 
11 is exactly correct, even though the Court hasn't had a lot of 
12 time to look at that case. And there are some similarities 
13 that are extremely striking here. 
14 And one is the fact that as the Court has said, the 
15 critical issue is whether or not they could reasonably 
16 anticipate the issue to be raised at trial. We tried to claim 
17 surprise in Turner vs. Nelson, saying there was certain 
18 testimony that came out in opening statement, that we didn't 
19 anticipate, so we went and found this new witness. And the 
20 Court said, "Wait a minute. The issue of obstructed stop sign 
21 was known from the time the complaint was answered, and it was 
22 denied, and the time the defendant's deposition was taken." 
23 Same thing in this case. May of 1995. Our defendant is 
24 deposed, and she says, "This was a rolling accident. This was 
25 not a high-speed collision." The dispute was before them. 
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They never sent discovery requests to the defendant. 
When we identified Newell .Knight, they didn't ask, in formal 
discovery, what will Mr. Newell Knight testify to? They never 
asked to take his deposition. And in that Turner vs. Nelson 
case, on page 1025, the Supreme Court chided Plaintiff's 
counsel, stating that they did not take the depositions that 
they properly should have taken. In fact, the record suggests, 
if Turner failed to appreciate the extent of Nelson's reliance 
on this defense, it was probably because of Turner's earlier 
failure to depose adequately several witnesses. Nelson's 
counsel had listed certain witnesses on their designation of 
witnesses, and had made them available for deposition. Turner, 
the plaintiff, took no attempt to depose the expert or, as far 
as we can tell from the record, determine through written 
interrogatories the cortc \ of that testimony. 
That's what Plaintiff has done here, and I don't 
think they should be allowed to now come in and put on their 
prima facie case in rebuttal, when it could have been 
reasonably anticipated, and should have been. 
THE COURT: Someplace in law school and thereafter 
the Court learned that rebuttal testimony was testimony to 
rebut a surprise witness, a surprise element of the case. I 
don't know if there is any sound argument to the contrary. Why 
would it be rebuttal if the element of surprise is not there, 
if you can anticipate, reasonably anticipate, and in your case 
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know for a certainty that the speed was going to be challenged 
in this case, and that the resulting injury was going to be 
challenged, why not present that in your case in chief? I just 
can't think of one good reason why. 
MR. KING: Mr. Knight came up — Mr. Knight is not my 
favorite. 
THE COURT: Aside from that, you knew what he was 
going to say. Or if you didn't, you reasonably could 
anticipate. 
MR. KING: I made the comment for a reason, and the 
reason is that I think Mr. Knight is one of these people, and 
this is just my opinion of him, that will say what he has to 
say in order to get where he wants to go. 
THE COURT: You are entitled to your opinion on that. 
MR. KING: It makes it impossible for me to 
anticipate what Newell is going to say until he has said it, 
because I haven't found he bases his testimony on scientific 
data, but on what's going to work for a given problem. I could 
not anticipate exactly what he is going to say until he said 
it, even though I know the generalities of it. For example, he 
also testified that the bumper would have been deformed if it 
had been hit over a few miles an hour, and it would have been 
torn. 
Now, on the other witness we have, Mr. Hardle, that's 
total surprise, is out in the hall with the Taurus bumper 
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1 that's not damaged a bit, and it was in a much higher speed 
2 impact, which would show that Mr. Knight's testimony on that 
3 area" is in error, and that was total surprise we couldn't 
4 anticipate. Again, surprise is not the element of purpose of 
5 rebuttal. Purpose of rebuttal is we put on our case in chief, 
6 they put on their case, then we rebut their case. Supprise is 
7 not a factor. 
8 THE COURT: Are you saying that everything that they 
9 have testified to in the defense you have the right to rebut? 
10 MR. KING: I wouldn't --
11 THE COURT:. Then where does surrebuttal come in? 
12 MR. KING: On occasion it comes up. 
13 THE COURT: Where does the process start and end? 
14 And in this case, if the Court was of the opinion that this 
15 witness caught you off guard, that this witness said something 
16 that you totally had not expected he was going to say, or that 
17 just came out of the blue, the proverbial blue, and stiuck you, 
18 a rebuttal witness is appropriate. But you have represented to 
19 the Court that you knew exactly he was going to testify to a 
20 low-impact collision, very low speed, and, in his opinion, 
21 there would not be any significant injury. 
22 MR. KING: Right. He did testify in those areas. 
23 When he went further and said, had there been any more speed, 
24 the Taurus bumper would be permanently deformed, and when he 
25 said the position plaintiff was in, in her vehicle, she would 
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not be hurt, because she was protected, these were new areas we 
didn't anticipate. Mr. Lord can handle the injury and 
Mr. Hardle can handle the bumper. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. HANSEN: We will submit it. 
THE COURT: The Court finds and rules as follows: 
The plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known and 
anticipated that the defense was going to challenge the 
testimony of the plaintiff. The knowledge is based on the 
photographs of both vehicles, the back bumper of the 
plaintiff's vehicle, the front bumper of the defendant's 
vehicle. The photograph is based on the absence of skid 
marks -- or the findings, rather, are based on the absence of 
skid marks, the findings are based on the absence of any 
significant movement of the plaintiff's vehicle after the 
striking, and the findings are based on the lack of any injury 
to the driver of the striking car. 
It defies reason that any of that testimony would 
ccr.£ £.s a surprise to the plaintiff. It was known or 
reasonably could have been known. It was anticipated. It was 
not a surprise. And it is a requirement that the burden of 
proof be met showing that the accident, as it was alleged by 
the plaintiff, occurred from a high-speed collision, that is 10 
or 15 or 20 miles an hour, that substantial damage would have 
been caused, and that resulting injury could have occurred. 
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1 And the Court finds that it is not appropriate, when those 
2 matters are part of the plaintiff!s case in chief, and do not 
3 come as a surprise in any way, to the plaintiff, that it is 
4 inappropriate to sandwich the defendant's case with the 
5 plaintiff's case on matters that could and should have been 
6 presented in the case in chief. 
7 Therefore, based on the proffers made by Plaintiff's 
8 counsel, on what rebuttal witnesses will testify to, if called, 
9 the motion to deny those witnesses testifying as rebuttal 
10 witnesses is granted. 
11 MR. KING: Your Honor, I understand the ruling in 
12 general, but the surprise elements that Mr. Knight said the 
13 bumper would deform, that we could not anticipate, and Mr. 
14 Hardle is here with the bumper. May I call him on that 
15 specific point? I can call Mr. Lord on the specific point of 
16 where you are in the passenger seat, as the car gains momentum 
17 underneath you, it exaggerates the motion to the head, and this 
18 makes you very prone to injury. 
19 MR. HANSEN: I think Plaintiff is trying to reargue 
20 his motion. 
21 THE COURT: Counsel for the defendant will prepare 
22 very specific findings on this motion in limine, and an 
23 accompanying order, and at some time in the next two to three 
24 weeks submit the findings to opposing counsel for approval as 
25 to form, and the findings and the order to the Court for 
75 
1 signature, so the record is clear. And if somebody wants to 
2 challenge the Court's finding, that's why we have an appellate 
3 court, 
4 MR. KING: If the record may show my exceptions to 
5 the ruling of the Court, with the -- we have no rebuttal. Has 
6 Defendant rested? 
7 MR. FELT: Yes, 
8 THE COURT: Yes, the defense rested, and that's when 
9 the Court excused the jury, and then we had the motion in 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, BRAD J. YOUNG, hereby certify that I attended and 
reported, as official court reporter, the proceedings in the 
above-entitled and numbered matter before the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian and that the foregoing is a true and correct transcription 
of my stenographic notes thereof. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 29th day of March, 1996. 
BRAD J. Y0U&"! 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
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ADDENDUM "N" 
JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4 5 90 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
Attorneys for Defendant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone*: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN B. ASTILL, : FINDINGS OR FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, , : 
vs. : Civil No. 950902307PI 
LEESHA CLARK, , : Judge Pat Brian 
Defendant. : 
Jury trial in the above-captioned matter was held on 
February 6-8, 1996, the Honorable Pat Brian presiding. David J. 
Friel of King, Friel & Colton appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. 
Paul S. Felt of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and John E. Hansen of 
Scalley & Reading appeared on behalf of Defendant. During the 
course of the trial, Defendant objected to the Plaintiff's calling 
of two rebuttal witnesses after the close of Defendant's case. The 
Court, having rendered its decision after considering each parties' 
respective arguments, now makes and enters the following Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
C \JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK FOF 
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dPR 1 6 1996 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about June 6, 1994, a rear-end automobile 
collision occurred between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
2. Defendant's deposition was taken on May 24, 1995, 
during which she testified that she was travelling at a low speed 
when she collided with Plaintiff. 
3. The Court held a Scheduling Conference on September 
14, 1995 at which time the Court ordered Plaintiff to identify her 
witnesses by November 15, 1996. A Court Order was entered 
thereafter v/hich so stated. 
4. On November 15, 1996, Plaintiff identified her 
witnesses, including: 
"6. West Valley Auto Body 
a. Plaintiff's husband took her vehicle to this 
shop for a damage estimate. 
b. Plaintiff's counsel will provide the name of 
this mechanic as soon as possible." 
6. On January 2, 1996, over a month before trial, 
Defendant formally identified Newell Knight as an expert witness in 
Defendant's Designation of Expert Witnesses. 
7. Plaintiff failed to take Mr. Knight's deposition or 
to obtain any other form of discovery from Mr. Knight, including 
Answers to Interrogatories. 
C \JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK.FOF 2 
8. Plaintiff thereafter submitted a letter to 
Defendant's counsel wherein she supplemented her witness list to 
include "David Lord either as a direct or rebuttal witness." 
9. At trial, Plaintiff failed to call any expert 
witnesses during her case in chief to establish the speed of the 
collision between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
10. Defendant's expert, Mr. Knight, testified at trial 
that the Defendant's speed at the time of collision was three to 
four miles per hour. Mr. Knight based his conclusions on the 
photographs of the vehicle's bumpers, the lack of movement of 
Plaintiff's vehicle, the absence of any skid marks and the absence 
of any injury to Defendant resulting from the collision. 
11. After the defense rested its case, Plaintiff 
attempted to call expert witnesses David Lord (accident 
reconstructionist) and Mr. Hardle (a mechanic) to testify for the 
first time in rebuttal. 
12. Plaintiff's counsel knew before trial that the 
defense was going to challenge Plaintiff's account of speed of the 
accident and assumed that Defendant's expert, Newell Knight, "was 
going to put the speed around three to four miles an hour." 
Partial Trial Transcript at 68. This was confirmed when 
Plaintiff's counsel heard Defendant's opening statement. Id. 
C:\JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK.FOF 3 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The speed of Defendant's vehicle has been an issue 
since the beginning of this litigation and Plaintiff could have and 
should have reasonably anticipated Defendant's evidence before 
trial and could have and should have called her expert witness in 
her case in chief to meet Plaintiff's prima facia burden. 
2. Plaintiff's expert witnesses should be and are 
excluded from testifying in rebuttal because Plaintiff improperly 
withheld them until after the defense rested. 
DATED this \ v day of April, 1996 
BY THE COURT: 
-r ^ 7 — ^ (/ 
Honorable Pat Bri 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the April, 1996, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to the following: 
Samuel King, Esq. 
David J. Friel, Esq. 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Paul S. Felt, Esq. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
C \JEH\CLIENTS\CLARK FOP 4 
John Edward Hansen, Esq. 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM "O 
SAMUEL KING, No. 1820 
DAVID FRIEL, No. 6225 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-3751 
Facsimile: (801) 486-3753 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN B. ASTILL, * PLAINTIFF'S REPL^ TO DEFENDANT'S 
* MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * 
* Case No. 950902307PI 
LEESHA CLARK, * 
* Judge: Pat Brian 
Defendant. * 
OVERVIEW 
Justice Zimmerman recently said lawyers are expected to play 
hardball, but could not play lowball. 
Trial counsel fight hard to win. Iz is their nature. If the 
fight is not clean, as well as hard, what happens to justice? The 
law draws the line - counsel may fight like rutting bulls. What they 
may not do is intentionally mislead the Court. 
Plaintiff claimed defense crossed the line at trial. What 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant has not stated facts or law differing with those 
submitted by Plaintiff in her New Trial Motion except Defendant says 
Mr. Knight testified the impact speed did not exceed 3 - 4 m.p.h., 
and Plaintiff had said 2 - 3 m.p.h. Plaintiff accepts that 
modification. 
2. Accordingly, those facts alleged by Plaintiff are admitted. 
(Rule 8(d) U.R.C.P.) 
3. As stated in Plaintiff's New Trial Motion, and supported by 
the affidavits of her two experts, Mr. Hardle and Mr. Lord, the front 
bumper of a Ford Taurus does not deform, even at impact speeds of 15 
to 20 miles per hour. Mr. Hardle had with him at Court an undamaged 
Taurus bumper that he had personally removed from a car he was 
repairing, where the impact speed was over 15 miles an hour, and that 
bumper was undamaged. 
4. Thus, as a factual matter, Defendant having full opportunity 
to do so, has presented no evidence to this Court to back up Mr. 
Knight's key testimony that the Taurus bumper would have deformed at 





THE COURT MADE TWO ERRONEOUS RULINGS OF LAW. IN DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION IT HAS SUBMITTED NOT ONE CASE IN SUPPORT OF EITHER OF 
THOSE RULINGS. ACCORDINGLY THE LAW CITED BY PLAINTIFF ON THOSE TWO 
POINTS IS CONCEDED BY DEFENDANT TO BE ACCURATELY STATED LAW. 
The two points of law are these: 
1. AS A MATTER OF LAW A PARTY MAY HAVE THEIR EXPERT ATTEND 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE OTHER PARTY'S EXPERT. 
The Court erred by granting Defendant's Motion to exclude 
Plaintiff's experts during Mr. Knight's testimony. 
This error denied Plaintiff the right of effective cross-
examination of Mr. Knight. It also denied Plaintiff the right to have 
her experts adequately prepared to give appropriate rebuttal testimony. 
It is for reasons like these that Mr. Lord states in his affidavit 
(Plaintiff's New Trial Motion, Ex. 2) that in all the 29 years that he 
has been testifying as an expert witness in Court, that this is the 
first time he has ever been excluded from listening to the testimony of 
the opposing expert. 
The Court was led into this error by legally inaccurate argument 
of defense counsel. This was an important argument. Defense counsel 
should not have made it unless, pursuant to Rule 11 U.R.C.P., they had 
3 
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a good-faith and objective belief that they were citing accurate law to 
the Court. 
Annexed is Utah's most recent opinion dealing with an attorney's 
duty to objectively and accurately submit valid law to the Court. The 
case is Giffen v. R.W.L., 286 Utah Adv. Rep. 29. (3-14-96). 
In Giffen, Mr. Giffen, a licensed Utah lawyer appealed the trial 
court's order of Rule 11 sanctions against him, including an order that 
he pay all the fees and costs to a natural father for fighting and 
succeeding in getting an order of adoption of the man's child set 
aside. The child was 16 months old, born and raised in California 
until brought to Utah for adoption by a Utah family. Mr. Giffen had 
failed to comply with the Interstate Compact of Placement of Children 
and he failed to obtain a preplacement adoptive study, as required by 
Utah law. 
In his defense, Mr. Giffen argued that because of time constraints 
he hadn't had the opportunity to realize that he had to comply with 
those legal requirements. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed fees, including the appeal, because 
Mr. Giffen, is a lawyer, had a duty to know appropriate law before he 
proceeded. 
Defense in Astill violated Rule 11 when they submitted the 
exclusion of experts argument to the Court at trial. Defense continues 
4 
to violate "Rule 11 now by not admitting that it's argument was wrong. 
They have that professional duty of candor to the Court. 
, 2 . A PARTY MAY CALL REBUTTAL WITNESSES TO COUNTER DEFENSES 
RAISED BY DEFENDANT AT TRIAL. THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT REQUIRED TO 
ANTICIPATE THOSE DEFENSES AND MEET THEM IN HER CASE IN CHIEF. 
In her New Trial Motion, Plaintiff cited Utah and general law, all 
in conformity, that it is proper, and the right of a Plaintiff, to wait 
until Defendant has put on it's exact defenses, and then rebut them. 
THERE IS NOT A SINGLE CASE CITED BY DEFENDANT THAT SUPPORTS THE 
ARGUMENT DEFENDANT MADE TO THE COURT AT TRIAL THAT SUCH REBUTTAL 
WITNESSES MUST BE CALLED AS PART OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
Having submitted no law, pursuant to Rule 8 (d) U.R.C.P., 
Defendant concedes that the law cited by Plaintiff on point is 
accurate. 
What Defendant has done in it's Memorandum in Opposition is to 
continue to misquote the Turner v. Nelson case (Plaintiff's New Trial 
Motion, Ex. 3). 
Defense argued at trial, when Plaintiff started to call rebuttal 
witnesses, that Turner barred the use of rebuttal if defenses might 
have been anticipated. Defendant argued to the Court that Turner held 
such witnesses had to be called in the Plaintiff's case in chief. 
— There is no line in Turner so holding. 
5 
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The sole reason in Turner that Plaintiff could not use a rebuttal 
witness, was that the witness was a surprise witness. 
The holding in Turner is just absolutely clear. It entirely fails 
to support the argument Defendant made at trial, and renews now in it's 
Memorandum in Opposition that Turner requires rebuttal witnesses be 
called as part of a case in chief if a defense can be anticipated. 
There isn't a word in Turner that says that. There isn't a word 
in it that says calling a rebuttal witness after defense has rested is 
not proper. 
Defense counsel having been trial counsel at Turner submitted Utah 
case law on the Turner appeal that calling rebuttal witnesses was 
proper. 
Defense counsel now seems to state that the law he submitted to 
the Utah Supreme Court was false, by now arguing exactly the opposite 
of what he argued to the Supreme Court. 
Portions of Defendant's brief and reply on point in Turner are 
exhibits 4 and 5 in Plaintiff's New Trial Motion. 
Mr. Hansen's argument in Turner was (1) Utah law allowed him to 
call a rebuttal witness. With that a given rule of law, he asked (2) 
to be excused in calling a surprise witness on the basis that he 
himself was surprised and didn't know he needed him until the trial 
commenced. The Court agreed with (1) he could call a rebuttal witness. 
6 
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It disagreed with (2) Mr. Hansen had no basis for calling a surprise 
witness. 
Which way does Mr. Hansen want it? 
Did he mislead the Utah Supreme Court in briefing that he had a 
basic right to call a rebuttal witness or does he now mislead this 
Court by saying that Astill has no similar right? 
POINT 2. 
THAT DEFENSE CONTINUES TO MISLEAD THE COURT AS TO THE PROPER 
INTERPRETATION OF TURNER CONTRARY TO IT'S PLAIN HOLDING, AND DEFENSE 
CITING NO OTHER UTAH CASE IN SUPPORT, INDICATES DEFENSE STILL HOPES TO 
CONFUSE OR MISLEAD THE COURT. THIS REQUIRES SANCTIONS, 
In Giffen the attorney got hit with all fees of the natural father 
even though the lawyer could argue that time pressure kept him from 
adequately researching. 
Here, Mr. Hansen has had the opportunity to reflect and to 
reanalyze. 
Notwithstanding thai: he continues to argue that Plaintiff has to 
call in her case in chief all witnesses dealing with possible defenses 
that might or might not be raised by the Defendant at trial. 
As defense counsel has submitted no citation in support, the 
defense position is much weaker than in Giffen, so the justification 
for sanctions is greater. 
7 
0 0 o *> 6 * 
POINT 3. 
PLAINTIFF HAS GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO RULE 50 U.R.C.P. 
Defendant also argues in it's Memorandum in Opposition that 
Plaintiff has failed to state a basis for new trial under Rule 59 
U.R.C.P. 
In her original Motion, Plaintiff cited Rule 59 and the specific 
sections of it violated. 
It is sufficient to cite Rule 59. "New trials: amendments of 
judgment. (7) error in law." 
R. 59 (1) also applies: "...irregularity in the proceedings by 
the... adverse party... by which either party was prevented from having 
a fair trial." 
This applies because the Court was misled intentionally as to law 
by defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial should be granted. 
Defendant and her counsel should be required to pay all of 
Plaintiff's fees and costs for trial and for arguing and briefing this 
matter on New Trial Motion. 
DATED this I£ day of April, 1996. 
Jjrn^^j 
Samuel King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
OOOH 
CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE 
I hereby certify that on the 19 day of April, 1996, I faxed, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing "Plaintiff's Reply to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition" to the following parties: 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Facsimile No. 801-531-7968 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 




Attorney for Plaintiff 
Si5:astill.rpy 





Giffen v. R.W. L. 
286 Utah Adv. Ret). 29 
, the trial court cannot order UDOT 
permits. Without the permits, the 
re illegal, and the trial court is 
diction to change the signs' legal 
rant the further relief requested by 
declaratory action. See Utah Code 
-8 (1992) ('Further relief based on 
'judgment or decree may be granted 
sary or proper. The application 
J be by petition to a court having 
to grant the relief.* (emphasis 
CONCLUSION 
rort erred in concluding that section 
3) applies only to areas outside 
cities and towns. Outdoor 
3 prohibited in any location zoned 
nary purpose of allowing outdoor 
Because Kunz and UDOT have 
conflicting evidence regarding 
3 primary purpose behind its zoning 
. land, we reverse the grant of 
lgment and remand for a trial on 
uDurt also erred in concluding that 
Drder on Remand has no binding 
uz. Nevertheless, res judicata does 
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FILED: March 14, 1996 
Fifth District, Washington County 
The Honorable James L. Shumate 
ATTORNEYS: 
John A. Giffen, St. George, Appellant Pro Se 
James L Watts, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood. 
This opinion is subject to revision before > 
i j pqblicarion in the Pacific Reporter. -
*%3S T*i!& BENCH, Judge? ^ V ^ ; ? ^ 
• John A. Giffen, an attorney, appeals the trial 
court's imposition of sanctions against him 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The trial court sanctioned Mr. Giffen 
for filing an amr ' ' petition for adoption on 
behalf of his ci*w X, the Hankses. The trial 
conn found thai Mr. Giffen was deficient in 
failing to make reasonable inquiry into existing 
f
 law and for pleading information in the amended 
petition that was not well grounded in fact- We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
If MrT Giffen was contacted by an individual in 
nm on behalf of a pregnant mother wher 
[to place her unborn child for adoption^ 
ultimately selected the' Hankses air 
^idoptive parents and they agreed to provide: 
^^-^juppott for, the i^nodxer durmg hIJ* 
y^The mother caine"to; Utah in Ji 
09W40She>- was ^ accompanied Vby *he£ 
•^ixteen-month-old child, R*N.Ii When the 
f mother miscarried, Mr. Giffen informed her that' 
Idie ^ financial support would cease unless the 
[would alio w the Hankses to adopt R.N.L. Thev | mother agreed and RJ .^L^began living with the 
:•; J i Mr; Giffen filed an adoption petition on behalf 
% t f the Hanloes/m Fifth District C^^pleadmf 
^"that"the natural parents would Jonsent to the 
VT <fadoption of R.N.L. Because the natural mother 
was temporarily residing in Salt Lake City, Mr.' 
Giffen arranged for a Salt Lake attorney, Pan! i UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
Halliday, Jr., to obtain the mother's consent in 
Third District Court. That case was assigned to 
Judge Homer Wilkinson. 
When Mr. Halliday and the mother arrived in 
Third District Court on July 29, 1993, Judge 
Wilkinson was out of town and Judge Glenn 
Iwasaki agreed to hear the matter. During the 
hearing, the court became concerned about the 
voluntariness of the mother's consent. The 
mother stated that she thought the adoption was 
"a temporary custody thing/ which she was 
doing because she was homeless and thought it 
would be best for her child. She also stated that 
she wanted the Hankses to pay for counseling 
and therapy for her. Judge Iwasaki refused to 
take the consent until there could be further 
communication between the birth parents and the 
Hankses, concluding that "there was no way we 
can do this today." 
Mr. Halliday then spoke with the mother in 
the hall and they decided to go ahead with the 
consent. They proceeded to the courtroom of 
Judge John Rokich, who agreed to hear the 
matter in view of Judge Wilkinson's absence. 
Without knowledge of the hearing before Judge 
Iwasaki, Judge Rokich took the, mother's, 
consent. '^•;-•-'i^ «>. y ' *%-".'•%* ••' jj^v^r*-'^ 
In early August, R.W.L.?the child's natural4 
father, contacted Mr., Giffen and told him that* 
he * would not'consent to the adoption, phe^ 
child's father retained attorney James Watt to 
seek a dismissal of the adoption petition. ^ The^  
other's motion to terminate the adoption ^ was? 
filed m early September, along with a jnotion 
for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of thejptah; 
Rules of Civil Procedure. A hearing on both 
motions was set for September 8,1993, in Fifth 
District Court. Because Mr. Giffen had not 
received proper notice of. that hearing, it was" 
rescheduled for September 27,1993. , $MM 
On September 21 j 1993, Mr. Giffen riled an 
amended adoption petition with only one changed 
Rather than alleging that the natural father 
would consent to the "adoption, the amended 
petition averred that an action would be initiated 
to terminate the natural other's parental rights. ? 
Mrr Giffen made arrangements with an attorney 
in jCalifornia to file an action to terminatejthe j 
Kpatural father's parental rights^based^upon^ 
~~......^.> j ^ actioa waj filed in QuUfbrnia, 
Septonbet2Af19n.mm¥l 
~ i September Ztsmgir ~ 
*^-ral fatherV mot ion^ ^ _ 
and motion for sanctions. Witnesses'A«I < 
both sides testified and several affidavita^were1 
considered|4br the ^ limited purpoW^of, 
determining whether sanctions were warranted 
against Mr. Giffen. l|tfhe courT ordered the 
petition for adoption dismissed and imposed 
sanctions upon Mr. Giffen for the natural 
father's costs and attorney fees incurred after 
September8,1993.*H*" - 1 ^ ^ ; •/ ' - ^ ':i-
^ Mr.; Giffen^ subsequently filed a motion 
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 'alleging that irregularity in the 
proceedings or abuse of discretion prevented a 
30 Guien r. R.W.L. 286 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 
fair trial. After a hearing, the trial court upheld 
the sanctions previously imposed, but denied 
additional sanctions. On appeal, Mr. Giffen 
argues that the trial court'ijorder imposing Rule 
11 sanctions against him?wa^ improper, and 
alternatively, the amoun^pffsanctions was 
excessive.., 
-"' STANDARD OF REVIEW; _ 
When reviewing Rule 11 determinations, "we 
review the trial court's findings of fact under a 
clearly erroneous standard . .4- and the trial 
court's determination of the type and amount of 
sanction to be imposed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.".? Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah App-
1993). We review the trial court's conclusion 
that Rule 11 was violated under a correction of 
error standard. Id. We grant a measure of 
discretion to the trial court's application of the 
legal principle to the facts. See State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 938-39 (Utah 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
L Rule II Sanctions 
Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certification by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in ; 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a ^ 
good faith argument for the extension, * 
modification, or reversal of existing law, ^ 
and that it is not interposed for any •• 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to ; 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increay^ 
in the cost of litigation. . . . If a pleading, 
motion or other paper is signed in violation 
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, a represented party, 
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
include an order to pay to the other party or 
parties the amount of the reasonable 
expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the pleading, motion, or other paper, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added). 
The determination of whetfesffconduct violates 
Rule 11 is made on an o b j e ^ k basis. Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P*2dlMfl71 (Utah App. 
1989). The trial juds^pSK^mstant case 
articulated several reasons imSSpking Role 11 
sanctions against Mr^Gifle^Tfir trial court 
found Mr. Giffen deficient in failing to make 
reasonable inquiry into existing law, and also, 
for making allegations in the amended petition 
that were not well grounded in fact. Specifically, 
the trial court found that Mr. Giffen failed to 
obtain a preplacement adoptive study; failed to 
comply with the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children; knew or should have 
known the natural mother's consent was flawed; 
knew the natural father would not consent to the 
Code*€o 
Prove Utah 
adoption; and failed to make a reasonable 
inquiry as to whether the natural father's 
parental rights were terminable. 
The trial court found that Mr. Giffen failed to 
obtain a preplacement adoptive stady for the 
adoption prior to the child's placement with the 
adoptive parents, as required by Utah Code 
Ann. 578-30-3-5 (Supp. 1993). Mr. Giffen 
admitted at the evidentiary hearing that he had 
not obtained the preplacement study because of 
time constraints. Section 78-30-3.5 also provides 
that the court may authorize temporary 
placement of a child in the potential adoptive 
home pending the completion of the adoptive 
study. However, Mr. Giffen failed to comply 
with this requirement as welL A reasonable 
inquiry of the applicable statute by Mr. Giffen 
would have revealed the necessity of the 
preplacement study or temporary placement 
order. 
Utah law requires the adoption petition to 
indicate whether the child was born in another 
state, and if so, the petition must state that the 
requirements of the Interstate Compact on 
Placement of Children have been met. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-30-15.1 (1995). The purpose of 
the Interstate Compact is to inform state 
authorities of the proposed adoption so they can 
protect the child's interest by ascertaining and 
evaluating the circumstances of the proposed 
placement. Utah Code Ann^ §62A-4a-701 
(1993). While both petitions stated die child was 
born in Sacramento, California, neither petition 
mentioned the Interstate Compact or compliance 
therewith. Mr. Giffen made no effort to comply 
with the Interstate Compact. Again, a reasonable 
inquiry of the appropriate statutes would have 
revealed that compliance with the Interstate 
Compact was required. 
The trial judge also held that Mr. Giffen was 
in violation of F*' - 11 for proceeding with the 
adoption aft^ 1« 1 cw or should have known 
that the natuu mother's consent was flawed. 
Mr. Giffen did not directly take part in the 
hearings held in Salt Lake City before Judges 
Iwasaki and Rokich. However, the evidence 
supports the court's conclusion that Mr. Giffen 
knew of alleged deficiencies in the mother's 
consent when ho filed the amended petition. 
The record contains an affidavit of the natural 
mother. She asserted that following her 
miscarriage, Mr. Giffen told her the Hankses 
would no longer pay her living expenses. He 
also told her that she would have to repay the 
travel, living, and medical expenses already 
expended, and that she would be "out on the 
street" unless she agreed to let the Hankses 
adopt R.N.L. She asserted that she only 
consented to the adoption because of financial 
pressure and duress from Mr. Giffen. She also 
stated that subsequent to giving her consent, she 
requested that Mr. Giffen terminate the adoption 
proceedings and return the child to her. 
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The mother's affidavit was dated September 2, 
1993, and the mailing certificate attached thereto 
indicates that a copy was mailed to Mr. Giffen 
on that same day. Therefore, Mr. Giffen knew, 
prior to filing the amended petition on 
September 21, 1993, that the mother claimed 
her consent was given under financial pressure 
and duress, and that she- wanted the adoption 
proceeding terminated.' Nevertheless, in the 
#.' amended petition, Mr. Giffen represented that 
v the? natural mother would consent to the 
; adoption. His pleading was therefore not well 
grounded in fact as required by Rule 11. 
- •' Finally, the trial court also found that Mr. 
Giffen knew the natural father refused to consent 
to the adoption, and also that Mr. Giffen had 
failed to make reasonable inquiry as to whether 
the r natural father's parental rights were 
\ terminable. However, we need not address 
•: * whether the trial court could sanction Mr. Giffen 
;; for lack of reasonable inquiry as to the interests 
V - of the natural father in view of the errors of law 
and pleading heretofore mentioned^ >' f>^*f^ 
, ' ' In Taylor, sanctions against an attorney, were 
v upheld after the attorney erroneously submitted 
* a. will to probate with only^onesignature "and* 1& F:^  | | attached* the^pmmg do<nimemV to/a* pleading^ 
\ m Taylor, 770 P.2d at 170-7IVTheie errors caused, 
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 V ^opposing counsel to incurcosts of researching^ 
v pieparmg, and argumg a'nx)tion to dismiss as 
- v well as a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. This 
jp:- court held that the attorney should have known 
;v ' that the will, bearing only cm signature, was 
invalid. Thus, sanction*' were appropriate to 
compensate the opposing party for having to 
defend the flawed action. hL 
Similarly, the natural father in this case w& 
forced to retain counsel to challenge and defend 
against an adoption that Mr. Giffen reasonably 
should have known was defective. Thus, Rule 
11 sanctions were appropriate. 
IL Sanction Amount 
^ "Rule 11 gives trial courts great leeway to 
"tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of the 
particular case." Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171. 
•use Mr. Giffen failed to comply with the 
^requirements of a valid adoption and because he 
tbiew^of the natural mother's challenge to her 
jbcbnjent^we see no abuse of discretion in- the 
Jfrial court's order awarding the natural father his 
coats and attorney fees incurred after September 
8,1993. See Schoneyv. Memorial Estates, Inc., 
863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah App. 1993) (holding no 
abuse of discretion awarding costs and attorney 
fees when sanctions were warranted). 
• -. • CONCLUSION 
We therefore affirm the sanctions imposed by 
the trial court and award the natural father his 
costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. We 
remand the case to the' trial court for a 
determination of the amount of the award on 
appeal. 




v Judith M. Billings, Judge -
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. Although unclear from the trial transcript, the 
parties agreed at oral argument before this court that 
the affidavits of the natural mother tad others were 
admitted into evidence for the limited purpose of 
determining whether sanction! were warranted against 
Mr. Giffen. i• .«.-._ 
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Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Tyrone Medley 
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Kea Chamberlain, K. L. Mclff, Richfield, for 
plaintiff'' 
Ronald L. Rencher, Mark Dykes, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter, 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: , 
SAG Incorporated appeals a district court 
order dismissing with prejudice its claims for 
relief. SAGV complaint alleged three claims 
against Intennountain Power Agency (IPA) that 
arose out of a contract wherein SAG agreed to 
sell to IPA water rights appurtenant to land SAG 
owned near Delta, Utah. The district court 
dismissed SAG's first and third claims, one 
sounding in contract and the other in tent, on 
statute of limitations grounds; and on 
cross-motions for summary judgment the court 
ruled that SAO had entered into an accord and 
satisfaction and released the second claim for 
relief. We affirm. * 
. . . . . .•• - * * • » * • - . - ! . - . • ' 
I. BACKGROUND 0 0 ? 7 1 
Prior to 1980, SAG owned 228 acres' irf 
Millard County, Utah, that included a well used 
for irrigation purposes and a water right that 
allowed the use of 5 cubic feet per second from 
April to October of each year, up to a maximum 
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CASE NO: 950902307 Pi 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was rear-ended by Defendant. As a negligence issue, proximate cause was the 
controlling matter. On January 2nd Defendant filed a designation of expert witnesses which 
identified Newell Knight as a defense expert. Plaintiffs counsel, having had previous experience 
with Mr. Knight, chose not to depose him and assumed that Mr. Knight would put Defendant's 
speed at from three to four miles per hour. That assumption was confirmed in Defendant's 
opening statement on around February 7th. Plaintiff notified Defendant on around January 6th 
that they would call David Lord as an expert rebuttal witness. 
At trial, Plaintiff testified that she was struck by Defendant and presented evidence that 
her health sharply worsened after the accident. Plaintiff further testified that the Defendant was 
traveling at around 10 to 15 miles per hour at the time of the collision. Mr. Lord was prepared to 
testify that the damage done to Plaintiffs Ford Explorer was the result of an impact of well over 
five miles per hour. Mr. Lord was also prepared to testify that such impact is sufficient to cause 
injury. Plaintiff chose to save Mr. Lord's expert testimony for rebuttal. 
(I i. ft:;:« 
During Mr. Knight's direct-examination, Plaintiff requested that Mr. Lord be allowed in 
the courtroom to analyze Mr. Knight's testimony and advise Plaintiffs counsel on how to 
conduct the cross-examination. The Court held this in violation of the exclusion order but 
allowed a recess in between direct- and cross-examinations in which time Plaintiff consulted Mr. 
Knight about how to conduct the cross-examination. At the close of Defendant's case-in-chief, 
the Court took up the issue of Mr. Lord's rebuttal testimony. The Court held that Mr. Lord's 
testimony was proper case-in-chief evidence and should have been presented in Plaintiffs case-
in-chief The Court disallowed Mr. Lord's rebuttal testimony. 
BASIS OF MOTION 
Plaintiff moves for new trial. The basis of the motion is: 1) "the exclusion of Plaintiff s 
expert during testimony of defendant's expert," 2) "refusing to allow plaintiff to call rebuttal 
witnesses who would have effectively demolished Mr. Knight's testimony," and 3) "the court 
was led into error in refusing to allow rebuttal by intentionally false statements of law made by 
defense counsel James E. Hansen," (Plaintiffs New Trial Motion, 13-14). Plaintiff claims that 
the errors were prejudicial in nature and the trial outcome would likely have been different if not 
for these errors. Motion denied. 
COURT FINDINGS 
As with the first allegation of error, the exclusion of Mr. Lord during Mr. Knight's 
testimony, an exclusion order was issued by the Court at the pre-trial conference. At no time 
before the trial did either party request the presence of their experts in the courtroom during the 
direct-examination of opposing expert testimony. Furthermore, the Court recessed after Mr. 
Knight's direct-examination and before his cross-examination. The recess provided Plaintiff 
2 
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with ample time to discuss Mr. Knight's testimony with Mr. Lord. The cross-examination of Mr. 
Knight was lengthy and well directed. The outcome of the trial would not have been altered by 
Mr. Lord's admission into the courtroom during Mr. Knight's testimony. 
Plaintiff also alleges as error the Court's refusal to allow Mr. Lord as a rebuttal witness to 
Mr. Knight's testimony placing the speed of the accident at from three to five miles per hour. 
Plaintiff knew as early as January 2nd that the Defense was to call Mr. Knight as an exnert 
witness. Plaintiff assumed that Mr. Knight was to place the speed of the accident at around three 
to five miles per hour, and that assumption was confirmed during the opening statement made by 
the Defense. Plaintiffs counsel also represented to the jury in opening statement that there was a 
substantial impact estimated at from 10 to 25 miles per hour. The Plaintiff testified in direct-
examination that, in her estimation, the Defendant was traveling at least 10 miles per hour at the 
time of impact. Plaintiffs counsel made an issue of speed in both their opening statement and 
direct-examination of the Plaintiff 
The Court held that "the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known and anticipated 
that the defense was going to challenge the testimony of the plaintiff." The Court also held that 
as an issue of fact, it was Plaintiffs burden of proof to show "that the accident, as it was alleged 
by the plaintiff, occurred from a high-speed collision, that is 10 or 15 or 20 miles an hour, that 
substantial damage would have been caused, and that resulting injury could have occurred." 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined rebuttal evidence as to "refute, or to so modify or 
explain, as to nullify or minimize the effect of the opponent's evidence," Board of Education of 
South Sanpete School District v. Barton. 617 P.2d 347, 349 (1980). It is well established in 
common law that rebuttal evidence is relevant only by virtue of evidence introduced by the 
3 
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adverse party and is not mainly to support the case-in-chief. Wells v. CM. Mays Lumber Co.. 
Inc.. 754 P.2d 888, 889 (Okl.App. 1987). Evidence which was proper or should have been 
introduced in chief should not be introduced on rebuttal. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 102, 215; 75 Am.Jur. 
Trial § 374, 573. 
The dangers of saving proper case-in-chief evidence is illustrated in 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial 
§373, 573, Evidence in chief on rebuttal: 
'The danger of tactically saving evidence in chief for rebuttal is that an appropriate 
objection will bar it altogether. For example, defense counsel may object on the ground 
that the question goes beyond the proper scope of rebuttal and allows the plaintiff to 
withhold part of its case in chief depriving the defense of the opportunity to address the 
evidence in its case in chief. Even relevant rebuttal evidence, which might properly have 
been introduced in the case in chief, may be excluded where its probative balance is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or unfair and harmful 
surprise." 
Speed was an issue from the outset. Plaintiff had burden of going forward with evidence 
that not only was Plaintiff hit by the Defendant, but that such impact was of sufficient speed to 
cause the damages claimed by the Plaintiff. Mr. Lord's expert testimony was not presented 
during Plaintiffs case-in-chief, but was instead reserved for rebuttal. The result was to unfairly 
prejudice the Defense by saving such testimony as the last word and not giving the Defense an 
opportunity to address it in their case-in-chief. 
I { A *) ^ *> 
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Therefore, plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
Dated this ^)£ day of July, 1996. 
sz.^6 / > 
PAT B. BRIAN J 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Court Ruling, 
postage prepaid, to the following, this ^ Qj^U day of July, 1996. 
Samuel King 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
John Edward Hansen 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorney for Defendant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
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JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4590 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN B. ASTILL, : ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
AND OTHER RELIEF 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : Civil No. 950902307PI 
LEESHA CLARK, '.:: Judge Pat Brian 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiff Lynn B. Astill's motion for a new trial and 
other relief came for hearing before the Court on May 31, 1996. 
Plaintiff Lynn B. Astill was represented by Samuel King of King, 
Friel, Colton & Hardy. Defendant Leesha Clark was represented by 
John Hansen of Scalley & Reading and Paul Felt of Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker. The Court, having reviewed and considered all the 
evidence, the corresponding memoranduma of points and authorities 
submitted by the parties, having heard the oral arguments of 
counsel, having taken the matter under advisement and being duly 
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor, it is 
hereby 
AUG 2 2 1996 
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial and Other 
Relief is hereby denied. 
DATED this 6K<^\ day of August, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
0 0 0 2 8 C 
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I hereby certify that on the /Sl"lh day of August, 1996, 
I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing Order on Motion 
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Samuel King, Esq. 
David J. Friel, Esq. 
2120 South 1300 East, No. 301 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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Paul S. Felt 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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LEESHA CLARK, ) 
) 
Defendant/Appellee. ) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 950902307PI 
judge: Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiff hereby appeals from a jury verdict and judgment 
adverse to her, and from an Order Denying her a New Trial Motion, 
dated August 22, 1996, Judge Pat B. Brian, Third Judicial Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
DATED THIS ?3> day of September, 1996, 
Samuel King 7 
Attorney for Appellant 
0C02S* 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document by U.S. mail, postage pre-paid on September 
2~> , 1996, to: 
JOHN EDWARD HANSEN 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 EAST 300 SOUTH, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
PAUL S. FELT 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM "T 
Q. You still mark 80-percent improvement, right? 
A. Some of the — one of the symptoms, or generally, 
yes, but not the flare-up. 
Q. Then the last one, right — 2/7/95, that's, what, the 
day before the trial; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
MR. KING: I think we are in f96. 
MR. FELT: We are. I apologize. I thought these 
were in order. And they are. For some reason, we have just 
this one here. We have already looked at February. I have no 
further questions. 
MR. KING: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
Call your next witness. 
MR. KING: The plaintiff rests her case, your Honor. 
MR. FELT: May we approach the bench, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
MR. FELT: The defendant calls Leesha Clark to the 
stand. 
THE COURT: Step forward and be sworn, please. 
LEESHA CLARK, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the defendant, being 
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
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Will you tell the jury your name? 1 
Leesha Clark. J 
Can you really speak loudly? 1 
Leesha Clark. 1 
A little nervous? 1 
Yes. 
What is your address? J 
2390 West Surrey Road, Bennion, Utah, 84118. J 
How old are you? J 
29. 
Are you married? 1 
Yes. 
Do you have children? 1 
Yes. 
What are the names and ages? I 
I have two children. I have a daughter, Laticia, who 
; and I have a son, Tyler, who is four. 
Are you employed? 
Yes. 
By whom? 
Wenco & Pozzi Windows. 
What do you do for that company? 
I am an office manager. 
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Q. Let's just get right to the point and talk about the 
day of this accident. That's June 6, 1994. You were involved 
in an automobile accident with the plaintiff, Mrs. Astill? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What car were you driving on that day? 
A. I was driving a Ford Taurus that I had rented. 
Q. Why had you needed a rental car? 
A. I was in a previous accident on 1-215, and it had 
totaled my car — actually, not totaled it, but I needed a 
rental car. 
Q. Was that accident your fault? 
A. No. 
Q. Where were you going at the time of the accident? 
A. I was on my way to work, but I had to drop off my son 
to day care on the way. 
Q. Were you late? 
A. No. 
Q. Why don't you just take — as I understand, you are 
going east on 4100 South, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Take it from there, as you approach that intersection 
of — what is it, 4800 West? 
A. Right. I am stopped at 4800 West and 4100 South. 
Q. Let's take it from the time you approach that 
intersection. What color is the light as you approach? 
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A. It is red. 
Q. Do you see any cars in front of you? 
A. Yeah. The Explorer was in front of me. 
Q. Take it from that point, and tell me what happened. 
A. Well, it is a red light, so I stopped behind this 
other car, and I hear my son click off his seat belt, or undo 
his seat belt. 
Q. How old is he? 
A. He was three then. He is four now. This isn't our 
normal car, that we are used to driving. And so I reatched over 
to click it back into place, and my foot slipped off the brake, 
and I just felt a bump, and so I got up, and I noticed I hit 
the lady in front of me. 
Q. Let's take it, stop there. What position were you in 
when you felt this bump? 
A. I was trying to put the seat belt on my son, so I was 
like way reaching around him, while I am trying to keep my foot 
on the brake. 
Q. Had you been conscious that your car was moving 
forward? 
A. I was at a stop. We were at the stop light. That's 
when I hear the noise. So I just reached over to put it back 
into place. 
Q. When you came to a stop behind the Explorer, how far 
were you behind? 
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1 A. I don't know, just a normal distance you would stop 
2 behind a car. I am not really good at judging distance. Maybe 
3 a quarter of a car length, a few feet. I don't know. Just 
4 normal. 
5 Q. When your foot slipped off the brake, did it hit the 
6 accelerator, make the car go forward? 
7 A. No. I just felt a bump, and I sat up, and I knew 
8 that I had bumped into the lady in front of me. 
9 Q. Describe what that bump felt like to you. 
10 A. Just a bump. It was just a bump. It was just a 
11 noise, and I sat up and went — this isn't my car. I am not 
12 used to driving it. I went, oh, no. I got out of the car to 
13 talk to her. Actually, we both got out. She asked me what 
14 happened. 
15 Q. We will get to that in a minute. Did this bump knock 
16 you or your son? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Did it affect your body? Was it severe enough to 
19 jostle you or anything? 
20 A. No, not at all, just enough that I noticed that I had 
21 bumped into her. You would feel that. I mean, I felt a bump, 
22 not an impact. 
23 Q. Did you move your car before you talked to the 
24 defendant? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. Was your car in a position, two cars, where traffic 
2 could move around? 
3 A. Yes, because there is a turning lane on the left-hand 
4 side and the right-hand side. We didn't move our vehicles at 
5 all. We weren't — we weren't in the intersection at all. And 
6 there was enough room for traffic to go around us. And we were 
7 only out there a few minutes. 
8 Q. So you got out, the defendant came back to your car, 
9 and you get out before you talk to her? 
10 A. I don't remember who actually got out of their 
11 vehicles first. I just remember that we ended up meeting at 
12 the middle, where I had bumped into her, and that's where she 
13 just asked me what happened, and I explained to her I was 
14 trying to put on my little boy's seat belt, and my foot had 
15 slipped off the brake. And so we were trying to see if there 
16 was any damages on the vehicle. And I said, "This is not my 
17 car." So, yo\\ know, and we are looking around, because I am 
18 not used to driving this car, and she didn't notice any damage, 
19 and I said, "I don't think there is any damage." 
20 Q. Did you see any damage to the front bumper of the 
21 Taurus you were driving? 
22 A. No, nothing at all. But there wasn't — there wasn't 
23 anything to see. 
24 Q. You can see that this Explorer has a trailer hitch on 
25 it? 
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A. Right. 
Q. Did the trailer hitch dent the bumper of the Taurus? 
A. Not that I noticed. I noticed when I got to work 
that. I had a little ding in the license plate. But before 
that, no, I didn't notice it. 
Q. Even after you checked it again at work, the only 
damage you saw was a ding in the license plate? 
A. Yeah, like from the ball of her thing, it just made 
an indent around the little plate of the license, or at the top 
of the license. 
Q. When you took this car back to the rent-a-car 
company, did you tell them about this incident? 
A. Yes. 
MR. KING: I object to hearsay. 
THE COURT: She is not relating what was said, what 
someone eise sa id, merely what she stated. Overruled. 
Q. Did they come ov»t and look at the bumper of the 
Taurus? 
A. When you take back the vehicle, that's the first 
thing they do is walk around the vehicle. 
MR. KING: Excuse me. I want hearsay excluded, if 
she is going to give a narrative answer, just be instructed. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. Go on a 
question-and-answer basis. And anything someone out of court 
said to her is hearsay. 
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Q. I am not going to ask that. I am just asking, did 















When you took it back? 
Yes. 
Did you tell them where on the car this accident had 
Yeah, I had to show him, yes. 
And did he then examine that area specifically? 
Yes. 
And were you charged any sum for damage to that car? 
No, not anything at all. 
THE COURT: Is this a good place to take our break, 
MR. FELT: I am almost done, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you? 
MR. FELT: I really cm. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
Why didn't you call the police? 
Because, from what I understood, there were no 




How long were you at the scene? 
Five minutes maximum. We both had to go to work, and 
it was more of kind of, I am sorry, got in the car, maybe some 
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phone numbers, and went on our way. 
Q. Did you tell the plaintiff that it was a rented car 
at that time? 
A, Yeah, because she was — she asked me if I had any 
damages to my car. I said, "This isn't my car." That was — 
Q. Did you tell her what company? 
A. No, not at that time. We just exchanged phone 
numbers and addresses and things like that. 
Q. Did she ask you? 
A. No. 
Q. Did there come a time later on that day when you 
talked to her? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Was that a phone conversation? 
A. Actually, it was with my husband, and then I returned 
the phone call to her at work, 
Q. I am just getting when you talked to her at work. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What time of day was that? 
A. Probably late afternoon sometime. 
Q. Tell me what was said, and by whom, in that 
conversation between you and Mrs. Astill. 
A. She previously asked my husband where we rented the 
car, and my husband didnft know, because I took care of all of 
that. So he had given me that information, and I just relayed 
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1 it on to her, and told her where I had rented it from, and that 
2 was all, and that was the end of the conversation. 
3 Q. Short conversation? 
4 A.. Yes. 
5 Q. Was there another conversation? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Did the plaintiff call back? 
8 A. Yeah, later that evening, at my house. 
9 Q. Just you and she on the phone? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. What was said by whom in that second phone 
12 conversation? 
13 A. She proceeded to tell me how much damage she had to 
14 her vehicle, that the bumper was dented, that the doors 
15 wouldn!t open, that something was wrong with the back end of 
16 it, and so I asked her, if we had all tftis damage, how come we 
17 didn't call the police? And she didn't say anything. She 
18 said — she told me you could have up to so many dollars worth 
19 I of damages before you call the police, or something, and the 
20 conversation ended there. 
21 Q. Did you ever refuse to tell her what company you 
22 rented it from? 
23 A. Oh, no. Why would I? 
24 Q. Did you have another conversation with her? 
25 A. Yeah. 
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Q. Same night? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened? Tell me what was said by whom in that 
third conversation. 
A. She had called again to explain to me that now her 
back was hurting, and that she was going to seek medical 
attention the next day. And again I said, if we had all these 
damages and you were hurt this bad, why didn't we call the 
cops? I didn't understand. And then she started just to tell 
me all of these rules and stuff that you can and can't do. I 
just said okay. I didn't know what else to tell her. I said I 
understand, she was going to go to the doctor. I didn't know 
what else to tell her. 
Q. Did you have any further information to give her? 
A. No. We had already exchanged all the information 
that we had. 
Q. Did she call back another time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Another time? 
A. Yes. She called back to — just to explain to me all 
these rules, and all this stuff that I was supposed to do, all 
of the damages on her vehicle, how long before she could seek 
medical attention. And I said, "I don't know what else to tell 
you." She was telling me all these rules and regulations that 
I was supposed to follow. I just said, "I don't have any more 
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to tell you.'1 
Q. On this fourth conversation the same night, did you 
say anything else to her? 
A. No. I just said, "That's all. I cannot talk to you 
any more." I didn't know what she wanted. She knew 
everything. What was I supposed to tell her? 
MR. FELT: That's all, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. We will take the noon recess. 
Ladies and gentlemen, during the recess, remember the 
admonition given previously. Do not discuss the case among 
yourselves, do not permit anyone to discuss the case in your 
presence, do not form nor express an opinion in the case until 
it has been submitted to you for your deliberation and your 
decision. We will be in recess until 1:30. Return at 1:25 so 
that we may start promptly at 1:30. It is still our intention 
to have the case submitted to the jury mid afternoon or 
slightly later. The Court will be in recess until 1:30. 
Counsel, the Court has another matter to attend to. 
Maybe I can meet with you just a little before 1:30, and we 
will take a look at the jury instructions and verdict forms. 
(A lunch recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: The record will reflect the presence of 
the jury, counsel, and the parties. Are you ready to proceed 
with cross-examination? 
MR. KING: Thank you, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Step forward. You have been previously 
sworn. And you may conduct your cross-examination. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KING: 
Q. When the accident happened, were you in a hurry? 
A. Just on my way to work. 
Q. I understand your son, Tyler, is four now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So he was, I guess, just barely three when the 
accident happened? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had him in a seat belt, not in a car seat? 
A. Yes, he was in his seat belt. 
Q. He undid his seat belt? 
A. I just heard it unclick. 
| MR. FELT: You have to speak up. 
Q. He undid the seat belt? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why wasn't he in a car seat? 
A. That wasn't our normal car that I was used to 
driving, and the car seat that I have was in my car from the 
previous accident. That wasn't something that I normally did. 
Q. But you had this rental car for three weeks? 
A. Yes. He was just used to sitting on the side with 
the seat belt over him. 
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Q. In regard to the accident itself, I tried to write 
down what you said, and you said you just felt a bump. It was 
just a noise. Are those the terms you used this morning to 
describe the severity of the impact? 
A. Just a bump. I really — I mean, it has been almost 
two years. It was just a bump. I let my foot off the brake, 
and rolled into her. I don't know how more to explain it. 
Q. Later in the day, while you were at work, Mrs. Astill 
called to say that she had talked to her husband, there was 
damage to the bumper, and she wanted to have the name of the 
rental company, didn't she? 
A. No. She previously had called my husband, and my 
husband called me at work to tell me that she had called, and 
asked for information, where I got the rent-a-car. And he 
didn't know that information, said I had to call her. 
Q. Then you called her? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. But you didn't give her the information on the rental 
car? 
A. Yeah, I would have had it, I am pretty sure. It just 
comes, it is in the glove box. I know that's where I got it 
from. They just give you a pink receipt or whatever. So, 
yeah, I did give her the information. 
Q. You said that she made a number of calls to you? 
A. Yes. Once I got home, she did. 
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Q. The other calls were at home? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Directing your attention to your deposition, do you 
recall that I took your deposition? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was May 29 — May 24 of last year? 
A. I am not sure the exact date. 
MR. KING: I would ask Mrs. Clark's deposition be 
published. 
MR. PELT: No objection. 
THE COURT: Granted. 
Q. Do you have a copy of it in front of you? 
A. No. 
MR. FELT: Your Honor, may I approach the witness and 
give her a copy? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q, Directing your attention to page 21 of your 
deposition, Mrs. Clark, I will read the questions I asked you 
before. You were under oath, weren't you, when you gave your 
deposition? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And you do have to give a verbal answer for the 
reporter. 
A. Yes. 
Q. We will start on line 21 of page 21. I will read the 
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questions, and if you will read your answers. "Did she ask you 
the name of the rental car company?" Please read your answer. 
It starts on line 22. 
A. "Yes, she did, when she called my husband, and I 
returned her phone call. 
Q. "What did she tell you about that?" Correction, 
"What did you tell her about that?" 
A. "I canft remember if I had the papers in front of me, 
or if I told her I would call her back. I am not sure." 
Q. Read what you said. 
A. "I canft remember if I had papers in front of me, or 
if I told her I would call her back. I am not sure. I can't 
remember. I know, eventually, she ended up getting it through 
one of her phone calls." 
Q. "The other phone calls were the ones later in the 
night when you were saying she was giving you all these rules?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "What she was trying to find out was the name of the 
rental car company?" 
A. That's not true, because I gave it to her in the 
phone call. There would be no reason for me not to give it to 
her. 
Q. Excuse me. You just read your deposition May of last 
year, when you said, "I told her I had to get back with her. I 
am not sure. I can't remember. I know, eventually, she ended 
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1 up getting it through one of those phone calls." 
2 A. She did. She got it through a phone call. 
3 Q. You testified earlier today you gave her that 
4 information when you called her in the afternoon, so she had no 
5 reason to make the calls in the evening. 
6 A. Well, those were — those phone calls she made in the 
7 evening were about how much damage was to her vehicle, and how 
8 she hurt, and, what am I supposed to do? 
9 Q. Your reaction was to tell her she was trying to rip 
10 you off, wasnft it? 
11 A. Eventually, by about the fourth phone call, yeah, I 
12 was just tired. I didn't know what to tell her. She had 
13 called me so many times — 
14 Q. Isn't that — 
15 THE COURT: Let her finish her answer. 
16 A. She just called me so many times that I told her I 
17 don't kn^ what more I can answer to her, because she knew 
18 everything. She knew how the system worked. I didn't know 
19 what more to say to her. 
20 Q. Isn't the phone call in which you told her the name 
21 of your rental car company the last call she made? 
2 2 A. No, that is not true. 
23 Q. Going to the answer you just read — 
24 A. It wasn't the last phone call. 
25 Q. Excuse me. I get to finish my question, too. In the 
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answer, you said somewhere, "I know, eventually, she ended up 
getting it through one of those phone calls." 
A. Right. She did. She got it through the first phone 
call. 
Q. Well, but that's not what you testified to here. 
MR. FELT: He is arguing with the witness. 
THE COURT: The question has been asked and answered, 
Q. Okay, we will go on. One last question. You have 
seen the bumper brackets on the Explorer that have been marked 
in evidence, haven't you? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Can you explain how an impact so slight that it was 
just a noise could produce that much damage? 
MR. FELT: I object to that. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. FELT: She has no foundation to be giving 
accident reconstruction opinions. 
MR. KING: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Anything on redirect? 
MR. FELT: I have no questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
Call your next witness. 
(See transcript entitled "Partial Transcript.") 
MR. KING: I would like to make a motion for a 
directed verdict. 
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THE COURT: You may. And the Court understood that 
the defense had requested at the time the plaintiff rested that 
they wanted to put some motions on the record, and the Court 
indicated it would defer to both counsel until a convenient 
time when the jury was not present for you to do that. So go 
ahead. 
MR. HANSEN: For the record, I guess we should have 
our motion for directed verdict on the record first. We don't 
feel the need to argue it. We would submit it to the Court. 
THE COURT: The defendant has made a motion,for a 
directed verdict, and the Court understood that that motion was 
properly made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, and 
then reserved until now to be put on the record; is that 
correct? 
MR. HANSEN: That's our understanding, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Give the Court one good reason why it 
should grant the directed verdict. 
MR. HANSEN: I think that the evidence of any injury 
coming from this accident is just so weak that I don't think 
any reasonable mind could so find. 
THE COURT: That objection goes to the weight the 
trier of fact will give the testimony in this case, and not to 
the question of admissibility. And the motion for directed 
verdict is denied. 
Counsel? 
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1 MR. KING: There is no evidence in the record to 
2 support any finding of negligence on the part of Plaintiff, so 
3 I would move a directed verdict that the jury be instructed she 
4 was not negligent. The only evidence on the record is that the 
5 defendant failed to keep her vehicle under proper control, 
6 proper lookout, as you would. She drove into the back of the 
7 plaintiff's vehicle, without any legal cause. Accordingly, the 
8 jury should be instructed that the issues of liability have 
9 been decided, but the question of proximate cause and damages 
10 is for them. 
11 THE COURT: What is your response to that? 
12 MR. FELT: Our response is we have never contended 
13 the plaintiff was negligent in this case. The verdict form we 
14 prepared at the outset of this case does not have the 
15 plaintiff's negligence on it. We agree that that is not a 
16 proper matter to be submitted to the Court. We never intended 
17 it to be submitted to the Court. As to the — she wasn't. She 
18 was in the car in front, and she wasn't negligent. 
19 I THE COURT: And the Court believes counsel for the 
20 defendant has made a persuasive point, that it is not a 
21 question about whether or not there was a collision, and there 
22 is not a question about who caused the collision. The question 
23 is, what resulted from the collision? 
24 MR. FELT: Right. And the question as to whether 
25 Defendant is negligent, I think the jury is entitled to rule 
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whether a foot slipping off the brake is negligence. So I 
think that is a matter properly submitted to the jury. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. FELT: No. 
THE COURT: You may each argue your positions to the 
jury in that regard, and the Court, based on the defense 
counsel's representation that the verdict form will clearly 
provide for the fact that there is no allegation of negligence 
by the plaintiff, will resolve — 
MR. KING: May I advise the jury in their answer to 
the complaint they denied negligence, and claimed she was 
negligent? 
THE COURT: They may have made a thousand assertions 
at the time the defense — the answer was offered, but at least 
today, in front of this trier of fact, they have not asserted 
any negligence by the plaintiff, And they have stipulated to 
that on the record, and that is not an isr; in the case. 
MR. KING: I would certainly like a break before we 
go to the jury. I know the jury wants to get to work. 
THE COURT: I think the jury is probably a little 
antsy. 
MR. KING: We have to get the instructions covered. 
THE COURT: Let's take a brief break, review the 
instructions. What I am going to do, if counsel agree, is try 
and structure a timetable that we can all live with. If I 
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commence instructing the jury in 20 minutes from now, will it 
take the Court longer than 20 minutes to instruct? 
MR. FELT: No. 
THE COURT: Will counsel for the plaintiff give an 
estimate of how much time is going to be taken for closing 
argument and rebuttal argument, combined? 
MR. KING: 15 and 10. 
THE COURT: So no longer than 30 minutes, total? 
MR. KING: Yes. 
THE COURT: What is the time estimate of counsel for 
the defendant for their closing argument? 
MR. FELT: 15, 20 minutes, maybe less. 
THE COURT: I want both of you to take a deep breath, 
and think about what you just told the Court, and take a look 
at the clocks on the wall, and understand that's what we will 
live by. We will start jury instructions at 20 to the hour. I 
will meet with you immediately. I will have the bailiff tell 
the jury that they can expect us to be back in session in 20 
minutes. We will start Plaintiff's closing argument at around 
5:00. You will take whatever time you want, knowing that you 
do not have more than 30 minutes, total, to address the jury. 
And you can discipline yourself any way you want on that. And 
Counsel has indicated that you will not take more than 20 
minutes? 
MR. FELT: I believe that to be correct. 
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1 THE COURT: I will hold both of you to that. And 
2 that means that we will have this case to the jury no later 
3 than a quarter to six. 
4 MR. KING: What next? If we are going to take a 
5 break now, then we are going to go straight through. I want to 
6 work on the instructions. I also want to get a ten-minute 
7 break. 
8 THE COURT: We will take a look at the instructions, 
9 and then you can have a ten-minute break. Then I am going to 
10 instruct the bailiff and the clerk to order up some pizza. 
11 MR. KING: I have moved the introduction of 
12 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 14. 
13 THE COURT: Letfs hear from the defendant. 
14 MR. FELT: I object to that, your Honor. It is 
15 simply hearsay. It is not a business record. It is not proper 
16 for a party to write down testimony, and then submit it in 
17 written form, if it is not something that would otherwise pass 
18 the hearsay muster. 
19 THE COURT: It is illustrative of the plaintiffs 
20 J testimony. It will come in. 
21 (Court was in recess.) 
22 THE COURT: The record will reflect the presence of 
23 the jury, counsel and the parties. Ladies and gentlemen of the 
24 jury, the Court has resolved a number of matters, legal in 
25 nature, between counsel, in your absence. We are now ready to 
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proceed. Plaintiff has rested. The defendant has rested. We 
have reviewed the jury instructions and verdict forms, the 
exhibits, and a number of other matters that did not require 
the presence of the jury. We are now ready to proceed. The 
Court will instruct you on the law. After the Court has read 
the law, counsel for the plaintiff will argue, counsel for the 
defendant will argue, and counsel for the plaintiff has the 
right of rebuttal. It is our anticipation that we will have 
the case to you by about a quarter to six. We have ordered 
some pizza, and something for you to drink, and you can eat and 
deliberate simultaneously. 
If the Court gives you instructions that are read 
faster than you think you can understand them, don't worry, 
because I am going to take all the instructions in this case, 
staple them together, and send them in the jury room, so you 
can refer to the law at your leisure. So don't worry if the 
Court reads the jury instructions faster than you think you are 
comprehending them. And then at the conclusion of the 
argument, we will send the verdict forms, the jury instructions 
and all of the exhibits into the jury room for you. 
(Jury instructions were given.) 
THE COURT: Counsel will address the jury, and then 
at the conclusion of closing argument, Defense's closing 
argument, and rebuttal argument, the jury will be sworn, and 
you will retire to the jury room to commence deliberations, and 
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we will have a light dinner served about 45 minutes. 
Counsel, you may proceed with your closing argument. 
And you are invited to put the podium any place you like in the 
courtroom for purposes of your argument. 
MR. KING: Before I commence, your Honor, I have no 
idea that the jury will want or not want calculators. Let me 
give some to the bailiff, just in case. 
THE COURT: If they make that request, the Court will 
certainly instruct the bailiff to do that. 
(Closing argument by Mr. King.) 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
Closing argument? 
MR. FELT: Thank you, your Honor. If it please the 
Court, Counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. When I first 
spoke to you in opening statement, I told you that there were 
some questions that, if you kept those questions in mind, that 
this evidence would fit in better and you would kind of see 
where we were going. 
The first question I told you to look at, that we 
were going to have answered, is, how did this accident happen? 
Which version of this accident is more believable? And the 
beauty of the jury system is none of the instructions the judge 
read to you tells you to leave your common sense outside the 
jury deliberation door. You get to take that common sense in 
with you. You get to use your common sense. I sometimes refer 
360 
0 0 C ft S 
ADDENDUM "U 
ORIGINAL P 5 D DISTRICT COURT rhitf Judicial District 
IAN 0 3 1997 
Deputy CieiK 
I N THE THIRD J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 





Case No. 950902307 PI 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
* * * 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
February 8, 1996 
* * * 
BRAD J. YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
O^f A7 1 
MR. HANSEN: The defense calls Newell Knight. 
MR. KING: Your Honor, at this time I will advise the 
Court that our rebuttal expert, Mr. Lord, is going to come into 
the courtroom, as is customary. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. HANSEN: Yes, we object. 
THE COURT: We will discuss it at the bar. 
(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.) 
THE COURT: The Court may be required, within the 
next 30 minutes, to interrupt the proceedings briefly to take 
care of a matter thatfs being handled telephonically out of 
another state. When the call comes in we will take a brief 
break, and the Court will address those issues. 
NEWELL KNIGHT, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the defendant, being 
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HANSEN: 
Q. Mr. Knight, please state your full name for the 
record. 
A. My name is Newell Knight. 
Q. Where do you reside? 
A. Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Q. Are you employed? 
A. I am. 
or on: 
Q. What is the nature of your employment? 
A. I am self-employed. I am an accident investigator, 
accident reconstructionist• 
Q. How long have you been involved in the business of 
accident investigation and accident reconstruction? 
A. Probably about 40 years. I was a policeman starting 
in 1952, and then I retired in 1985, so I started doing this 
more than 40 years ago. 
Q. Would you please explain to the jury how you got 
involved in accident investigation and reconstruction.-
A. Sure. I started as a dispatcher in 1952, and worked 
full time doing that down in Provo. I worked part time for 
Utah County as a deputy sheriff and part time for Springville 
City as a police officer, doing what you did in those days. In 
1955 I went full time for the sheriff!s department in Provo, 
stayed there until 1958. In 1958 I went back to the highway 
patrol, this time as a trooper, and was assigned on tL /oad, 
working out of Utah County. I completed training at Camp 
Williams Police Academy, and then started teaching there part 
time in the early 1960fs. In 1965 I was given a scholarship by 
the Automotive Safety Foundation to go back to Northwestern 
University's one-year-long course called the traffic police 
administration training program. I was in an option or a 
specialty called traffic training, how traffic is investigated, 
why it is investigated, and then how you teach those subjects. 
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Q. How long were you back at Northwestern? 
A. One academic year. That was September through June 
of 1966. 
Q. Does Northwestern University have any special 
significance with regards to the field of accident 
reconstruction? 
A. Yes. It is the elite place in the world today, still 
is Northwestern University. They have been in business for 
about 60 years. And it is the — it is the place to go for the 
traffic training material. 
Q. What did you do after completing that year program at 
Northwestern? 
A. I was reassigned back to Utah, but this time 
transferred into Salt Lake, and worked out of the training 
division from 1966 to 1977. I taught at the police academy. I 
taught for Weber State College in credit courses, in accident 
investigation and vehicle traffic law in. 1977 I was 
transferred out as a zone commander for the highway patrol, 
stayed out about a year, went back to the administration at 
this time as the administrative officer, was there for three 
years, had a change of administration, went back to the field 
for two years, went back to headquarters in 1985, and then — 
!83, and then I retired in 1985. 
Q. What have you been doing? You say you retired. Was 
that from the Utah Highway Patrol? 
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A. I did. 
Q. What have you been doing since retiring in '85? 
A. Well, besides enjoying myself, I have my own business 
which is the accident reconstruction that I do now. And I had 
had that business from the 1960fs all the time I worked for the 
State. 
Q. Approximately how much of your time do you spend in 
this reconstruction business? Is this just a small time when 
you say — spend some time — 
A. I don't work always 40 hours a week, but I spend 
considerable time, just because of my work load, in doing 
reconstruction around the western states. 
Q. At the present time are you a member of any 
professional associations? 
A. I am. I am a member of the International Association 
of Accident Reconstruction Specialists, the Southwest and the 
Washington Association of Technical Accident Investigators, 
and, of course, Northwestern Alumni Association, through the 
traffic institute. 
Q. Do you attend any continuing training programs or 
seminars? 
A. I do. 
Q. What kinds of programs are those? 
A. I attend at least twice yearly, dealing with courses 
put on by the Southwest Association or Northwestern University 
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or the Institute of Police Technology Management. Last year I 
took training in low-speed collisions, medium-speed collisions, 
the use of microprocessors in accident reconstruction, which 
just means crunching numbers into a computer. 
Q. Mr. Knight, I may have gotten us a little bit ahead 
of ourselves. Would you explain to the jury what is meant by 
the term accident reconstruction. 
A. Yes. Reconstruction is putting together parts of an 
accident, in usable form. It is much like the person who 
designs puzzles. That person has intricate knowledge -that 
someone else may not have. An investigator measures length of 
skid marks, distances cars go, all of these things. A 
reconstructionist then uses that data to say, "But what if?" 
If this had occurred, what were the speeds? If this had 
occurred, what is the speeds? So it is the person who helps 
the trier of fact, the jury or the judge or the attorneys get 
some usable information from 11,e data that we have. 
Q. In accident reconstruction are you trying to 
determine how or why an accident occurred? 
A. Oh, yes, sure, the how and the why, of course, comes 
as part of that. We know where it happened, when it happened, 
but we move to another level and say, why did it happen? Why 
did we have these things happen? What was the motion on the 
body? Where did the cars go? Did they go the proper places? 
And all of those related things. 
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Q. Is accident reconstruction based on any particular 
science? 
A. Oh, yes. It is based upon physics, because it deals 
with movement and distance and time. The basis for accident 
reconstruction is physics and mathematics, obviously. 
Q. Now, over your years, how many years? 
A. Well, I have had my own business for 30 years, so — 
and I have been doing it for — I started 44 years ago in June, 
so I have been doing it a long time. 
Q. Would you have some kind of estimate as to how many 
cases or accidents you investigated or evaluated? 
A. Well, investigated, I only did about 250 on the road. 
But evaluated, I have looked at thousands and thousands, 
because that's part of the teaching process, as well as my own 
consulting work. 
Q. What types of cases have you looked at? 
A. All the way from no impact to very high impact, of 
closing speeds near or exceeding 100 miles an hour. So it is 
all the way from the "fender bender" up to the most serious 
I 
that you can get. 
THE COURT: Counsel, is anyone going to be offended 
if we take that brief break that the Court anticipated? We 
have the long-distance call in now. Give us an opportunity to 
briefly address the concerns of the caller, and we will be back 
and take whatever time either side requires to proceed with 
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this witness. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the Court is going to take a 
brief recess on a matter unrelated to this case. During the 
recess remember the admonition of the Court. Do not discuss 
the case among yourselves, do not permit anyone to discuss the 
case in your presence, do not form nor express an opinion in 
the case until it has been submitted to you for your 
deliberation and your decision. We are going to take a very 
brief recess. 
(Court was in recess.) 
THE COURT: The Court is back in session. The record 
will reflect the presence of the jury, counsel and the parties. 
You may proceed with your examination of the witness. 
Q. (By Mr. Hansen) Mr. Knight, I was asking you about 
some of your experience in investigating automobile accidents. 
Let me ask, do you have experience in reconstructing or 
evaluating automobile accidents involving speeds of 35 to 40 
miles per hour? 
A. I do. 
Q. Do you have — what experience do you have with 
regards to accidents involving speeds of 15 to 25 miles per 
hour? 
A. Well, I have experience, because, one, I have 
investigated them; and, two, we have staged them, in which we 
have cars that — in an inline crash, that we stage and have 
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1 the bullet car hit the target vehicle, or the side of the car. 
2 Q. When you say "we," we stage them? 
3 A. "We" meaning the association and others who do this 
4 routinely. The McMinnis Engineering did it for us at the last 
5 session in Phoenix. And when I say "we," it is the association 
6 that does it. 
7 Q. What is the purpose of these — 
8 A. A couple. One is to see what the dynamics is of the 
9 body, where the body moves, why the body moves. The other is 
10 for injury causation. Also, then we want to see if the 
11 mathematical models that we have meet true-life experience. 
12 Q. Have you had experience in reconstructing or 
13 evaluating accidents at lower speeds, say three to five miles 
14 per hour? 
15 A. I have. 
16 Q. How would you characterize the speed of three-to-five 
17 miles-per-hour impact versus 15 to 25 miles per hour? 
18 MR. KING: Excuse me. In regard to what? 
19 Q. Terminology. Is there some kind of terms we could 
20 I use make it less awkward if I am talking about a three-to-five 
21 mile-per-hour impact? 
22 A. Sure. Low-speed or walk-speed impacts are low. You 
23 are running into the medium range when you get about 25. 
24 Q. Low speed is what? 
25 J A. Three to five. Someplace. It is a gray area. You 
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get an overlap. About 25 you start to get in the medium. Over 
35, depending on the type, then it can be high injury causing. 
Q. For our purposes today, if we are talking about a 
three-to-five-mile-per hour impact, could we use the term low 
speed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What about 15 to 25 miles per hour? 
A. Well, you can't compare one with the other. 
Q. Is there a term we could use? 
A. Call that a medium speed. 
Q. With regards to your experience, have you had 
experience, or what experience have you had in investigating or 
reconstructing accidents where there is little or no apparent 
damage to the vehicles? 
A. I have looked at hundreds of those, where you have 
little or no damage, or no reported damage, but reported 
injury, and I have looked at, well, many hundreds of those over 
the years, and I have staged those and helped stage those. 
Q. Are there certain documents that you normally review 
and look at when reconstructing or evaluating an accident? 
A. There is. 
Q. What kind of documents do you normally look at? 
A. One of the documents you look at if it has been 
prepared is the state accident report. 
Q. Is that the report filled out by the investigating 
10 
o r o R s r ? 
1 officer? 
2 A. Yes. If it meets a certain criteria, they fill that 
3 report out. If it is under $400 damage, they don't fill the 
4 report out, because that's where the break-off level is now. 
5 MR. KING: That's not relevant. 
6 Q. Do you investigate accidents where there is no 
7 accident report? 
8 A. Oh, yes. 
9 Q. Have you done that before this case? 
10 A. Oh, yes, many, many times. 
11 Q. I think we may have interrupted you. What other 
12 documents do you tend to look at? 
13 A. Well, I look at the depositions that are usually 
14 taken. I look at any repair orders that were done. I look at 
15 photographs of the damage, and look for what was not damaged. 
16 I look at exemplar vehicles. And I also look at published 
17 data, dealing with tea'.- of human subjects in like crashes. 
18 And I look then at the data created dealing with the federal 
19 bumper standards of vehicles. So I look at all kinds of data, 
20 all the way from the federal rules, through the data that's 
21 created, through the data that you get from photographs, and 
22 then the depositions and all of that related material. 
23 Q. Let's talk about this case. Have you reviewed an 
24 investigating officer's report for this accident involving our 
25 client, Mrs. Clark, and Mrs. Astill? 
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1 I A. I did not. 
2 1 Q. Did you attempt to obtain an accident report? 
3 1 A. I did. I went to West Valley City and requested it, 
4 and none was on file. 
5 | Q. Do you know why there was no accident report? 
6 I A. Reported to be under $400 damage, and that's the 
7 break-off level of which you file a report. 
8 I Q. Have you reviewed any accident reports involving the 
9 plaintiff? 
10 I A. I have. 
11 Q. Would the other report be the 1992 accident? 
12 A. I did. 
13 Q. What about deposition testimony? Have you read the 
14 deposition -— 
15 A. I read the deposition of Astill and Clark, both. 
16 Q. Have you had an opportunity to review the photographs 
17 which have been put on a board, marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
18 No. 4? 
19 A. I have. 
20 Q. Are you familiar with the types of vehicles that were 
21 involved in this accident? 
22 I A. I am. 
23 Q. And this accident we are talking about, the 1994 
24 accident involving the parties? 
25 A. Yes. 
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Q. What vehicles were involved in that accident? 
A. One was a 1991 Ford Explorer, and the other one was a 
1994 I think it was Ford Taurus. 
Q. What familiarity do you have with these types of 
vehicles? 
A. Well, I own a new Explorer, or my wife does, and I 
own a '93 Ford Taurus. 
Q. Have you taken photographs of Tauruses and Explorers? 
A. I did. I photographed my vehicles. 
Q. Let me show you three photographs which have been 
marked as Defendant's Exhibit Y, Z and AA, and ask you if you 
can identify those photographs? 
A. I can. These are photographs that I took of my 
vehicle parked up against, virtually touching the Ford 
Explorer, and then a profile shot. 
Q. We should indicate that's photograph AA? 
A. That's AA. Y is the front of my '93 Ford Taurus. 
And Z is the back of the Explorer 
MR. HANSEN: I would move for the admission of 
Exhibits Y, Z and AA. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. KING: No. 
THE COURT: They are received. 
Q. Mr. Knight, are you familiar with the bumpers that 
are on the Ford Taurus and the Ford Explorer? 
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1 I A. I am. 
2 Q. Can you tell the jury anything about the composition, 
3 the make-up of these bumpers? 
4 A. Yes. The Ford Taurus bumper is a plastic cover that 
5 covers what we call an egg shell, and an egg shell is a series 
6 of plastic boxes and foam cover over it, and that's what gives 
7 it the body. The actual cover itself is very limber. You 
8 could stand it up, and it would fall down, because it is soft. 
9 Behind that you have this backing material of almost like a 
10 styrofoam, and behind it you have virtually an egg crate, and 
11 then, of course, that's eventually mounted onto something that 
12 goes onto the car. But from moving from the front of the 
13 vehicle back, you get the plastic cover, then you go into the 
14 styrofoam — 
15 Q. Would it help to show that on Exhibit AA? Would that 
16 help you to describe this? 
1 ' A. Sure. 
18 MR. HANSEN: Would the witness be allowed to step 
19 down? 
20 THE COURT: Step right into the well, and invite 
21 counsel to stand wherever they need to be to see the 
22 presentation of the witness to the jury. 
23 Q. Would you be able to use that photograph to help 
24 describe, show what you are describing? 
25 A. I could. I would probably have to stand about in the 
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1 middle, I guess. 
2 Q. You were starting to explain about what that bumper 
3 is made out of as you move away from the car. 
4 A. Maybe I will have to do it twice. 
5 THE COURT: Are counsel able to see the presentation? 
6 MR. KING: Yes, your Honor. 
7 A. You have the plastic cover, and then behind that 
8 plastic cover you have like styrofoam that sits behind it, and 
9 then behind it we have called the egg crate or the egg shell, 
10 and that's little pieces of square plastic, and then behind it, 
11 it hooks onto a piece of metal and eventually onto the car. So 
12 moving backwards, if you do damage, you — first of all, you 
13 can cut this plastic, then you go to the styrofoam, then you 
14 break this little egg shell stuff, and eventually, if the 
15 impact is hard enough, you get clear back into the motor, but 
16 this is the stuff that you see that looks i-ke ^etal, but is 
17 actually plastic. You have to go maybe two and a half, three 
18 inches before you ever get into metal on it. That in 
19 comparison to the bumper of the Ford, this is actually metal, 
20 it is about an eighth of an inch thick. 
21 Q. You are pointing to the Ford Explorer now? 
22 A. That's correct. The Ford Explorer — 
23 Q. How thick is the metal? Is it solid, a solid sheet 
24 of metal? 
25 A. It is a formed piece of metal, and it is probably 
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1 about an eighth of an inch thick, and it is formed so that you 
2 get the pretty lines that you have in here, and it is just what 
3 you see, a piece of chromed metal. Then you have a bottom 
4 party where the ball hooks on, and it is another piece, plate 
5 that bolts onto the bottom of it, two separate pieces. Behind 
6 it then you move into some mounting brackets. The mounting 
7 brackets then attach to the frame of the Explorer. So you have 
8 two different types, really, is what you have. 
9 Q. Are you familiar with the brackets that attach the 
10 bumper of the Explorer to the vehicle? 
11 I A. I am. 
12 Q. Let me ask this. A vehicle such as the Taurus that 
13 you have described, would you be able to say, from your 
14 experience in accident reconstruction, what damage one would 
15 expect to see from a Ford Taurus involved in a 15- to 25-mile-
16 per-hour impact? 
17 A. In a rear-end collision? 
18 Q. Front-end. The damage — 
19 A. Sorry about that. That's a bullet against a target 
20 vehicle. Sure, I could describe that. 
21 Q. Let's say you have a Taurus running into a stopped 
22 Explorer. What damage would you expect to see? 
23 A. The first damage you expect to see is to the Ford 
24 Taurus, because the Ford Taurus is the weakest part. When the 
25 Taurus hits, everything is plastic, will start to fold, and it 
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1 will fold proportionate to speed. When that folding stops, 
2 then you start to move further back into the engine. At 25 
3 miles an hour you would expect to see compaction of the bumper 
4 to where it is deformed and pushed in, and this type of crash 
5 you would expect to come up, over the top, actually cut the 
6 bumper, because of the lip that comes out on the Explorer, and 
7 then you would expect to see penetration clear into the engine 
8 compartment, past the radiator. First of all, everything that 
9 breaks first breaks, and there is nothing between the front of 
10 the car and the radiator but air, once you get past the front 
11 piece of plastic. So as that folds, then you get back into the 
12 engine compartment through the radiator, and that's where the 
13 force goes. 
14 Then that force then can start to do something to the 
15 Ford Explorer, because the phenomena is that which has the 
16 least strength breaks first, which it should. Now, if we start 
17 to reach equilibrium, all of the soft parts have started to 
18 fold, then we start to go to the next strongest thing, and that 
19 would be the bumper against the radiator of the car. 
20 Eventually, if you push the radiator back far enough, then you 
21 can start doing this damage as you move forward. 
22 Q. Let me see if I can speed this up just a little bit. 
23 Based on your experience and expertise in accident 
24 reconstruction, would it be consistent with your experience and 
25 expertise to have a 15- to 25-mile-per-hour impact by a Ford 
17 
0 0 fi fi Oft 
Taurus without showing any kind of significant damage? 
A. No, not in a case like this. 
Q. Let me ask, Mr. Knight, did you evaluate this 
accident? 
A, I did. 
Q. Would you tell us the process that you went through 
or that you go through in investigating — in evaluating this 
kind of an accident? 
A. Could I put it on the board? It might be faster. 
THE COURT: Mark whatever he is going to write on as 
Defendant's next in order, and he is invited to step into the 
well and use it. 
Q. Mr. Knight, what do you do, or what did you do in 
evaluating this type of an accident? 
A. The process I used was quite simple. I, first of 
all, looked at the damage and Ipck of damage. I looked at the 
damage that E could see and the lack of damage, because that 
puts it into perspective of what I would expect. Though I 
didn't actually draw these little Volkswagens, I mentally said, 
if I have a collision of this magnitude, what happens? If I 
have a high-speed accident, then I am going to see damage 
against the weakest parts showing most visual damage, and the 
strongest parts showing the least. 
Q. Are you referencing one as the Taurus and the other 
as the Explorer? 
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A. Yeah. We are moving in this direction. The left 
most Volkswagen here is the Taurus and this is the Explorer. 
Q. Do you mind putting a "T" below it? 
A. I will put "Explorer over here." The next thing I 
did is look and say, what was the report of distances of 
movement? The distance of the reported movement was one foot 
on the part of the Explorer. Then what I did is I said I have 
got a bracket now, and see what happens. 
Q. Are you talking about movement post impact? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. The one foot? 
A. That's the one foot that the plaintiff said that the 
vehicle may have moved. I looked at 15 miles an hour, and 
said, at 15 miles per hour, that equals 22 feet per second, so 
for every second that that car travels — I can hardly see that 
second hand, but I guess it is there — for every second, which 
is one thousand one, I have to account for 22 feet, because 
that's how far that vehicle moves at 15 miles an hour is 22 
feet. 
Q. Is there a general equation that the jurors could use 
to convert miles per hour to feet per second? 
A. Yes• 
Q. What is that, roughly? 
A. It is one and a half times the number. So if you 
take the speed of 15, plus one half the speed, which is seven, 
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1 that's 22 feet per second- 20 miles an hour would be 30. In 
2 other words, just the speed plus one half the speed. So I 
3 looked and said if, in fact, I am going 15 miles an hour, I 
4 have to account for 22 feet of movement in one second. How can 
5 I do that? I either do it through damage or I do it through 
6 movement. 
7 Q. Mr. Knight, let me make sure I understand what you 
8 are saying. Are you saying, then, that if the Taurus was 
9 moving at 15 miles per hour, that immediately before impact it 
10 is traveling 22 feet per second? 
11 A. Absolutely. 
12 Q. If it is traveling 15 miles per hour? 
13 A. In one second it moves 22 feet. 
14 Q. Now, you are explaining how you try to account for 
15 that movement? 
16 A. Well, the next thing I did, really, at the beginning, 
17 I said, what's the objective material that we have? Objective 
18 is like saying, well, this room is hot, you can argue all day. 
19 What is the actual temperature? 74 degrees. That becomes 
20 objective. The objective data we have from the photographs is 
21 there was virtually no damage at impact. Now, I say virtually 
22 I no damage. 
23 The second thing we know that is objective, although 
24 it was just by statement, is that there was one foot of skid 
25 mark. Now, putting that in balance, the driver said I am 
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1 stopped. My foot comes off the brake. And the velocity of the 
2 car moves forward with the acceleration of an idling car. So I 
3 looked at that and said, okay, what's that going to be if, for 
4 example, I am going at three miles per hour? That's four and a 
5 half feet per second. 
6 Q. Mr. Knight, why are you considering a speed of three 
7 miles per hour? 
8 A. Well, because the bumper standard on this Taurus is a 
9 three-mile-per-hour bumper. 
10 Q. What do — the jury and I may not be familiar with 
11 bumper standards. 
12 A. The federal government has said a bumper has to have 
13 a standard of "X" number of miles per hour before you really 
14 get distortion and damage back into the vehicle. That's the 
15 standard they put on it. The other reason I used it is because 
16 I know it has to be low, because there is so little damage done 
17 in the actual collision, and a reported one foot of movement. 
18 One foot of movement might account for about three miles an 
19 hour. But I took all of these things, and then said, okay, if 
20 I I am going 15 miles an hour, now I look to see what happens to 
21 the participants. 
22 MR. KING: Excuse me, your Honor. It took me a 
23 moment to think this through. The testimony of the witness 
24 about a federal standard, the question is, what is the 
25 specification of the Ford Taurus for its bumper? 
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1 THE COURT: He is objecting to a foundational 
2 question, and he is permitted to ask that isolated question. 
3 MR. KING: I would ask that the answer be stricken on 
4 the three miles per hour. The question is, what speed is the 
5 model Taurus involved in the accident designed to handle? 
6 THE COURT: The motion is denied. I thought you 
7 wanted to have a point of clarification on what the federal 
8 standard was. Overruled. You may inquire into that on cross-
9 examination. 
10 Q. I am sorry. I am distracted. 
11 A, I think you said, then what did I do? Was that it? 
12 Q. Let me ask this. You are indicating that you 
13 reviewed the testimony where Mrs. Clark said that she was 
14 stopped, and her foot slipped off the brake. 
15 A, Yes. 
16 Q. In accident reconstruction, are there formulas where 
17 you can calculate what speeds would be involved in a vehicle 
18 going from a stopped position traveling a few feet with normal 
19 acceleration? 
20 A. Sure. That's a basic movement formula. 
21 Q. Have you looked at those calculations? 
22 I A. I did. 
23 Q. Would you be able to give the jury any understanding 
24 as to what types of speeds might be involved if, in fact, the 
25 accident occurred as Mrs. Clark is indicating? 
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A. Sure. I ran a chart now I put away, and I have to 
find it. But the chart I used for normal acceleration, and the 
normal acceleration meaning that a person would step on the 
gas, as if he were going to go with "normal acceleration." And 
I said, what would the speed be at the end of — well, this is 
the closest, is 5.43 feet, and the speed will be 4.94 miles an 
hour. 
Q. That would be if a person were pressing the 
accelerator? 
A. That's with a normal acceleration rate. If we take 
the rolling acceleration, which would be about .05, if we went 
five feet, the speed would be about 2.7 miles an hour. 
MR. KING: Lack of foundation, your Honor. The 
testimony of Mrs. Clark in her deposition was she was five 
feet, ten feet • r more back. Five feet is misleading. It 
doesn't respond to her testimony. 
THE COURT: That's a matter for cross-examination. 
Overruled. 
Q. So, Mr. Knight, you have indicated that if we were to 
apply a rolling acceleration of .05, and you were to do that 
over five feet, the miles per hour would be about 2.7 miles per 
hour? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Let's go to Mr. King's statement about ten feet. 
A. The closest I have is 9.86 feet, and that would be 
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3.85 miles an hour. 
Q. So if one were to assume the facts as Miss Clark has 
indicated, what would you indicate would be a range that you 
would expect that vehicle to be traveling? 
A. Well, if we use that five feet or ten feet, someplace 
between two and three quarter miles an hour and 3.8 miles an 
hour. 
Q. Would you mind indicating that on your chart here? 
h. Sure. 
Q. Speed rolling from a stop. 
A. I have indicated five feet at 2.7 miles per hour, and 
ten feet, 3.85 miles per hour, both of those from a rolling 
from a stop. 
Q. Mr. Knight, I apologize. I did interrupt you. You 
were explaining what process you go through in evaluating this 
accident. What did you do next? 
A. The next thing I looked at was, what happened to the 
participants? during this crash? We have a woman who is sitting 
in the back, has a steering wheel in front of her. We have a 
driver who is virtually the same, sitting in front, steering 
wheel in front of her. But then I looked to see what would 
happen to the bullet vehicle, thatfs the defendant, because her 
testimony was, and the plaintiff was, that she was turned, 
adjusting a child, so she is in no position to protect herself. 
I looked at it — 
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Q. What would the laws of physics indicate would happen 
to a person sitting in that position, if they then rear-ended a 
vehicle stopped in front of them? 
A. She is going to go forward. 
Q. Is that based on the laws of physics? 
A. Sure. That's Newton's equal and opposite. That's 
why we have damage on both vehicles, because we have forces 
going in both directions. But that back driver, who is unaware 
that the crash is coming, is sitting in a turned position, and 
if she goes into a crash at the range of 15 miles an hour 
unprotected, with the side, then you look to see what her 
injuries were, because that's objective of what happens to her. 
We can't control that. She can't control it. She is looking 
away. 
The next thing I looked at was to see what happens to 
the lead driver. The lead driver, if the car moves, and moves 
proportionately, we want to see what the <-li&nge of velocity is 
in that direction. And this driver then — 
Q. When you say, "change of velocity," you are talking 
accident reconstruction terms, can we call that speed? 
A. For this case let's call it speed. She is going from 
zero, how fast did she get hit to? That's change of velocity. 
If the car gets hit, the first thing is we get the crush. I 
look to see what the reported injuries are of the people, I 
look to see what the damages are of the people, for the damage 
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of the car, and then those movements. If you put it in the 
range of 15 miles an hour, you just can't make it work, because 
there is certain things we can't control, and that's the amount 
of damage that goes to the vehicle, and how far the car moves. 
So all of these things, when you put them in balance, you can't 
account for 22 feet. But you can account for in the range of 
about three miles an hour, because we know there was a 
touching, we know there was an imprint of the ball into the 
bumper, and we know there was supposed to be a shifting of that 
bumper on the brackets of the Explorer. 
Q. Let me ask you now, after doing this evaluation, did 
you reach certain conclusions about this accident? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you reach any conclusions regarding the speeds 
involved by the Taurus vehicle? 
A. I did. 
Q. What was your conclusion? 
MR. KING: I will object, your Honor. May I voir 
dire the witness? I don't think there is an adequate 
foundation. 
THE COURT: Wherein is it lacking? 
MR. KING: I don't know, he is making so many 
assumptions, he is assuming there is no deformation of the 
Taurus bumper at the outset. He is assuming there is virtually 
no damage to the struck vehicle. He is assuming the 
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defendant's statement is correct. He is assuming there is only 
five or ten feet she moved forward, instead of maybe not having 
stopped. He is assuming the vehicle struck moved forward only 
one foot. These are all subjects. For example, he stated that 
the federal standard is three miles an hour, and the bumper 
will deform. It is a standard that's higher than three, if you 
run into a wall, not into another vehicle. 
THE COURT: Those are matters for cross-examination. 
Overruled. You may proceed. 
Q. If you want to take the stand again, Mr. Knight, we 
can move the chart out of your way. 
What opinions, then, did you form with regards to the 
speed of the Taurus? 
A. Based on one other analysis that I made of this, I 
can give you what I did, there is one other thing that I looked 
at with this. 
Q. What else did you look at? 
A. I looked at the imprinting and the, damage pattern 
between the two vehicles, because the Taurus has a torpedo 
nose, and it also hit a very sharp object, is sharp in terms of 
width and height and everything. The Taurus hits a bumper — 
hits a trailer hitch that has a ball on it. 
Q. Is that significant? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. The ball on the trailer hitch? 
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A. Well, it is significant because of the type of 
accident that you have and the damage that we have here. 
Q. Explain how it is significant. 
A. In actual crash tests, what you do with the Taurus, 
and any other car, is you run it into a barrier, and that 
barrier is a great, big piece of concrete that can't move. 
When you run it in, that whole front of the car folds 
proportionately. You can predict that the right front fender 
will fold back the same distance as the left front fender, 
because they are hitting. Now, if we change that, and turn the 
barrier that we hit pointed and run it in at the same speed, 
what you will see, you will see a magnitude much greater. 
Q. Can you show us on this drawing, or — I am wondering 
if this picture would help? 
A. It is easier to do it on another page. 
MR. HANSEN: If I may, I would like to take this 
paper off. I move for the admission of Exhibit BB. 
MR. KING: I object, your Honor. There is inadequate 
foundation. I would ask at least it be withheld until I have 
concluded my cross. 
THE COURT: The motion is sustained. The Court will 
not rule on its admissibility until after cross-examination. 
Mark the next one as Plaintiff's next in order. 
Q. Would you be able to explain to the jury what you are 
describing here, Mr. Knight, on Exhibit CC? 
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A. Let me write, and then I will move. Maybe they can 
do it right here. In actual crash testing, you run a car into 
a barrier. And if we run that car into a barrier fiXf! speed, we 
say this much damage occurs at "X" speed, and it is visual. 
You see that. And that damage is spread across the whole 
distance, kind of like taking an ax, you slam an ax against a 
piece of wood from the side, you don't see much. If we change 
this now, and in this particular case we have a Taurus that has 
a tapered nose, if we were to bring something in that is much 
sharper, if we ran this into this barrier again at "X" speed, 
whatever "X" is, the visual thing that you will see on this car 
will be much greater, because of the point, than you do across 
the whole thing, just because it is centered, and that velocity 
centers into a particular place• 
In the case that you have here, we have exactly the 
same phenomena, except what it hit was the ball. But that ball j 
hits the front, so whatever you see, all of that force was 
centered on one place, so the visual that's there would be much 
greater than the visual if we had retarded the whole front, as 
you see up here. 
Q. Mr. Knight, are you familiar with the testimony I 
think of the two drivers, that there may have been a small dent 
in the license plate of the Taurus, that would line up with the 
ball? 
A. I am. 
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1 Q. Could that denting account for a 15- to 25-mile-per-
2 hour impact? 
3 A. No, not that alone. Nothing in this case accounts 
4 for a 15- to 25-mile-an-hour impact. 
5 Q. Let me just ask one other question that may be a 
6 little bit of a sidetrack. Would you be able to compare the 
7 amount of forces that would have been involved in this accident 
8 as compared to the plaintiff's 1992 accident, a vehicle 
9 traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour? 
10 A. Oh, you can compare it, sure. What is the 
11 comparison, you mean? 
12 Q. Can you give the jury some assistance in the 
13 difference of the collision or the forces involved in those 
14 types of collisions? 
15 A. Well, the magnitude is much greater, obviously, the 
16 lower the speed, the less potential you have for injury. 35 
17 miles an hour takes 58 feet to skid to a stop. We have to 
18 account for 58 feet, if we have a left-turning car, we have to 
19 account for all of that speed. And that speed comes very 
20 quickly. I would be going from a forward velocity of 35, and I 
21 may go to zero velocity in as little as five feet, and that 
22 will give you a deceleration rate that's extremely high, and 
23 that's what causes injury. We went from 35 to zero in five 
24 feet, you would have an acceleration or deceleration, because 
25 they are all the same thing, of eight G's. That means that the 
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driver's body would weigh eight times what that person normally 
weighs. Tremendous forces when those things happen. 
Q. Eight times the force of gravity? 
A. Well, eight times the person's weight. Eight times 
the force of gravity. I have one G of gravity, but the weight 
is 250 pounds. 
Q. What type of G's would be involved in this accident 
that we are seeing between the Taurus and the Explorer? 
MR. KING: Same objection, your Honor, inadequate 
foundation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
A. I think that in this case you are probably in the 
range of about one G, if that high. 
Q. What is the significance of that? 
A. The significance'is that I stand up, I am moving one 
G. There is no injury causation in these low levels of change 
of velocity. As I sit — make sure where my chair is — as I 
sit, that might be three G's. The force is such that my weight 
and my velocity really makes me heavier, and without that 
"change of velocity," you donft get injury. So when we get 
down into these low levels of change of velocity, it is dealing 
with what we do every day. Every time you stand up, you go one 
G. Every time you step off a step, you may have gone two G!s. 
A runner, not a jogger, but a runner, may hit at three G!s, 
because every time he hits, that foot is coming down. So what 
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you see here is levels of forces that we encounter in everyday 
life, 
Q. In your evaluation of this accident, were you able to 
form any conclusions with regards to the mechanics of injury? 
A. I did. 
Q. Tell us what you found. 
A. Going back to the other exhibit, if I may, I looked 
to see the mechanics of injury to see what happens to the body. 
The most protected place that you can put a body if you want to 
change its velocity is against something that is both cushioned 
and supportive. If, for example, I wanted to be shot into 
space, one of the best ways is that you are prone, with your 
back supported against something that's cushioned, because that 
accepts part of the force as it goes in, because force 
diminishes as it goes. The force from the Taurus to the 
Explorer diminishes all the way to the driver. 
So then you look to see, well, where are those places 
that I am going to get this change of velocity? The best 
protection that a driver can have is to have a headrest in 
proper position, and a cushioned seat to cushion the lower 
back, because then what you are doing is you are spreading that 
force, just like I am going to sit down. It is much more 
comfortable for me to sit across my whole buttocks than to have 
a sharp object there, I guess is the best example, because I 
plop, but I am supported against that whole area, so the best 
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thing you can have is always have support across everything 
that has the potential for a change of velocity. 
Q. Mr. Knight, a moment ago I asked you what direction 
the driver of the Taurus would travel after impact, and you 
have indicated forward. 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. What about the direction of the driver of the 
Explorer when she is hit from behind? What direction would her 
body go? 
A. Technically, she doesn't move. The car moves out 
from under her. But in our mind she is propelled forward. 
Actually, she is sitting still, and the car wants to go 
through. 
Q. Backwards? 
A. We think she is propelled backwards. In reality, 
that isn't quite true, when you look at the physics of it, but 
that's t**e feeling we get. 
Q. The two drivers in this accident, would they have had 
equal protection as you were kind of describing it? 
A. Heavens no. 
Q. I think you have kind of explained that. 
A. The lady in the Taurus, first of all, if she is 
looking away, she has a side coming into a more rigid thing, 
which is the steering wheel. Compare the rigidity of the 
steering wheel with the cushion of the seat. 
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MR. KING: Object, there is no testimony that she was 
not in her seat belt, which would keep her from her steering 
wheel• 
THE COURT: The Court recalls the testimony was that 
she reached to the passenger seat to snap in a seat belt, and 
when she did that, the car moved forward. 
MR. KING: There is no testimony she released her 
seat belt, which would keep her from the steering wheel. 
Q. Let me ask this. You own a Taurus; is that correct? 
A. I do. 
Q. If you have your seat belt still on, would you be 
able to reach all the way over to the far end of the Taurus to 
buckle in a passenger's seat belt? 
A. No. Even if I did, the seat belt isn't going to 
restrain me at these low speeds. The seat belt doesn't kick in 
and lock until you get speeds over this. 
Q. The seat belt isn't a factor? 
A. No. The factor is the potential for her body's 
movement, and if she is protected in the Taurus, as the lady in 
the Explorer, and the answer is no, she isn't nearly as 
protected. 
Q. Who is most vulnerable? 
A. The lady in the Taurus. 
Q. And the lady in the Explorer? 
A. Well, she is protected by a higher-backed seat, a 
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cushioned seat, and she is in better position for injury 
mechanisms. She is better protected. 
Q. In accident reconstruction have you reviewed 
authoritative literature dealing with injury from low-impact 
accidents? 
A. I have. 
Q. Are you aware of any literature dealing with the 
potential, whether or not it exists, for low back injury in a 
low-speed accident? 
A. Yes. Lots of material has been produced even for CBS 
60 Minutes, dealing with low-speed crashes. 
Q. Have you studied that material? 
A. I have. Showing that in those accidents, where you 
have the low range of rear-end collisions, and side collisions, 
you don't have +' ** injury mechanism there that exceeds what we 
go through in daily life. 
Q. Let me just ar'„ you just a couple more questions, 
Mr. Knight. You have reviewed Mrs. Astillfs testimony about 
what she saw in the rear view mirror; is that correct? 
A. I did. 
Q. Do you recall what she stated the speed was that she 
saw the other vehicle traveling? 
A. Her deposition testimony was 15 to 25, and I am told 
that her trial testimony was 15. 
Q. Did she indicate also as to how far away the vehicle 
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was when she first saw it? 
A. I think — she did, but I don't remember it. I am 
lookinging for it. I think she said it was a car length. Ten 
to fifteen feet is what she said in her deposition. 
Q. Mr. Knight, is it mathematically possible, based on 
the laws of physics, for a vehicle to be 10 to 15 feet away, 
traveling 15 to 25 miles per hour, and have impact a second or 
two later? 
A. No. 
Q. That can't add up? 
A. Well, in the context that we have now, sure. I can 
be traveling 15 to 25 and have it occur later. 
Q. But not within — I mean — well — 
A. But you can't have the end result as this. You have 
to put it in balance, and say if I was going 25 miles an hour, 
10 to 15 feet away, what would the end result be? Because we 
know collision happened. You again go back to look at the 
objective data, and you just don't have those things that match 
up. 
Q. If the vehicle was traveling 15 to 25 miles per hour, 
and the vehicle was only 10 to 15 feet away, the length of time 
before collision would be far less than a second; isn't that 
right? 
A. Yeah. If you are 25, that's 37 feet per second. If 
you are 15 feet, that would be a half a second, you are talking 
36 
0 0 0 7 0 P-
parts of seconds for this to occur. 
Q. Based on accident reconstruction, then, do you have 
an opinion whether the plaintiff could be accurate in her 
recollection as to what she saw in that rear view mirror? 
A. I have an opinion. 
Q. What is your opinion? 
A. It could not be, because the end result doesn't match 
with all of this, because neither one of them talk about skid 
marks. Mrs. — get the name right — Clark says, "I was 
looking away. I didn't ever skid, because I am pulled up and I 
am stopped." When you put it into balance, it does not balance 
out that you have these speeds. 
Q. Mr. Knight, you have given a number of opinions here 
today. How confident are you about your opinions in this case? 
A. Based on all of the data that you have, all of the 
objective data you have, I am confident in -*v, because the data 
just does not support that high a speed. 
MR. HANSEN: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
MR. KING: Your Honor, my expert, Mr. Lord, is 
sitting in the hall, because he was excluded. I have got to 
talk over some of the details of Mr. Knight's testimony with 
him. I know we want to move, but I have to do this. 
THE COURT: Would you like a recess? 
MR. KING: Yes, please. 
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THE COURT: Letfs take a recess. That's a reasonable 
request. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the Court is going to be in 
recess ten minutes. During the recess remember the admonition 
given previously. Do not discuss the case among yourselves, do 
not permit anyone to discuss the case in your presence, do not 
form nor express an opinion in the case until it has been 
submitted to you for your deliberation and your decision. We 
will be in recess about ten minutes. 
(Court was in recess.) 
THE COURT: The record will reflect the jury is 
present, counsel are present, the parties are present. Are you 
prepared to proceed with cross-examination? 
MR. KING: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KING: 
Q. Mr. Knight, I understand you have testified that you 
handle about 250 cases a year; is that correct? 
A. True• 
Q. I understand you testified that you charge $1,000 to 
$1,500 per case; is that true? 
A. I have never said that. I have never even implied 
that. 
Q. What is your average charge per case? 
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How long have you been in this business? 
30 years. 
What is your average charge per case? 




I donft. All the way from $200 to $3 
Haven't you stated your average is $1 











There is no way I have said that. It 










t true, so 1 
But your charges run from a few hundred to a few 1 
True. 
I believe you testified that the overwhelming 
of your cases you represent the defendant? 
I didn't testify to that here, but that's 
defense work than plaintiffs. That's 
What speed does it take to deform the 





I don't know. 
Do you know if it is more than two mi. 
I don't know that. 





les an hour? 
your testimony 
today, wouldn't it have helped you to know how much speed it 
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takes to bend those things? 
A. Well, I looked at that, for that specific purpose, 
but I have no idea what it would take, because there is four of 
them. 
Q. So you have no idea what speed it would take to do 
that? 
A. No. 
Q. So if it takes ten miles an hour to bend them, that 
means your formulas are worthless, and the car was going ten 
miles an hour, doesn't it? 
A* No, that's not true, because for every force that 
goes that way to bend them, the same has to come back, and we 
don't have that balance in forces. 
Q. In deed. Now, what impact absorption did the Taurus 
have? 
A. It has the foam, it has the egg crate, it has got the 
back bar, it has got all of that and, of course, it has the 
plastic bumper. 
Q. What do you mean the plastic bumper? 
A. That's what that is. That is a plastic bumper. 
That — as I showed the jury before, that thing that looks so 
nice is nothing but plastic. 
Q, The structure of the bumper itself is what is the 
source of the impact absorption for the Taurus; is that right? 








' s in it, the egg carton, and the support parts 













What do you mean the support parts? 
Well — 
You mean parts like this? 
No. You don't put a piece of styrofoam wi* 
that sits behind it to support it. So you 
's behind it, that's supported, to hold the 
around it. 
That bumper is designed, it works within a 
What? 











That's what I just told you. 
And the soft material rebounds to shape, unless the 
cut? 
It could. There is always the resilience 1 







It is designed for that purpose, isn't it? 
that's 
That's part of its purpose. It isn't designed for 
that's what happens. 
And as you know, in this case, the ball on 
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Q. So you didn't have a sharp object hitting the sheath, 
you had the object hitting the license plate? 
A. Well, in terms of magnitude, it is still pointed, 
Mr. King. If I hit the license plate, and it is enough 
velocity, and it is narrow enough, you still get the centered 
impact. 
Q. In regard to that, the standard for a bumper is a 
five-mile-per-hour barrier, isn't it, before a bumper is 
damaged? 
A. I think it was changed in 1986. I would have to get 
the reg out. I think it is down to three now. 
Q, You are not sure, are you? 
A. I would have to look and see what the date was. But 
it is a three-mile-an-hour bumper. 
Q. If you are not sure, why did you testify to three 
without checking? 
A. I just told you it is . three-mile-per-hour bumper. 
That's what that Ford Taurus is on actual tests. 
Q. On the year of the vehicle involved? 
A. On the year of the vehicle involved. 
Q. That's a barrier that it is striking? 
A. Absolutely. That was my whole point to show if it is 
the barrier versus the point, absolutely. 
Q. The three miles means that, what, that it will exceed 
the impact of three miles an hour without damage to the bumper? 
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A. No. You have got it backwards. At three miles an 
hour you should not have deformation of the body. I think you 
said that backwards. 
Q. Deformation of what body? The body of the vehicle or 
the body of the bumper? 
A. The body of the vehicle. Well, the body of the 
vehicle includes the bumper and all of the support mechanisms. 
Q. What are the support mechanisms? 
A. Where are they? 
Q. What are they? Are they like this? 
A. Oh, no, not on the Taurus. They are softer. The 
Taurus doesn't have that, 
Q, What does it have? 
A. It has got supports. Do you want me to draw it for 
you? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. It has a support bracket. The typical support, if we 
were to look down like a bird is looking, the bumper wraps 
around, then you have the — 
Q. Would you mind making the front of that bumper more 
flat? It is not rounded like that. Your own photograph shows 
that. 
MR. HANSEN: I object. I think he is arguing with 
the witness. 
THE COURT: The Court will permit him to request how 
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he wants it drawn. 
MR. KING: I will allow the jury to take a look at 
the front of this bumper. 
Q. It curves on the side, and it is flat across the 
front; isn't that correct? 
A, Let me see if I can get it a little bit better. 
Q. Why don't you draw it like so. 
MR. HANSEN: I object. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
A. Is that any better? 
Q. Well — 
MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, I am going to object to 
Counsel — 
THE COURT: Let Counsel draw it, and then we will 
kind of skip all of the argument. 
Q. How about that? 
A. No. Let's agree, Mr. King, someplace between there 
and there. How is that? 
THE COURT: Circle the one you are both going to 
settle on, and let's move on. 
Q. We talk about the support structure behind the 
bumper, that connects. 
A. Which one do you want me to use? 
Q. The lower one. Let's be accurate. Use the lower 
one. 
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A. Let me change colors for just a second. Okay. We 
have black. Now we have red. Let's assume the red is 
styrofoam, the plastic material. Let's assume now that we have 
the — an egg carton that comes behind it, or the crating, or 
whatever you want to call it. And this starts to build 
support, because we agreed a minute ago that the outside is 
plastic. 
Q. My question is, what is the structure that connects 
the bumper onto the vehicle? 
A. Now, the structure that connects it, this side comes 
back in and hooks onto the body. This is the plastic cover. 
And then you have a support mechanism that comes in, and this 
now hooks to the "frame" of the vehicle. The vehicle doesn't 
really have a frame like we used to have. But if the car were 
to come back down like that, you h?^, a support mechanism that 
goes between and holds it out like that. Your radiator would 
sit here. That kind of orients us to where it is. 
Q. What kind of support mechanism is that? 
A. What do you mean? 
Q. Is it a piece like this? 
A. No. I told you before it isn't like that. 
Q. What is it like? 
A. Well, it is metal. Depending on the shape, it could 
be shaped like a "U", like this, that's a beam that comes out. 
It could have a flat plate on the back. It could have a number 
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of things on it. You can't always predict what it is from a 
•93 Ford. 
Q. Whatever it is, it is a solid piece of metal? 
A. No. Solid piece of metal -- well, if it were as 
thick as this, we could say, I guess, that's solid. If it were 
as thick as the cardboard on the box, I guess that's solid. I 
mean, it is a piece of metal. I don't know how you could get 
it better than a piece of metal. 
Q. It is not impact-absorbing without deformation? 
A. That's true. Once you get so far back, you do not 
have impact absorption without deformation. 
MR. KING: Mark this, please. I will advise the 
Court we have a rebuttal witness, we have given notice of, 
Leonard Hartle, who is coming to court from out in West Valley. 
He is the person we referred to earlier, who is the Taurus 
mechanic. 
Q. There is the brace for the Taurus for that year. 
Isn't it? 
A. It looks like it. 
Q. And it is impact-absorbing, isn't it? 
A. It looks like it is. This one looks like it does 
have an impact absorber in the back of this. 
Q. Several inches? 
A. Well, yeah, if it can go clear to here it would be 
about two and a half inches. 
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Q. How much impact will that absorb? 
A. Should be three miles an hour. 
Q. Thatfs three miles an hour in addition to the bumper 
absorbing three miles an hour, isnft it? That makes a total of 
six? 
A. No, no, no, I wish that it were. But this whole 
thing is three miles an hour. 
Q. Try to move that as far as you could. 
A. I canft move it. 
Q. You didn't know what kind of structure it had until I 
showed you? 
A. Not on that particular one you have there. I am not 
sure that is what was on it. If you represent that's what it 
was, thatf s f ine. 
MR. KT;IG. Offer Exhibit 15, your Honor. 
MR. HANSEN: No foundation, your Honor. Object on 
the basis of foundation. r'cher than Mr. King's testimony, we 
don't have anything on that. 
THE COURT: Well, it is — Counsel can argue it, 
whether it is or not, and the jury will decide who to believe. 
It is admitted. 
Q. Why didn't you tell the jury that you have that big 
shock absorber, as well as the bumper, and that you have to 
compress both of them before you have damage? 
A. I am not sure that's on there. Why didn't I tell 
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you? Because I am not sure it is on there. 
Q. You don!t know that much about the car, do you? 
A. 0h# yeah. 
Q. You don't know if it has a shock-absorbing front 
bumper or not? 
A. I do. There are some models that do, and some that 
do not, and some are oil, and some are air. 
Q. Which kind was Mrs. Clark driving? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Why didn't you find that out before you gave this 
testimony? 
A. Because I can't find the car. If I could find the 
exact car, I could probably do it. 
Q. It is not possibly because you charge 200 — you do 
250 of these cases a year, at $300 to several thousand dollars 
a case? 
MR. HANSEN: He is misrepresenting his testimony. 
THE COURT: It is argument. Sustained. 
Q. Are you giving this kind of testimony, those are your 
figures, 250 cases a year, 300 to several thousand, right? 
MR. HANSEN: It mischaracterizes his testimony. 
Mr. Knight has never testified that way. 
THE COURT: The question has been asked and answered. 
Q. There is a difference between a barrier test and a 




Q. And you didn't explain to the jury that the three-
mile-an-hour minimum standard applies to hitting a rigid 
barrier like a wall? 
A. I thought that's what I drew on that other exhibit. 
I thought that's what it was stating, that's how they establish 
those standards. 
Q. If you hit a vehicle that's going to move away from 
you, then you can have a higher speed than three miles an hour, 
because it is not like hitting a wall? 
A. Well, Mr. King, that is true if you have a case 
different than this. But in this case, if the lead vehicle 
moved one foot, we still have to come back within those 
parameters of everything we talked about. 
Q. But you are aware that mosL of Mrs. Astill's 
estimates, you are absolutely right when you said that the 
speed and the distance didn't work. It had to be farther back 
or something. She was making her best approximations. They 
made no measurement on how far forward her car moved? 
A. That's true. 
Q. The only thing she knew was her head went back 
sharply, and she felt pain in her low back. 
MR. HANSEN: Counsel is testifying. 




Q. So you can't make your estimates based on her car 
moving one foot, when everything she is doing is estimates that 
are substantially subject to error. She might have moved five 
feet. 
A. Well, Mr. King, you still have to go back and put 
everything in balance. If you wanted to move five feet, you 
still put everything in balance and say, where did it go? 
Q. Going back to the Ford Taurus, if we have a force 
that fully compresses — 
THE COURT: Counsel, if you are going to examine the 
witness, I insist that you use the podium, and not be at the 
jury box. 
Q. You are welcome to retrieve any of the exhibits, and 
you can use them. All counsel must use that podium. 
MR. KING: I started talking where they were. My 
apologies. 
Q. So, in addition, you acknowledge, unless the sheath 
around the cosmetic part of the bumper is torn, that it will 
return to its shape, right? 
A. It may. We usually expect to have it come back in 
low-speeders, that's true. 
Q. So not seeing damage, not having somebody observe 
damage to the bumper does not mean it was fully compressed, as 
long as it wasn't torn, and it wasn't, it would return to 
shape? 
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A. You can't say that, Mr. King. 
Q. Okay. And you also didn't tell the jury about the 
impact-absorbing pieces on the Taurus that would add to the 
amount of force it can absorb before you can have damage? 
A. Mr. King, that isn't right. They don't add. That is 
a part of the whole system. It doesn't add. You don't say 
this gives you three and this gives you three and this gives 
you three, which gives you nine. That isn't what happens. 
Q. You didn't even know — 
A. The dealer told me there was no absorber on that car. 
Q. You mean you are quoting the hearsay testimony of a 
deal.er, and you didn't tell the jury? 
MR. HANSEN: I am going to object. He is arguing. 
THE COURT: It is argumentative. 
MR. KING: I will ask all testimony based on his 
quotation of a dealer not present in court be stricken. It is 
based on hearsay, and I didn't know it. 
MR. HANSEN: He is an expert witness. 
THE COURT: Denied. 
Q. You also can't say how many miles per hour in speed 
it takes to deform those bumper brackets on the Explorer, do 
you7 
A. That's true. 
Q. And, also, when you did that example four miles an 
hour of sitting down hard in that chair, may I ask if you have 
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1 a good back or a bad back? 
2 MR. HANSEN: Objection, relevance. 
3 THE COURT: Overruled. 
4 A. I have no idea. I mean I don't know if I have a good 
5 back or bad back. I am 60 some odd years old. 
6 Q. Would you mind trying that same experiment again, but 
7 going down that hard head first. 
8 I A. Sure. 
9 THE COURT: Is that a question? 
10 Q. Yes. I asked him if he would be willing to do that, 
11 and he said he would. You see, there is a risk of injury, 
12 because the neck is not as strong as the behind. 
13 MR. HANSEN: This is not question and answer. I have 
14 objected several times. He continues to do it. 
15 THE COURT: It is argumentative. Let's move on with 
16 the questioning. 
17 Q. And you said the data you have looked at includes 
18 I hundreds of accidents in which there was no vehicle damage, but 
19 there was reports of injury? 
20 A. True. 
21 Q. You don't have any idea what effect a person with a 
22 previously injured back, mostly recuperated, how their 
23 susceptibility to injury would compare to the susceptibility of 
24 another person? 
25 A. Not in comparison to another person. I did not look 
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at tnat. 
Q. That's crucial here, isn't it? 
MR. HANSEN: Objection. That's medical testimony at 
this point. He has talked about mechanics of injury and 
accident reconstruction. 
THE COURT: The Court will permit the question. 
Q. You made the comment which — in your testimony you 
said that with the least strength breaks first? 
A. Or bends. That's true. 
Q. The Taurus, between the structure of the bumper 
itself and the structure of its brackets, would absorb enough 
impact, the brackets on the Explorer, or, comparatively, the 
weakest thing, because those are the things that did deform? 
A. You can't really draw that analogy, Mr. King, because 
th< bumper on that vehicle has substantially less strength 
than that bracket does, and the bumper, supposedly, wasn't 
injured, and that bumper is probably an eighth of an inch 
thick, and that's less strength than what this has got, and I 
can never rectify that. I can't understand how you can have 
the mass of that bracket damaged, when the weakest part, which 
is the bumper, didn't get damaged, and that's what the Taurus 
hit. They didn't hit the bracket directly. They hit the 
bumper. 
Q. Is that the thing that had you baffled in this case? 
A. Well, one of the number of things. 
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1 Q. Well, you have a straightforward impact across this 
2 bumper, but toward the lower part of it. The whole bumper is 
3 pushed forward, by the whole bumper of the Taurus, as we have 
4 it correctly drawn. So the impact is absorbed by the brackets 
5 that bend. What's hard about that? 
6 A. Well, the thing that I touched had less strength. 
7 The thing that hits it has less strength than what gets hit. 
8 And then we bend a piece of steel that's behind a bumper, that 
9 has less strength than the plastic that's here, and the bumper 
10 that's here, and then we bend something that has that mass in 
11 front of it, when that which we first touched was a bumper that 
12 has less strength. And I am saying, gee, if I hit that which 
13 has the least strength, which is the bumper, how did that 
14 strength transfer through and bend something that has that 
15 mass, and there is four of those on the bumper? And I don't 
16 know how that happened. I can't imagine how you can have 
17 something sandwiched in between, that has less strength than 
18 the bullet — or the target vehicle, and greater strength than 
19 the bullet vehicle, and have that occur. 
20 Q. Have you ever used a piece of wood over a nail to 
21 drive the nail in, like when you are doing finish work, and you 
22 don't want to leave a hammered dimple in the wood, so you use a 
23 nail — you have a nail, have a piece of wood over it, and you 
24 hit the wood, and drive the nail? 
25 A. I haven't, but I know what you are describing. 
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1 Q. The piece of wood is softer than the nail, but the 
2 nail moves. 
3 A. But the wood moves also, because you have the direct 
4 and opposite force of the two. Are you saying the nail doesn't 
5 go into the piece of wood that I am hitting? 
6 I Q. Would you consider that a fair analogy? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. To the broad bumper matching the broad bumper? 
9 1 A. In conceptual terms, that's true. In that case, if 
10 we did that with the nail, then what you have got, if I take a 
11 piece of wood, and I put it on, and I hit that, don't I get a 
12 mark aaainst the wood? And if that's the case, then that's the 
13 same thing that we have happen here. And if I took a piece of 
14 balsa wood to drive that nail, guess what? I will never get 
15 the iaail driven, beer a^e that piece fails first. 
16 Q. If you take it to the extreme, of course, you are 
17 correct. But if you have a broad bumper and a broad bumper, in 
18 contact with each other, the brackets are the appropriate thing 
19 to fold. That is their function. That's how they are 
20 designed. 
21 k. First of all, Mr. King, we don't have a broad bumper 
22 agaihst a bumper, regardless of which way you have me draw it, 
23 that thing has a bulge on the front of it. And that sticking 
24 out there is going to cause the leading edge to make contact 
25 firsjt. It isn't flat like you have on a Ford Taurus. But 
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1 whatever it is, we can have contact with it. 
2 I MR. KING: Counsel, you have a number of photographs. 
3 Do you have any photograph that better shows the configuration 
4 of this bumper? 
5 MR. HANSEN: I will object to "better show." I think 
6 we introduced three photographs. Mr. Knight may have the third 
7 one. I have some others back at my office, if you are 
8 interested. But the same thing. Mr. King, do you want 
9 Exhibit Y? 
10 THE WITNESS: How about AA? AA, you can see the 
11 curve. 
12 I Q. Thank you. But when that thing comes in for an inch 
13 or two in the front, then it flattens out, because the curve 
14 isn't very big. 
15 MR. HANSEN: Hasn't this been asked and answered? 
16 THE COURT: Sustained. 
17 MR. KING: I pass that, your Honor, I think I am 
18 about through. 
19 Q. Do you recall testifying in the case of Beck vs. 
20 Lassiter about a year and a half ago? 
21 A. I could probably refresh my memory, but you would 
22 I have to do it. 
23 Q. Do you recall it was a rear-end collision in which 
24 the struck vehicle had $2,000 damage, the rear axle was 
25 displaced forward a few inches, and you testified that the 
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1 impact was four miles an hour? 
2 A. I remember the case. I don't think the facts were 
3 quite what you stated, Mr. King. 
4 I Q. I am asking if you agree or disagree. 
5 MR. HANSEN: I object. Mr. King gave him certain 
6 parameters, and Mr. Knight is saying those parameters are not 
7 what he recalls. 
8 THE COURT: Unless there is some reasonable 
9 relationship between that case and the one today, the Court is 
10 not going to permit the question. It is irrelevant. 
11 MR. KING: Withdraw the question. 
12 Q. Again, you don't know the force, the total force in 
13 miles per hour to bend brackets on the Explorer? 
14 MR. HANSEN: Objection, asked and answered. 
15 MR. KING: Okay. 
16 I THF COURT: It has been. Sustained. 
17 Ixd. KING: No more questions. 
18 THE COURT: Redirect? 
19 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. HANSEN: 
21 I Q. Mr. Knight, after having responded to Mr. King's 
22 questions, have you changed your opinion in any regard 
23 concerning the speed of the vehicles in this accident? 
24 A. I have not. 
25 Q. What is your opinion — have you changed as to your 
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1 confidence in your opinions with regard to the speed of those 
2 vehicles? 
3 A. I have not. 
4 MR. HANSEN: Nothing further. 
5 MR. KING: Nothing further. 
6 THE COURT: Is there any objection to the witness 
7 being excused? 
8 MR. KING: Not at all. 
9 MR. HANSEN: No objection. 
10 THE COURT: You may be excused. Thank you. 
11 MR. HANSEN: The defense rests. 
12 THE COURT: The Court will speak with counsel for a 
13 moment, on the record, out of the presence of the jury. So the 
14 bailiff will take the jury into the jury room, and there is a 
15 question to be resolved out of the presence of the jury. 
16 (The jury left the courtroom.) 
17 THE COURT: The record will reflect that the Court is 
18 in session, out of the presence of the jury. The Court was 
19 notified prior to the defense resting in this case that the 
20 plaintiff intended to call a rebuttal witness to the accident 
21 reconstruction witness called by the defendant. Explain to the 
22 Court the r€*asons why the witness that you seek to call now was 
23 not included in your case in chief. 
24 MR. KING: It is a matter of the shift of the burden 
25 of proof, your Honor. We had the burden of proving there was 
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1 an accident, and resulting from the accident there was an 
2 injury. The defense said they would prove that the impact was 
3 sufficiently low speed, that the injury would probably not have 
4 occurred. They may not have put on that defense depending on 
5 how our case went. Depending on how effectively they put their 
6 case on, we may or may not need the expense of a rebuttal 
7 witness. But we certainly don't need to take the time of the 
8 Court and of the jury with rebuttal witness until they have 
9 carnied their burden of proof by showing they have a serious 
10 challenge to our version of the facts. At that point we called 
11 the rebuttal witness, and that was what the rebuttal witness is 
12 for, and this is the classic use of it. 
13 If I could refer to the case they gave the Court of 
14 Turner vs. Anderson. 
15 THE C0TT2T: The Court has thet case. 
16 MR. KING: In my reading of it, the witness was 
17 offered as a rebuttal witnt,£. . The problem, and the sole 
18 problem in the case was the witness' name had not been given to 
19 the other side in time for them to depose him or find out 
20 anything about him. The fact that he was offered as a 
21 rebutting witness, the Court had no complaint with that. What 
22 they complained about is that the need to call him could have 
23 been anticipated earlier, and the other side given notice 
24 earlier. So inferentially — or else — also, he is an 
25 improper rebuttal witness. They didn't say that. They said 
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you knew the issue. You knew the rebuttal you were going to 
put on. And you didn't give them notice that you had a witness 
to prove it. The function of the rebuttal witness, our burden, 
their burden, rebut, inferentially, it was entirely 
appropriate. So this case supports us, in view of the fact 
they stipulate, gave full and timely notice that we would call, 
possibly, Mr, Lord, a reconstruction expert, and, possibly, 
mr. Hardle, who is a Taurus mechanic and repairman. 
THE COURT: Did you depose Mr, Knight? 
MR. KING: I did not, your Honor. I have dealt with 
him in court before. 
THE COURT: Were you aware of what he was going to 
testify to? 
MR. KING: That he was going to put in the speed 
around three to four miles an hour. 
THE COURT: When did you know that? 
MR. KING: I assumed that he was going to do that, 
because it is what he customarily does. It was confirmed when 
I heard the opening statement. 
THE COURT: Prior to the jury being impaneled, what 
date, in relation to the 6th of February of 1996, did you know 
that Mr. Knight was going to testify for the defense, and when 
his testimony would be? 
MR. KING: It would be around the 1st of January, 
because our letter to them advised Mr. Lord would be our 
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1 rebuttal witness is dated, I think, January 6. 
2 MR. HANSEN: We formally filed on January 2 a 
3 designation of expert witnesses and identifying Newell Knight. 
4 1 MR. KING: That sounds right. 
5 MR. HANSEN: That was on January 2 he was formally 
6 identified. 
7 1 MR. KING: We, within four days, gave the response, 
8 if Newell is going to be here, we are going to call Mr. Lord. 
9 I THE COURT: Is there some reason why you didn't call 
10 him?| 
11 MR. KING: Mr. Lord is here. He is waiting to 
12 testify as my rebuttal witness. 
13 THE COURT: Let the Court reason outloud for a moment 
14 on the record, and then I will invite both counsel to respond. 
15 The Court has been cited by both cr nsel to the case of Turner 
16 vs. "Nelson. It is a Supreme Court case decided March of 1994. 
17 The holding in that case regarding the calling of rebuttal 
18 witnesses centered on whether or not the evidence sought to be 
19 rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to trial. 
20 If ilt could, then the witness should be called in the case in 
21 chief. 
22 MR. KING: No, your Honor, it is not what the case 
23 saidl 
24 THE COURT: Just a moment. Let me reason, and then 
25 you are invited to argue. If the witness — if the testimony 
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that you are seeking to rebut could reasonably have been 
anticipated before trial, put it in, in your case. If you knew 
that the defense in this case was going to be that the accident 
was low speed, is nonimpacting, noninjury causing, it is your 
responsibility, knowing that, to present evidence in your case 
in chief to establish that it was a high accident, high impact, 
and injury causing. That's precisely what the sandwiching of 
the defendant's case involves. If you knew that that was going 
to be an issue in this case, then it is your responsibility to 
present that in your case in chief, not present half of your 
case at the beginning, and the other half at the conclusion of 
the defense case. 
MR. KING: The Court hasn't had a chance to study 
Turner vs. Nelson in detail. 
THE COURT: That'r probably a true statement. You 
realize that you gave me this case while the Court was in 
session, and I have glanced at it as we have ruled on 
objections and listened to the testimony of the witness. But 
at least the paragraph clearly states that if you could 
anticipate certain witnesses to — I mean certain evidence to 
be presented, then why didn't you present evidence to the 
contrary in your case in chief? 
MR. KING: What the case turns on, your Honor, is not 
whether he was rebuttal witness or a direct witness. What the 
case turned on was that he was a surprise witness. 
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THE COURT: No. It was whether or not he was listed. 
That was one of the questions, whether or not he had been 
listed as a witness. 
MR. KING: That was the sole ground for disposition. 
THE COURT: Not so. That clearly is not so. 
MR. KING: Please take a look at page 1024, 
paragraphs 3 and 4. "When the offering party contends that the 
undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut, the issue hinges on 
whether the evidence sought to be rebutted could have 
reasonably been anticipated." 
THE COURT: That•s the Court's point. 
MR. KING: That doesn't put him into the case as a 
witness in chief. 
THE COURT: Read the next paragraph. The next two 
paragraphs, as a matter of fact. The trial court indicated 
that the testimony regarding the obstructed stop sign was not 
new. The plaintiff had known for weeks and months that they 
were contending — 
MR. KING: Indeed — 
THE COURT: Just a moment. I will give you all the 
time to argue. You give me all the time to argue. The trial 
court said you have known from the get-go that there was going 
to be a question about whether or not this stop sign was 
obstructed. Now, you can't, with that knowledge, wait until 
the defense has presented their case, go out the night of 
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1 trial, get a witness, and bring him in and say that the stop 
2 sign was not obstructed. You have known that was going to be 
3 an issue all along. In this case, by your own admission, you 
4 have said that you didn't even bother to depose the 
5 reconstruction witness, because you knew he was going to 
6 testify that the speed of impact was three to four miles an 
7 hour. You can't claim that that was a surprise segment of this 
8 witness1 testimony. And if you have known that, then you 
9 should properly prepare in your case in chief to deal with it. 
10 MR. KING: There isn't a single reference in this 
11 opinion, Nelson vs. Turner to — whether the surprise witness 
12 should have been in the case in chief or rebuttal. That was 
13 not the issue. The issue was that he wasn't given to the other 
14 side. 
15 Now, if I know — J am going to put on my case. 
16 Speed is not a factor. They are going to put on their case 
17 that speed is a biij factor. I rebut that by showing — 
18 THE COURT: Speed has been a factor from the outset 
19 in this case. 
20 MR. KING: This is rebuttal by definition, and it is 
21 the only place in the orderly sequence of the case it should be 
22 put on. I don't have to anticipate their defense until they 
23 put it on. 
24 THE COURT: But it is part of the case in chief. You 
25 are going to show high impact, high speed, and resulting 
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inj\iry, you have to prove it. That's one of the elements of 
MR. KING: I never had to prove high speed. I had to 
prove a collision and an injury. At any rate, if you will 
please read the case again, it is solely because they didn't 
give timely notice until the night of trial that they were 
going *co call this witness, not that he was a rebuttal witness. 
From the defense presented, they could have anticipated they 
would have had to call a rebuttal witness, they did not give 
notice they were going to call the rebuttal witness until the 
start of trial. There was no objection to him being a rebuttal 
witness. The objection was no notice, as the opinion says, so 
he qpuldn't have been deposed or — and so forth. There is not 
a word in the opinion calling him as a rebuttal witness was 
wrorif. You can anticipate a rebuttal witness is needed if the 
othe|r side is going to put on a defense. That's what rebuttal 
is for. What we have to do, if we know we are going to put a 
rebuttal witness in, we have to give them time to prepare. 
I try a case against General Motors, and I say the 
fuel tank was defective. Then they bring in a bunch of 
witnesses that the fuel tank — 
THE COURT: Was not defective? 
MR. KING: They come up with new ideas, new 
approaches to it. Until they have done that, their battery of 
experts, I don't know exactly what to rebut. What I do know is 
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I have to rebut, and I give the name of the expert I am going 
to call to rebut. 
THE COURT: What you do know is it is your 
responsibility to prove a defective fuel tank. You know that 
right from the get-go. So you have to prove it in your case in 
chief. You can't lay back in the bushes and wait until the 
defense has presented its case, and then sandwich the defense 
case in with what should have been presented in your case in 
chief. That's a time-honored principle of the orderly 
presentation of the evidence. 
MR. KING: Okay. When I tried a case of that kind, 
the defense General Motors put in, Ford actually, was the 
people would have died anyway, because the accident was severe. 
They didn't worry about whether the tank was adequate or not. 
When I realized they were coming into this new defense, because 
of the character of the witnesses thev called, and associate 
counsel who had worked with Ford be ove said these guys will 
say these guys would have died anyway, then we put in our 
rebuttal witnesses. We didn't have to prove that in our case 
in chief, but we did have to prove it in our rebuttal. 
Rebuttal is a proper part of trial. 
THE COURT: It is if there is some element of 
surprise. 
MR. KING: It is not the element of surprise. 
THE COURT: That is what this opinion says. 
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MR. KING: It doesn't. It says the whole problem is 
that she knew she needed a rebuttal witness, and so she should 
have told them. When she didn't tell them until the day of 
tridl, she couldn't call the witness. 
THE COURT: Let's read the next paragraph. The trial 
court indicated that the testimony regarding the obstructed 
sigri was not new. It wasn't a surprise. It wasn't something 
that had been injected into the trial during the defense of the 
case. Everybody knew by the pleadings and by discovery and so 
on tfiat that was challenged by the defense, that the sign was 
obstructed. It was not a new factor. And the Court says, 
"Therefore, Nelson's essential defense had always been that the 
sign was obstructed, and although the trial court didn't 
specifically say that Turner could reasonably have anticipated 
that testimony, the tl *ust of the Court's ruling is clear. 
Nelson's evidence was foreseeable." And it is foreseeable here 
that they were going to challenge — 
MR. KING: But there is not a line in here that says 
Nelson wouldn't have been an appropriate rebuttal witness. The 
thing is they didn't give notice of him at all until the third 
day tof trial. The proper sequence in the case is we put on 
ours, they put on theirs, we rebut. Just like debate. Open, 
respond, rebut. 
THE COURT: Perhaps the better analogy is you have 
the burden of proof, and in your case in chief you are well 
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advised to prove what you intend to prove. In this particular 
case, the Court understood that you were going to prove that 
this accident was caused by a 10- to a 15-mile-an-hour impact 
or 15- to 25-mile-an-hour impact, and, because of that, the 
plaintiff sustained injury. You need to prove that. 
MR. KING: I didn't have — I didn't care what speed 
was testified to. When she talked about speed and measurements 
and so forth, I said those are approximations. She 
acknowledged that. She said it was at least ten miles an hour. 
But ten miles was not vital to our case. 
THE COURT: It is three times the amount of the 
anticipated testimony of the defense expert. You said that you 
have known all along he was going to estimate this speed at 
three to four miles an hour, even if you went at ten miles an 
hour. 
MR. KING: Supposing they decided not to call 
Mr. Knight. 
THE COURT: It would have been a plus for you, 
probably. 
MR. KING: Possibly. But the thing is I don't have 
to put on testimony that speed is a factor in the injury until 
they put on testimony that it is not. 
THE COURT: I don't think — this Court has never 
operated on that basis. Having tried over 200 jury trials in a 
criminal arena, it would be highly imprudent for a prosecutor 
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to p'resent evidence that somebody was shot, and not put any 
evidence in until the gun — about the gun until rebuttal, 
hoping that somebody is going to challenge the shooting. 
MR. KING: I agree with that entirely. It is this is 
a totally different concept. 
THE COURT: It is, but the principle is the same. 
MR. KING: It is not, because in a criminal defense 
they don't have to put on a defense at all, and you are 
obligated to advise them of everything you have. 
THE COURT: You don't have to put anything on in a 
civil defense. They could have rested at the conclusion of 
your case, sent it to the jury, and let the jury do what they 
want to. 
MR. KING: They might have come up with 15 other 
th^oi ies. 
THE COURT: What they might have done and what they 
in fact did \ are worlds apart, and the Court is of the 
opinion that you simply cannot sandwich the defense with 
testimony that you have known and anticipated right from the 
beginning, and hope to maybe get the last word in. I don't 
know what it is, 
MR. KING: I didn't know what to have Mr. Lord say 
until I heard exactly what Mr. Knight said and exactly the 
bases that he used. I couldn't use Mr. Lord in advance. 
THE COURT: Proffer what this witness is going to 
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1 testify to. 
2 MR. KING: The essential thing I am going to have 
3 Mr. Lord work on is something I couldn't anticipate Mr. Knight 
4 would say. Mr. Knight said that the body of the woman in the 
5 striking car was less exposed to harm, or more exposed to harm, 
6 than the body of the person in the struck car. 
7 THE COURT: Do you want him to testify to that? 
8 MR. KING: I didn't know he was — Mr. Lord will 
9 testify that when your head moves back a few inches, this can 
10 cause substantial damage, based on a tremendous amount of 
11 experience he has. 
12 THE COURT: If that's what you are going to call your 
13 rebuttal witness for, I will permit you. You have won the 
14 argument. If you are going to call this witness and say that 
15 you couldn't reasonably anticipate that, because the driver of 
16 the striking car was leaning into the passenger's seat, and, 
17 therefore, was more vulnerable to injury than the driver of the 
18 car that was struck, you can call the witness and testify to 
19 that. What else? 
20 MR. KING: Just on the same line, he said the person 
21 in the car struck, being in the seat, would not be injured. So 
22 when I cover that topic, vulnerability to injury being struck. 
23 MR. HANSEN: I think that's going to open the whole 
24 flood gates, if I may respond very briefly. 
25 THE COURT: Go ahead. You had no opportunity. Take 
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what time you like and respond. 
MR. HANSEN: Having been counsel for Plaintiff in 
Turner vs. Nelson — 
THE COURT: Were you on the winning or losing side of 
thatj? 
MR. HANSEN: I was on the side that tried to present 
the new witness. I was on the losing side. We briefed this 
before the Supreme Court. So I well know the arguments and the 
positions of the parties and the underlying facts. Let me 
indicate that I think the Court's reading of Turner vs. Nelson 
is exactly correct, even though the Court hasn't had a lot of 
time to look at that case. And there are some similarities 
that, are extremely striking here. 
And one is the fact that as the Court has said, the 
critical issue is whether or not they could reasonably 
anticipate the issue to be raised at trial. We tried to claim 
surprise in Turner vs. Nelsc*. , saying there was certain 
testimony that came out in opening statement, that we didn't 
anticipate, so we went and found this new witness. And the 
Court said, "Wait a minute. The issue of obstructed stop sign 
was known from the time the complaint was answered, and it was 
denied, and the time the defendant's deposition was taken." 
Same thing in this case. May of 1995. Our defendant is 
deposed, and she says, "This was a rolling accident. This was 
not 4 high-speed collision." The dispute was before them. 
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They never sent discovery requests to the defendant. 
When we identified Newell Knight, they didn't ask, in formal 
discovery, what will Mr. Newell Knight testify to? They never 
asked to take his deposition. And in that Turner vs. Nelson 
case, on page 1025, the Supreme Court chided Plaintiff's 
counsel, stating that they did not take the depositions that 
they properly should have taken. In fact, the record suggests, 
if Turner failed to appreciate the extent of Nelson's reliance 
on this defense, it was probably because of Turner's earlier 
failure to depose adequately several witnesses. Nelson's 
counsel had listed certain witnesses on their designation of 
witnesses, cind had made them available for deposition. Turner, 
the plaintiff, took no attempt to depose the expert or, as far 
as we can tell from the record, determine through written 
interrogatories the content of that testimony. 
That's what Plaintiff has done here, and I don't 
think they should be allowed to now come in and put on their 
prima facie case in rebuttal, when it could have been 
reasonably anticipated, and should have been. 
THE COURT: Someplace in law school and thereafter 
the Court learned that rebuttal testimony was testimony to 
rebut a surprise witness, a surprise element of the case. I 
don't know if there is any sound argument to the contrary. Why 
would it be rebuttal if the element of surprise is not there, 
if you can anticipate, reasonably anticipate, and in your case 
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1 knoW for a certainty that the speed was going to be challenged 
2 in this case, and that the resulting injury was going to be 
3 challenged, why not present that in your case in chief? I just 
4 can'lt think of one good reason why. 
5 MR. KING: Mr. Knight came up — Mr. Knight is not my 
6 favorite. 
7 I THE COURT: Aside from that, you knew what he was 
8 going to say. Or if you didn't, you reasonably could 
9 anticipate. 
10 MR. KING: I made the comment for a reason, and the 
11 reason is that I think Mr. Knight is one of these people, and 
12 this is just my opinion of him, that will say what he has to 
13 say in order to get where he wants to go. 
14 THE COURT: You are entitled to your opinion on that. 
15 MR. KING: It makes it imj^nible for me to 
16 anticipate what Newell is going to say until ho has said it, 
17 because I haven't found he bases his testimony on scientific 
18 data, but on what's going to work for a given problem. I could 
19 not anticipate exactly what he is going to say until he said 
20 it, even though I know the generalities of it. For example, he 
21 also testified that the bumper would have been deformed if it 
22 had t?een hit over a few miles an hour, and it would have been 
23 tornj 
24 Now, on the other witness we have, Mr. Hardle, that's 
25 total surprise, is out in the hall with the Taurus bumper 
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that's not damaged a bit, and it was in a much higher speed 
impact, which would show that Mr. Knight's testimony on that 
area is in error, and that was total surprise we couldn't 
anticipate. Again, surprise is not the element of purpose of 
rebuttal. Purpose of rebuttal is we put on our case in chief, 
they put on their case, then we rebut their case. Supprise is 
not a factor. 
THE COURT: Are you saying that everything that they 
have testified to in the defense you have the right to rebut? 
MR. KING: I wouldn't — 
THE COURT: Then where does surrebuttal come in? 
MR. KING: On occasion it comes up. 
THE COURT: Where does the process start and end? 
And in this case, if the Court was of the opinion that this 
witness caught you off guard, that this witness said something 
that you totally had not expected he was going to say, or that 
just came out of the blue, the proverbial blue, and struck you, 
a rebuttal witness is appropriate. But you have represented to 
the Court that you knew exactly he was going to testify to a 
low-impact collision, very low speed, and, in his opinion, 
there would not be any significant injury. 
MR. KING: Right. He did testify in those areas. 
When he went further and said, had there been any more speed, 
the Taurus bumper would be permanently deformed, and when he 
said the position plaintiff was in, in her vehicle, she would 
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not be hurt, because she was protected, these were new areas we 
didn't anticipate. Mr. Lord can handle the injury and 
Mr. Hardle can handle the bumper. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. HANSEN: We will submit it. 
THE COURT: The Court finds and rules as follows: 
The plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known and 
anticipated that the defense was going to challenge the 
testimony of the plaintiff. The knowledge is based on the 
photographs of both vehicles, the back bumper of the 
plaintifffs vehicle, the front bumper of the defendant's 
vehicle. The photograph is based on the absence of skid 
marks — or the findings, rather, are based on the absence of 
skid marks, the findings are based on the absence of any 
significant movement of the plaintiff's vehicle after ^he 
striking, and the findings are based on the lack of any injury 
to the driver of the striking car. 
It defies reason that any of that testimony would 
come as a surprise to the plaintiff. It was known or 
reasonably could have been known. It was anticipated. It was 
not a surprise. And it is a requirement that the burden of 
proof be met showing that the accident, as it was alleged by 
the plaintiff, occurred from a high-speed collision, that is 10 
or 15 or 20 miles an hour, that substantial damage would have 
been caused, and that resulting injury could have occurred. 
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And the Court finds that it is not appropriate, when those 
matters are part of the plaintiff's case in chief, and do not 
come as a surprise in any way, to the plaintiff, that it is 
inappropriate to sandwich the defendant's case with the 
plaintiff's case on matters that could and should have been 
presented in the case in chief. 
Therefore, based on the proffers made by Plaintiff's 
counsel, on what rebuttal witnesses will testify to, if called, 
the motion to deny those witnesses testifying as rebuttal 
witnesses is granted. 
MR. KING: Your Honor, I understand the ruling in 
general, but the surprise elements that Mr. Knight said the 
bumper would deform, that we could not anticipate, and Mr. 
Hardle is here with the bumper. May I call him on that 
specific point? I can call Mr. Lord on the specific point of 
where you are in the passenger seat, as the car gains momentum 
underneath you, it exaggerates the motion to the head, and this 
makes you very prone to injury. 
MR. HANSEN: I think Plaintiff is trying to reargue 
his motion. 
THE COURT: Counsel for the defendant will prepare 
very specific findings on this motion in limine, and an 
accompanying order, and at some time in the next two to three 
weeks submit the findings to opposing counsel for approval as 
to form, and the findings and the order to the Court for 
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1 signature, so the record is clear. And if somebody wants to 
2 challenge the Court's finding, that's why we have an appellate 
3 court. 
4 1 MR. KING: If the record may show ray exceptions to 
5 the ruling of the Court, with the -- we have no rebuttal. Has 
6 Defendant rested? 
7 1 MR. FELT: Yes. 
8 I THE COURT: Yes, the defense rested, and that's when 
9 the Court excused the jury, and then we had the motion in 
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